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ABSTRACT 
 
The recent years have shown an increasing number of inter-linkages across countries. This surely is a 
result of what is called the integration phenomenon. Looking at the financial side, stock and bond 
markets have become more intertwined across countries leading to a simplification of trade in securities 
and goods. Banking sectors across borders on the other hand have come to be more unified, allowing 
countries to increase the number of operations further boosting trade and helping promote domestic 
growth and development. To this end my dissertation has studied the recent phenomenon of financial 
integration and its effect on economic growth and financial development. Moreover it examined the 
impact of the most recent measures taken at the European level that are established to promote greater 
integration and harmonization. 
 
The first chapter of the dissertation, “Financial Openness and Financial Development: An Analysis Using 
Indices” studies the link between financial openness and financial development through panel data 
analysis on advanced and emerging market countries. Using indices, financial openness together with 
institutional, educational and macroeconomic variables is shown to explain a large part of the variation 
in financial development across countries and over time. The analysis demonstrates that different 
indexing strategies could serve in finding better measures in terms of significances for financial 
openness and financial development in comparison to the individual indicators used in the literature. 
Principal component type financial openness index conveys a positive effect on financial development 
independent from the lag structure chosen, time dummies and trends used.  
 
The second chapter of the dissertation, “Financial Harmonization and Industrial Growth: Evidence from 
Europe” analyzes the growth effects of the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) of the European 
Commission, a set of measures and directives that aim to harmonize European financial markets. Using a 
panel of 25 countries and 30 industries, the standard specification predicts harmonization to lower 
growth, though the negative effect is mitigated for industries that depend more on external finance. This 
seemingly surprising result however occurs as a result of omitted variable bias. As in any policy 
implementation, early adopters are more likely to bear higher costs and experience less of the benefits of 
harmonization. Controlling for the relative timing of adoption, harmonization is then shown to have a 
positive effect on growth. This finding is robust to including further controls, splitting up the sample into 
different groups of countries, and extending the model to a dynamic setting. 
 
The third and the last chapter of the dissertation, “Financial Harmonization and Financial Development: 
An Application of Europe’s Financial Services Action Plan” examines the Financial Services Action Plan 
(FSAP) of the European Commission which intends to create an open, secure, integrated financial market 
across EU member countries. Although recent research has shown a positive impact of the FSAP directives 
on cross-border lending and industrial growth the effect on financial development remains to be 
examined. Using principal component analysis to construct financial, banking sector, bond and stock 
market development indices, this paper investigates the impact of financial harmonization policies of the 
FSAP on financial development in a panel of twenty five EU member states for the period of 1996 – 2007. 
Taking into account the timing perspective in implementing the FSAP directives across countries financial 
harmonization is found to positively affect financial development. The results are shown to be robust to 
different approaches in constructing the harmonization index and the harmonization difference (relative 
timing of adoption) variable, adding further controls, and extending the analysis to include the data for 
the recent period. 
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                                                      RESUMEN 
 
En los últimos años hemos presenciado un incremento en el número de vínculos entre los países. Esto 
sin duda es un resultado de lo que se denomina fenómeno de integración. Mirando el lado financiero, 
los mercados de acciones y bonos se han entrelazadas más entre los países, llevando a una 
simplificación del comercio de valores y mercancías. Los sectores bancarios a través de fronteras, por 
otra parte han llegado a estar más unificados, lo que permite a los países a aumentar el número de 
operaciones para impulsar aún más el comercio y ayudar a promover el crecimiento interno y el 
desarrollo. Con este propósito, mi tesis estudia el fenómeno reciente de la integración financiera y su 
efecto sobre el crecimiento económico y el desarrollo financiero. Además se analiza el impacto de las 
medidas más recientes adoptadas a nivel europeo que se establecieron para promover una mayor 
integración y armonización. 
 
El primer capítulo de la tesis, "Apertura Financiera y Desarrollo Económico: un Análisis utilizando 
Índices" estudia la relación entre la apertura financiera y el desarrollo económico mediante un análisis 
de datos de panel de países avanzados y países emergentes. Utilizando los índices, se muestra que la 
apertura financiera, junto con variables institucionales, educativas y macroeconómicas explica una gran 
parte de la variación en el desarrollo financiero entre los países ya lo largo del tiempo. El análisis 
demuestra que las diferentes estrategias de indización podrían ser útiles en la búsqueda de mejores 
medidas en términos de significatividad para la apertura financiera y el desarrollo financiero en 
comparación con los indicadores individuales utilizados en la literatura. Los índices de apertura 
financiera de componentes principales transmiten un efecto positivo en el desarrollo financiero 
independiente de la estructura de retardos elegida, dummies temporales y tendencias utilizadas. 
 
El segundo capítulo de la tesis, "Armonización financiera y Crecimiento Industrial: Evidencia de Europa" 
analiza los efectos de crecimiento del Plan de Acción de Servicios Financieros (SFAP) de la Comisión 
Europea, un conjunto de medidas y directivas dirigidas a armonizar los mercados financieros europeos. 
Utilizando un panel de 25 países y 30 industrias, la especificación estándar predice la armonización a 
menor crecimiento, aunque el efecto negativo se ve mitigado por las industrias que dependen más de la 
financiación externa. Este aparentemente sorprendente resultado, sin embargo, se produce como 
resultado del sesgo de variables omitidas. Como en cualquier aplicación de políticas, los primeros 
usuarios son más propensos a enfrentar mayores costes y experimentar menores beneficios de 
armonización. Controlando por el tiempo de adopción, la armonización muestra entonces tener un 
efecto positivo en el crecimiento. Este hallazgo es robusto a la inclusión de nuevos controles, dividiendo 
la muestra en diferentes grupos de países, y extendiendo el modelo a un entorno dinámico. 
 
El tercer y último capítulo de la tesis, "Armonización Financiera y Desarrollo Económico: Una Aplicación 
del Plan de Acción de Servicios Financieros Europeo", analiza el Plan de Acción de Servicios Financieros 
(SFAP) de la Comisión Europea, que pretende crear un mercado financiero integrado, abierto y seguro 
para los países miembros de la UE. Aunque la investigación reciente ha demostrado un impacto positivo 
de las directivas del SFAP en los préstamos transfronterizos y el crecimiento industrial, queda por 
examinar el efecto sobre el desarrollo financiero. Mediante el análisis de componentes principales para 
la construcción de los índices de desarrollo de los mercados financieros, el sector bancario, y los 
mercados de bonos y acciones, este trabajo investiga el impacto de las políticas de armonización 
financieros de la SFAP en el desarrollo financiero de un grupo de veinticinco Estados miembros de la UE 
para el período de 1996 a 2007. Teniendo en cuenta la perspectiva de los tiempos de implementación 
de las directivas del SFAP en los países, se concluye que la armonización financiera influye positivamente 
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en el desarrollo financiero. Los resultados se muestran robustos a diferentes enfoques en la 
construcción del índice de armonización y la diferencia de armonización (tiempo relativo de adopción), a 
la adición de más controles, y a la extensión del análisis para la inclusión de los datos para el período 
más reciente. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
Financial Openness and Financial Development: An Analysis 
Using Indices 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines the link between financial openness and financial development through 
panel data analysis on advanced and emerging market countries. Using indices, we show that 
financial openness together with institutional, educational and macroeconomic variables can 
explain a large part of the variation in financial development across countries and over time. 
Our analysis demonstrates that different indexing strategies could serve in finding better 
measures in terms of significances for financial openness and financial development in 
comparison to the individual indicators used in the literature. Principal component type 
financial openness index conveys a positive effect on financial development independent from 
the lag structure chosen, time dummies and trends used.  
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1.1 Introduction 
 
In the wake of the recent financial crisis, the role of financial development in emerging markets and 
developed countries has gained further interest among researchers. Financial development, the channel for 
increasing the efficiency of financial markets and resources and improving on the overall importance of the 
financial system, has become one of the main elements that influences economic growth and welfare 
(Huang, 2006). 
 
Although the role of financial development on economic growth is newly recognized, a wide spread debate 
on the effects of financial liberalization on growth and financial development is ongoing. Studies have shown 
that financial liberalization through alleviation of capital controls and deregulation of financial markets can 
endorse economic growth and enhance welfare by creating opportunities for a better and more efficient 
allocation of resources and by portfolio and risk diversification under appropriate controls, frameworks and 
regulatory apparatus (Aziakpono, 2007; Chinn and Ito, 2006).  
 
The literature provides a broad examination of financial liberalization and economic growth, nevertheless, 
the link between financial liberalization and financial development has been overlooked. A proper analysis 
of this link will help clarify the ambiguity in the relationship between financial liberalization and economic 
growth. Our paper, by this means, examines the effects of financial openness, the most prominent measure 
of financial liberalization, and financial development through a panel study of developed and emerging 
market countries. Using indices we show that financial openness together with institutional, educational and 
macroeconomic variables can explain a large part of the variation in financial development across countries 
and over time. Principal component type indices provide better results in terms of economic and statistical 
significances. The robustness checks and the heterogeneity analysis convey that findings are robust to 
different lag structures, time dummies and trends, specifications and reductions in the sample size. A 
graphical examination of our results reveals that the indices correspond to economical and political events 
that occured during the period of our sample. 
 
The small strand of literature attempts to answer the question regarding the effects of trade and capital 
account openness on financial development. Chinn and Ito (2002) and (2006), Ito (2006), Baltagi, 
Demetriades and Law (2007), Demetriades and Law (2006), Demetriades and Andrianova (2005) and Huang 
(2006) show that financial liberalization (capital account openness in most cases) contributes to financial 
development in equity and stock markets for both less developed and emerging market countries. There 
are, however, three main issues in examining the link between financial openness and financial 
development. Firstly, the choice of indicators has been a topic of concern. Studies lack a comprehensive 
indicator that can bring together all features of financial development; the banking system, the stock and 
the bond markets. With different measures used for financial openness and for financial development, the 
results obtained seem unconvincing. Another concern is that the results from various studies become hardly 
comparable due to the particular choice of individual measures and due to the country and time coverage 
selected for the study. Constructing better financial openness and financial development indices will help 
resolve problems associated with particular choice of measures. Secondly, the number of countries included 
in most studies is limited. Due to the lack of data for many less developed and some emerging market 
countries, most studies use developed countries in their estimations, which highly influence the results. 
Lastly, what seems to be a minor issue, which in reality can affect almost all findings, is the choice of control 
variables. The literature shows that the choice of control variables can influence the link between financial 
openness and financial development. Correct specification of control variables can lead to a better 
examination of these concepts. 
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Compared to the existing literature we contribute in three aspects. First, we give a view on different indices 
for financial openness and financial development straining away from choosing individual variables which 
we believe do not fully represent the aspects of financial openness and financial development. Second, we 
examine the simultaneity hypothesis of opening financial and goods markets with indices. Lastly we 
explicitly study one of the main problems of panel data models; heterogeneity issues. We complement 
Huang’s (2006) work by suggesting additional principal components type indices for financial openness and 
financial development and by offering a first-time comparison among different types of indices used in the 
analysis. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce the data. Section 3 describes the 
construction of aggregate indices of financial openness and financial development. Section 4 provides a 
discussion of the empirical model. Section 5 reports our estimation results. Section 6 discusses the 
robustness checks and further issues related to our sample. Section 7 concludes. 
 
1.2 Data 
 
The analysis is based on annual data for 61 developing and advanced countries, over a 12 year period of 
1996 - 2007. The data are obtained primarily from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine’s database on Financial 
Development and Structure (referred as BDL from onwards), the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (WDI), Worldwide Governance Indicators, and Edstats which extracts data from the UNESCO 
Institute for Statistics.  
 
1.2.1 Financial Openness Indicators  
 
Financial openness is measured with foreign direct investment (% of GDP), portfolio investment flows (% of 
GDP), and international debt issues (% of GDP).  
 
 Foreign direct investment, is the sum of net inflows and outflows of foreign direct investment recorded as a 
percentage of GDP. This indicator adds up equity capital, reinvestment of earnings and other short- and 
long-term capital (World Bank, 2007). Portfolio investment flows (% of GDP), is the sum of portfolio debt 
flows (private and publicly guaranteed and private nonguaranteed bond issues purchased by foreign 
investors) and non-debt-creating portfolio equity flows.1 International debt issues (% of GDP) measures “the 
net flow of international bond issues relative to a country’s economic activity.”(Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 
2009, 15).2 
 
As summarized by Kose et.al (2006) financial openness indicators are divided into two mainstream 
measures; de jure measures which depend on the removal of legal restrictions and controls on cross-border 
capital flows, and on prices, quantities and foreign equity holdings and de facto measures which observe 
countries’ actual integration into the world capital and financial markets through flow variables. De jure 
measures such as the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) 
typically illustrate the number of years for which a country’s capital accounts have been open and free from 
                                                          
1 Non-debt-creating portfolio equity flows are defined as the sum of country funds, depository receipts, and direct 
purchases of shares by foreign investors (World Bank, 2007). 
2 The literature suggests the use of gross foreign direct investment, gross private capital flows, and some independent 
indices as measures of financial openness. Gross private capital flows are excluded from our analysis and are replaced 
by portfolio investment flows due to their discontinuity by the World Bank. 
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restrictions and controls. The AREAER measure, Chinn and Ito’s (2005) capital openness measure, Quinn’s 
capital account openness index (1997, 2003), Mody and Murshid’s (2005) and Edwards’ (2005) measures on 
capital and current account restrictions are based on narrative, discrete 0-1 type variables that demonstrate 
openness or closedness of capital accounts (Bussiere and Fratzscher, 2004). De jure measures have long 
been accused of not fully reflecting the degree of financial or capital account openness due to their reliance 
on the removal of restrictions associated with foreign exchange transactions (Kose, Prasad, Rogoff and Wei, 
2006). Although they aim to measure financial globalization in terms of openness of capital and financial 
markets, they do not represent the extent of integration into the global markets. Alternatively, de facto 
measures which are grouped into price differential and quantity based indicators focus on legal restrictions 
and capital flows. However, due to the difficulty in interpreting and utilizing price differential based de facto 
measures, quantity based indicators of financial openness are more frequently used. Although quantity 
based de facto measures such as gross capital flows may cause measurement errors and create difficulty in 
overcoming endogenity and causality issues, they remain to be the superior measure of financial integration 
(Kose, Prasad, Rogoff and Wei, 2006). For all of the above reasons, we restrain from using discrete de jure 
type measures and prefer to use stock and flow variables to measure financial openness.3  
 
1.2.2 Financial Development Indicators 
 
Financial development indicators consist of banking system, stock market and bond market measures. 
Below we discuss each group of measures in detail. 
 
We use five indicators to measure the development of the banking sector. These variables are liquid 
liabilities (% of GDP), private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions (% of GDP), the 
ratio of deposit money bank assets to the sum of deposit money bank assets and central bank assets (in 
percentages), total bank assets (% of GDP), and domestic credit provided by the banking sector (% of GDP). 
The annual data is obtained from the Financial Development and Structure database by BDL and the World 
Bank’s WDI.  
 
a) Banking sector development indicators: 
 
Liquid liabilities (% of GDP) equals the ratio of liquid liabilities of bank and nonbank financial intermediaries 
to GDP (Demirguc-Kunt, Levine, 2001). This variable is commonly used as a measure of financial sector 
development and is a typical measure of financial depth.  
 
Private credit by deposit money banks and other institutions (% of GDP) is an indicator for the overall 
development in private banking markets (Chinn and Ito, 2006). This variable includes financial resources 
provided to the private sector by deposit money banks and other financial institutions. It measures the 
credit provided to the private sector.  
 
The ratio of deposit money bank assets to the sum of deposit money bank assets and central bank assets (in 
percentages) is used to demonstrate the weight of deposit money bank assets among total assets. It reflects 
the importance of private lending compared to total lending (Huang, 2006).  
 
Total bank assets (% of GDP) is used as a measure of financial depth. It is used to represent the overall size 
of the banking sector. 
                                                          
3 We only report the results for one of the most popular de jure type indices, the Chinn and Ito index of capital 
openness for comparison reasons. We believe that these results guide in demonstrating the strength of our de facto 
type financial openness index in comparison to the individual de facto measures by the literature. 
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Domestic credit provided by the banking sector (% of GDP) includes credit extended to the private sector and 
general government, to the nonfinancial public sector in the form of investments in short- and long-term 
government securities, to banking and nonbank institutions and includes loans to state enterprises but 
excludes credit to the central government (World Bank, 2007). It is a measure of banking sector depth and 
financial sector development in terms of size (World Bank, 2007). 
 
The variables for banking sector development correspond to those used in the literature. We believe that a 
wide range of different variables will help capture all aspects of banking sector development.  
 
b) Stock market development indicators: 
 
Three different variables are used to measure development in stock markets. These variables are stock 
market capitalization (% of GDP), stock market turnover ratio (in percentages), and stock market total value 
traded (% of GDP). The data listed below is annual and is extracted from the Financial Development and 
Structure database of BDL. 
 
Stock market capitalization (% of GDP) is equal to the value of listed shares divided by GDP. It is an indicator 
of the size of the stock market.  Stock market turnover ratio (in percentages) is used as the efficiency 
indicator of stock markets (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2001). It is classified as the ratio of the value of total 
shares traded to stock market capitalization. Stock market total value traded (% of GDP) is equal to the total 
shares traded on the stock market exchange divided by GDP. This indicator measures the activity or liquidity 
of the stock markets (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2001). 
 
Stock market development indicators used correspond to the ones found in the literature. We believe that 
these three variables will summarize all prospects of stock market development. 
 
c) Bond market development indicators: 
 
Private bond market capitalization (% of GDP) and public bond market capitalization (% of GDP) are the two 
indicators used to measure bond market development.  Data is reported annually from the Financial 
Development and Structure database of BDL. 
 
Private bond market capitalization (% of GDP) is equal to the total amount of outstanding domestic debt 
securities issued by financial institutions and corporations as a share of GDP.  Public bond market 
capitalization (% of GDP) is equal to the total amount of public domestic securities issued by governments as 
a share of GDP. Both of these indicators are used to determine the efficiency of bond markets.  
 
Bond market development indicators have not been previously used in the literature on financial openness 
and financial development. Even though they have been employed extensively in the equity market 
development literature, due to their short period of availability they have not been used as indicators for 
financial development. In our analysis we propose using the bond market development indicators in order 
to capture the efficiency and the effectiveness of bond markets on the overall level of financial 
development. 
 
1.2.3 Control Variables 
 
To examine the effect of financial openness on financial development we introduce a broad range of control 
variables. These variables allow for analyzing the true impact of financial openness on financial 
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development. The control variables include GDP per capita, trade openness, secondary school enrollment 
rate, and legal and institutional variables. The data come from the World Bank’s WDI and the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators, and Edstats. We summarize the control variables below. 
 
Logarithm of GDP per capita (in constant 2000 US dollars) is used as a measure for economic performance 
among countries. We employ this measure to control for the demand of finance and to monitor the 
differences in performances and productivities across countries.4 
 
Trade openness (% of GDP) measured by the sum of imports and exports of goods and services is used to 
determine whether trade liberalization is a precondition for financial liberalization. Controlling for trade 
openness allows examining the direct effects of financial liberalization on financial development. 
 
Secondary school gross enrolment rate (% of population) is used as an indicator that controls for differences 
in educational attainment across countries. We consider this measure as an important reason for why we 
observe disparities across countries in their levels of financial development. Even though an educational 
attainment indicator has not been used previously as a control variable in the financial openness and 
financial development literature, we believe that its inclusion can alter our findings. If wide educational gaps 
which are observed between developed, and less developed countries affect the link between financial 
openness and financial development, then the exclusion of such a variable would certainly introduce a 
measurement bias. Following the examples of the educational attainment indicators from the economic 
growth literature we use secondary school gross enrollment rate as a control for educational attainment. 
 
Lastly we employ four legal and institutional measures to control for institutional, legal, political and 
economic factors that may affect the overall level of financial development. These indicators are 
constructed using subjective, perceptions-based data that reflect views of respondents, agencies and 
organizations. We use government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control corruption as 
measures of legal and institutional quality. These variables do not fluctuate widely across time and are 
measured in a range from -2.5 to 2.5 where higher values correspond to better governance outcomes.5 
Given that our analysis is based on panel data specifications that vary across time, the use of almost time-
invariant control variables may constitute a main drawback. However, as Chinn and Ito (2006) explain, the 
inclusion of these time-invariant factors do not pose a substantial problem for our analysis since the 
characteristics of the institutional quality variables are likely to change very slowly (Chinn and Ito, 2006). On 
this note, due to the relatively small fluctuation structure of these indicators, we take averages of two 
consecutive years to replace the missing years’ data in the Worldwide Governance Indicators database for 
four legal/institutional quality variables. 
 
1.3 Aggregate Indices  
 
By aggregating different measures of financial openness and financial development into a single index we 
summarize the comprehensive nature of the financial sector. We describe four different indexing techniques 
below.  
 
                                                          
4 Chinn and Ito (2006) argue that logarithm of GDP per capita is important in accentuating the link between financial 
deepening and rising income levels. 
5 Please refer to the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) dataset. 1996 – 2009. World Bank. 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/resources.htm 
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1.3.1 Equally weighted indices 
 
We construct equally weighted indices for financial openness, banking sector, bond and stock market, and 
overall financial development as well as for institutional quality. The biggest concern with equally weighted 
indicators is that the weight structure may over-or-underestimate the importance of such measures which 
could potentially bias our results.  In order to avoid this possibility we construct indices using other 
approaches. 
 
1.3.2 Coefficient of variation type indices 
 
The second methodology uses the coefficient of variation approach.6 The weights for financial openness, 
financial development, and institutional quality are calculated using the coefficient of variation for each 
variable and the sum of all coefficients of variation for all variables to be used in the index. Weights 
following this method are constructed as follows: 
𝑤𝑖 =
𝑐𝑣𝑖
𝑠𝑐𝑣
 
 where 𝑠𝑐𝑣 is the sum of all coefficients of variations for variables, and 𝑐𝑣𝑖  is the coefficient of variation for 
each variable i, and is calculated as: 
𝑐𝑣𝑖 =
𝜎𝑖
𝜇𝑖
 
 
𝜇𝑖  and 𝜎𝑖 in the above equation represent the mean and standard deviations of each variable i. 
This procedure allows for weighing each variable differently in the financial openness, financial development 
and institutional quality indices. It thereby helps avoid the potential bias that may occur when using equal 
weights. 
 
We can construct an index for financial openness as: 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖
3
𝑖=1
(𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠)𝑖,𝑡 
 
where 𝑤𝑖 is the relative weight of each variable in the financial openness index and 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑖 denotes each of 
the measures used for constructing the financial openness index. 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑖 represents foreign direct 
investment (% of GDP), international debt issues (% of GDP) and portfolio investment flows (% of GDP). 
Similarly, banking sector, bond and stock market and financial development, and institutional quality indices 
are constructed as weighted averages of the corresponding variables using the above methodology. 
 
1.3.3 Principal component analysis for creating indices 
 
Principal components analysis in its simplest form involves a mathematical procedure that helps transform a 
number of possibly correlated variables into a smaller number of uncorrelated ones. Principal components 
has two main objectives; reducing the dimensionality of the data set, and identifying new meaningful 
variables.7  
                                                          
6 For more information please refer to: Ullah, Aman, and Davide E. A Giles. 1998. Handbook of Applied Economic 
Statistics, N.Y: Marcel Dekker, Inc. and Sheret, Michael. 1984.  “The Coefficient of Variation: Weighting 
Considerations.” Social Indicators Research, 15 (3):289 - 295 
7 For a more in depth discussion of the principal component analysis please refer to Jackson (1991), Dunteman (1989) 
and Jolliffe (2002). 
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Our dataset contains a large number of variables which summarize the information for both financial 
openness and financial development. This method has been shown to be more efficient in establishing 
optimal weights of variables in comparison to other methods where variables are given equal or subjective 
weights.  
The theory behind the principal components analysis is as follows: 
Suppose that y1 is a principal component of x1, x2, x3, …, xp such that: 
𝑦1 = 𝑎11𝑥1 + 𝑎12𝑥2 + ⋯ + 𝑎1𝑝𝑥𝑝 = ∑ 𝑎1𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
𝑥𝑖 
 
Then the variance of y1 is maximized given the constraint that the sum of the squared weights of x1, x2, x3, 
…,xp is equal to one (Hatcher, 1994). That is: 
∑ 𝑎1𝑖
2
𝑝
𝑖=1
= 1 
 
The random variables, xi are standardized scores or deviations from the mean scores (Hatcher, 1994).8 Using 
principal component analysis we find the optimal weight vector (a11, a12, …, a1p) and the associated variance 
of y1, λ1 (Hatcher, 1994). Similarly for the second principal component, y2, we follow the same procedure of 
finding a second weight vector, (a21, a22, … , a2p) such that the variance of : 
𝑦2 = 𝑎21𝑥1 + 𝑎22𝑥2 + ⋯ + 𝑎2𝑝𝑥𝑝 = ∑ 𝑎2𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
𝑥𝑖 
is uncorrelated with the first principal component and  
∑ 𝑎2𝑖
2
𝑝
𝑖=1
= 1 
 
This shows that y2 has the next largest sum of squared correlations with the original variables. The variances 
of the principal components thereby become smaller as we extract successive principal components from 
our model (Hatcher, 1994).9 One major problem using principal component analysis is to decide how many 
components to retain. Four different criterions are suggested in the literature; eigenvalue-one criterion, the 
scree test, proportion of the variance accounted for by each component, and the interpretability criteria.  In 
this analysis we use the first component which accounts for the maximal amount of variance among the 
observed variables (Hatcher, 1994). However, in order to avoid particular bias, we suggest a different 
principal component method that relies on information from all components. 
 
We construct principal components indices for financial openness, financial development and institutional 
quality. For financial development we construct three sub-indices; the banking sector development index, 
the stock market development index and the bond market development index.  
 
 
                                                          
8 A score is “a linear composite of the optimally-weighted observed variables.” (Hatcher, 1994, 11). We use 
standardized scores or deviations of the observed variables from their means in order to attain observations with zero 
mean and unit variance in each column. 
9 The variable weights for a particular principal component are used in interpreting the principal component factor, and 
the magnitude of the variances calculated for principal components depicts how well the variables account for the 
variability of the data (Hatcher, 1994). 
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(a) First score principal component índices 
 
To construct our principal component type indices using the first approach we score the first principal 
component of three individual measures of financial openness. Similarly the indices of financial 
development will be determined by the first principal component of a total of 10 variables. We construct 
first principal component indices for banking sector, stock and bond market development. Institutional 
quality index is constructed using the first score of the four variables; government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, rule of law and control of corruption. 
 
(b) Principal components indices that account for information from all components 
 
We utilize an additional principal component index that takes into account all possible components. By 
doing so, we do not discard any information that could potentially affect our estimations. 
This principal component index proposed by Bo and Woo (2008) offers a method for calculating weights for 
individual measures.10 According to this methodology the weights for each measure of the index are 
constructed as follows: 
𝑤𝑗 =
∑ 𝜆𝑖𝛼𝑗
𝑖𝑖=𝑝
𝑖=1
∑ 𝜆𝑖
𝑖=𝑝
𝑖=1
 
 
where 𝜆𝑖 (i =1,…,p) is the i
th eigenvalue and αipx1 (i = 1, …, p) is the ith eigenvector of the correlation matrix 
Rpxp respectively (Bo and Woo, 2008). Supposing that λ1> λ2> λ3>…> λp and denoting the ith principal 
component as PCi we obtain: 
 
𝑃𝐶𝑖 = 𝑋𝛼
𝑖 
 
where X represents a multi-dimensional matrix that is compromised of normalized transformations of the 
variables it includes and: 
𝜆𝑖 = 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑃𝐶𝑖) 
 
This implies that the first principal component is the linear combination of the initial indicators, and has the 
largest variance (Bo and Woo, 2008). The second principal component has the second largest variance and is 
a linear combination of the indicators which is orthogonal to the first principal component, and the pth 
principal component is a linear combination of the indicators and has the smallest variance. 
The index is constructed taking into account the relative importance of all indicators: 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 =
∑ 𝜆𝑖
𝑖=𝑝
𝑖=1 𝑃𝐶𝑖
∑ 𝜆𝑖
𝑖=𝑝
𝑖=1
=
∑ ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝛼𝑗
𝑖𝑥𝑗
𝑖=𝑝
𝑗=1
𝑖=𝑝
𝑖=1
∑ 𝜆𝑖
𝑖=𝑝
𝑖=1
= ∑ 𝑤𝑗
𝑗=𝑝
𝑗=1
𝑥𝑗 
 
where  𝑥𝑗 (j = 1, …, p) is the j
th column of the matrix X and 𝑤𝑗 is the final weight of the indicator j.  All 
variables that constitute the jth column of the matrix X, xj, are standardized. One important remark is in 
place; the sum of the weights expressed by the formula above does not necessarily have to equal unity. This 
is due to the fact that the principal component analysis in its underlining structure normalizes the mode of 
                                                          
10 The principal components methodology of Bo and Woo (2008) is similar to that proposed by the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) for constructing the Trade and Development Index. Bo and Woo 
(2008/2010), Nagar and Basu (2002) and Klein and Ozmucur (2002/2003) provide different approaches in constructing 
indices analogous to the Trade and Development Index (TDI) with minor alterations. 
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each eigenvector to unity. The weights therefore could be very close to but not always equal to 1 (Bo and 
Woo, 2008). 
 
Following this methodology and taking into account information from all components, we construct indices 
with standardized individual measures for financial openness, banking sector, stock and bond market 
development, financial development and institutional quality.11 This avoids any potential problem that could 
arise as a result of using different scales or units of measurement. 
 
1.4 Empirical Model 
 
There have been various approaches employed in literature for the estimation of the link between financial 
openness and financial development. While Chinn and Ito (2006) utilize simple, point estimate OLS, Huang 
(2006) argues for fixed effects estimation with levels, OLS estimation with first differences, and Arellano-
Bond dynamic panel data model approach with GMM estimators. Baltagi, Demetriades, and Law (2007) and 
Demetriades and Law (2006) find dynamic panel data models appropriate. 
A standard static specification of the problem is as follows: 
 
𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝜆𝑗
𝑠
𝑗=1
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
 
where 𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 is the financial development measure, 𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 is the financial openness measure, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗𝑖𝑡  is the 
group of control variables of trade openness,  logarithm of GDP per capita, secondary school enrollment 
rate, and institutional quality. 𝛼𝑖 represents country specific effects that are captured neither by the 
financial openness indicators nor by the control variables. 𝛽 is the coefficient on financial openness 
measures which we expect to be positive. It summarizes the total effect of financial openness on financial 
development and helps determine the effectiveness of the link between the two. Dealing with unobserved 
heterogeneity one can refer to the within-group fixed effects and first differences estimators. Unfortunately 
neither estimator captures the partial adjustment property that accounts for the new information that 
explanatory variables that carry out (Huang, 2006). Given that this is accounted for in the dynamic panel 
data models, we prefer to use a dynamic model in comparison to within-group fixed effects estimators, or 
first difference estimators. To obtain consistency in dynamic panel data estimations we employ the 
Arellano-Bond GMM panel data procedure to overcome the Nickell bias that occurs when the lagged 
dependent variable is correlated with the disturbance. Ultimately our Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data 
model of 61 countries and twelve years, 1996 – 2007, can be represented as: 
 
Δ𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛾𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1
Δ𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡−𝑘 + 𝛽∆𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝜆𝑗
𝑠
𝑗=1
∆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗𝑖𝑡 + Δ𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
where 𝛾𝑘 measures the speed of adjustment, and 𝛽 denotes the short-run effect of financial openness on 
financial development.12  
                                                          
11 This method makes use of all eigenvectors and proposes to use weights depending on the eigenvectors and 
eigenvalues. 
12 Any influence of financial openness is now conditioned on the history controlled by the first differenced lagged 
dependent variable (Huang, 2006). This model is a restricted version of the static fixed effects specification given above 
and it includes dynamic effects through the lagged dependent variable that is included as a right hand side regressor. 
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The above model no longer has a country specific effect. The Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data model 
accounts for the individual effects. All terms in the above model have been differenced in order to elude the 
Nickell bias. Moment conditions require that: 
 
𝐸[𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡−𝑘Δ𝜀𝑖𝑡] = 0 for  ∀𝑘 ≥ 𝑛 + 1 
 
This condition guarantees the lagged dependent variable to be uncorrelated with the first difference of the 
error terms although the first difference of the lagged dependent variable could easily be correlated with 
the first difference of the error terms. 
 
Two diagnostic tests for serial correlation are derived by the model. We expect to find first order serial 
correlation in first differenced residuals because Δ𝜀𝑖𝑡 and Δ𝜀𝑖𝑡−1 contain the same term, 𝜀𝑖𝑡−1. Second order 
and higher serial correlations could create further problems due to the difficulty in verifying the validity of 
the moment conditions.  
 
To test for overidentifying restrictions we perform Sargan tests. In estimations we allow for one lag of the 
dependent variable to be used as a right hand side regressor, and one lag of variables other than the 
dependent variable to be used as instruments. We do not include the lag of the dependent variable as an 
instrument. We utilize the Arellano-Bond two-step estimator to avoid any panel-specific autocorrelation and 
to obtain better results of diagnostics. 
 
Given our model background, following Baltagi, Demetriades, and Law (2007), we test for the following 
hypotheses: 
 
(a) Do both trade and financial openness influence financial development? What happens to financial 
development when we control for trade openness? What are the effects of economic and legal 
institutions on financial development over and above the effects of openness? Do educational 
indicators affect financial development? 
(b) Does simultaneous opening of both financial and trade accounts bring additional benefits to 
financial development?  
Following these two hypotheses, we specify the following dynamic equations for financial development: 
 
Model (a): (Without an interaction term) 
 
Δ𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾Δ𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽∆𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆1∆𝑇𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆2∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆3∆𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑄𝑈𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆4∆𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑆𝐶𝐻𝑂𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡 
+Δ𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                                                             (1.1) 
 
Model (b): (With an interaction term) 
 
Δ𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾Δ𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽∆𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆1∆𝑇𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆2∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆3∆𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑄𝑈𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆4∆𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑆𝐶𝐻𝑂𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜆5{∆𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 × ∆𝑇𝑂𝑖𝑡}
+ Δ𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                               (1. 2) 
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where FDit is the financial development index, FOit is the financial openness index, TOit is the trade openness 
measure, logGDPpcit  is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita, INSQUAit is the institutional quality index 
and secschoolit is the secondary school enrollment rate. 
 
The two models express the link between financial openness and financial development and examine 
whether a simultaneous effect of financial and trade openness leads to additional benefits in terms of 
financial development. In the first model, Model (a), we would expect to have positive and significant 
coefficients for both 𝛽 and 𝜆1. Similarly if 𝜆3 and 𝜆4 are found to be positive then, improvements in 
institutions and in the quality of legal systems and education will enhance financial development. To test for 
the second model, Model (b), we introduce an interaction term which represents the significance of opening 
both markets at the same time. If 𝜆5 is found to be positive, we can state that the simultaneity hypothesis 
between financial and trade openness has additional benefits for financial development. 
 
Both models serve to advance the literature in terms of the methods used in the estimation process.  
Our model argues for a broader range of countries with variables affecting both financial openness and 
financial development. We hope to complement the work by Baltagi, Demetriades, and Law (2007) through 
an in depth examination of the simultaneity hypothesis with our indices. Given our objective of establishing 
the importance of financial development as an element influencing economic growth and welfare, and given 
that the literature has yet to find an answer to why we observe differences among countries in extracting 
the advantages of financial liberalization, our analysis stands as a starting point for determining the 
transition mechanism between financial openness and financial development.13 
 
There remain to be a few drawbacks in our estimations. The literature shows that in many cross-sectional 
studies both developing and advanced countries are lumped together in the same sample. As Henry (2006) 
explains, including both sets of countries increases the sample size and could lead to more efficient results in 
estimation. However, doing so without employing an empirical methodology, which particularly recognizes 
the fundamental theoretical difference between advanced and developing countries, would undermine the 
study’s ability to interpret the data. In order to correct for the problem, we first estimate our model with a 
full sample and then subgroup the data into developing and developed countries so as to compare the 
results obtained in both estimation procedures.  
 
1.5 Empirical Results 
 
We discuss the results of the dynamic panel data model. Table 1.1 in the Appendix gives a brief summary of 
the variables used in our estimation procedure. Tables 1.2 (a) to (d) depict the relations of the indices and 
the control variables. Overall the results demonstrate that all indices have high correlations with each other 
while the banking sector development index has higher correlations with the financial development index. 
 
1.5.1 Results using equally weighted indices 
 
Our empirical estimations for equally weighted indices are presented in Table 1.4 (a).14 In the benchmark 
dynamic GMM estimations, all variables other than the lags of the dependent variable are treated as 
                                                          
13 Our indexing strategies allow the data to tell us how to measure financial openness and financial development. By 
not choosing individual indicators for financial openness and financial development, we argue that our index measures 
will help overcome the problem of the particular use/choice of individual measures that exists in the literature. 
14 In the benchmark dynamic GMM estimations, all variables other than the lags of the dependent variable are treated 
as exogenous. 
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exogenous. The four dependent variables used in our regressions are banking sector, bond and stock 
market, and financial development indices. Table 1.4 (a) shows that the equally weighted financial openness 
index is statistically significant for 3 columns. Financial openness has a positive coefficient for all dependent 
variables but the equally weighted bond market index.15  
 
The rest of the results from Table 1.4 (a) indicate that trade openness is positive and significant for all 
development indices, whereas logarithm of GDP per capita is significant and positive for all dependent 
variables with the exception of the equally weighted bond market index. The equally weighted institutional 
quality index is negatively significant for three dependent variables. This finding contravenes the one of the 
literature which states that the effects of higher development in terms of institutions should be carried out 
to all sources of financial development. Baltagi, Demetriades and Law (2007) using individual dependent 
variables find institutional quality to be positive whenever significant but negative when the stock market 
capitalization is used as the dependent variable. Similarly Chinn and Ito (2006) demonstrate institutional 
quality has altering signs depending on the measures chosen and the dependent variables to be used. Our 
finding could therefore reinforce the argument that a threshold level of institutional and legal development 
is needed in order for countries to benefit from financial openness. 
 
The results of the diagnostic tests show that in all cases the first order serial autocorrelation is rejected and 
the second order is accepted. The Sargan test, on the other hand, cannot reject the null hypothesis in all 
cases. 
 
Our results are in line with those of the literature. Our initial findings highlight the link between financial 
openness and bond market development.  
 
1.5.2 Results using coefficient of variation type indices 
 
Table 1.4 (b) reports financial openness index to be significant for all dependent variables however the 
coefficients are positive only when the stock market development and financial development indices are 
used as dependent variables. Trade openness is found to be positively significant for all indices. Logarithm of 
GDP per capita is positive and significant for all cases with the exception of the bond market development 
index.  Secondary school enrollment rate enters with negatively significant coefficient for all cases with the 
exception of the bond market development index whereas the institutional quality index is negative and 
significant for all cases. Similarly the first order serial correlation is rejected in all cases and the Sargan test 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of over-identification for all cases. 
 
1.5.3 Results using principal component analysis type indices 
 
Results using first score principal components16  
 
                                                          
15 Huang (2006) finds the equally weighted financial openness index to be significant for banking sector, stock market 
and overall financial development. Baltagi, Demetriades and Law (2007) show that for individual measures of banking 
sector development, financial openness index of total foreign assets and liabilities (% of GDP) is positive and significant 
only when private credit, domestic credit, and liquid liabilities are used as measures of banking sector development. 
Baltagi, Demetriades and Law (2009) find the financial openness measures of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, and Abiad and 
Mody, and the capital account openness index of Chinn and Ito to be significant for both private credit to GDP and 
stock market capitalization. 
16 We initially verify that the individual variables used in our indices are correlated. Our results show that we have 
positive correlations among individual variables. 
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The results for the first principal component of financial openness, in Table 1.3 (a), show that this 
component captures 47.77 % - 62.94 % of the total variation of individual measures depicted in terms of 
eigenvectors.17 First component type financial openness index is shown to capture 76.98 % of the entire 
variance of three individual indicators of financial openness. Since most of these variables have similar 
eigenvectors constructing an index of financial openness using the first principal component measure yields 
accurate and sensible results (Huang, 2006). Given similar weights expressed by the eigenvectors using any 
single measure to study the impact of financial openness on financial development would bias our results. 
We thereby use the first principal component to score a proper and an efficient index for financial openness. 
Similarly the results of the principal component analysis for banking sector development in Table 1.3 (b) 
show that the first principal component of banking sector development captures 28.03% - 48.94 % of the 
total variation of individual measures. The index summarizes 72.77% of the variance of 5 individual 
indicators of the banking sector. 
 
The results of principal components analysis on bond market development depicted in Table 1.3 (c) show 
that the first component explains 67.26% of the total variation of the two individual indicators. Since the 
number of individual variables forming this index is relatively small we are assured that the first component 
will be sufficient in capturing total effects of the principal component analysis.  
 
The first principal component of stock market development in Table 1.3 (d) is found to capture 48.64% - 
68.59 % of the total variation of individual measures. PCSMD, the first component of stock market 
development index, overall, accounts for 65.57% of the entire variance of 3 individual indicators of the stock 
market development. 
 
Lastly Table 1.3 (e) shows that the first principal component of the financial development index explains 
50.82% of the total variation of the 10 variables that construct banking sector, stock market and bond 
market development indices. The eigenvectors of the first principal component of financial development are 
positive, capturing 12.18 % - 41.04 % of the total variation of individual measures.  
 
For the institutional quality index we score the first principal component of government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. The variance explained by the first component is 
95.90% as shown in Table 1.3 (f). The eigenvectors range between 49.35% - 50.41%.  
 
The results strongly verify our choice for principal component type indices for financial openness, banking 
sector, bond and stock market, financial development and institutional quality. The examination of the 
eigenvectors portrays that the use of individual variables to examine the link between financial openness 
and financial development would potentially lead to selection bias. 
 
Table 1.4 (c) depicts our findings for first score principal component indices. The results show that the 
financial openness index is significant in all cases with the exception of the bond market development index. 
Likewise trade openness is positive and significant for all dependent variables. This could mean that trade 
openness affects the development of bond markets whereas financial openness does not have a significant 
effect on the overall enhancement of bond markets.  
 
Control variables of institutional quality and secondary school enrollment rate are mostly significant 
however with differing magnitudes. Secondary school enrollment rate enters with a positive coefficient in 
two out of four cases, whereas institutional quality is found to be negatively significant for all cases. The 
                                                          
17 The total variation here refers to the maximal amount of variation in all three observed variables. 
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diagnostics are satisfactory for all dependent variables used. The absence of first order serial correlation is 
rejected and the Sargan test results cannot reject the over-identification restrictions.18 
 
Overall, our findings show that there is a significant link between financial openness and financial 
development when both measures are constructed using first score of principal components. The results 
also demonstrate that the link between financial openness and financial development becomes more 
comprehensible with first score indices in comparison to equally weighted and coefficient of variation type 
indices.19  
 
Results using principal components that take into account information from all 
components 
 
The results in Table 1.4 (d) indicate that the financial openness index is significant for all dependent 
variables. Trade openness is also positively significant for all cases. Logarithm of GDP per capita is significant 
for all cases with the exception of the bond market development index. First order serial autocorrelation 
tests are rejected, while the Sargan test of over-identification cannot reject the null hypothesis in all cases.  
 
Our results convey that using further components in our indices depicts similar findings for the link between 
financial openness and financial development. Due to the similarity of the results with both types of 
principal component indices, it is difficult to identify one methodology as the ideal procedure in constructing 
indices. In this context we choose the index measure that maximizes the goodness of fit of the linear model 
that we have studied between financial openness and financial development. Further examination of Tables 
1.4 (c) and (d) conveys that while first score indices depict higher significances in terms of t-statistics, this 
methodology of principal components provides better results in terms of magnitudes and interpretations. 
We thereby use this methodology in reporting the rest of our results. 
 
1.5.4 Adding the interaction term 
 
Findings from Table 1.5 which include the interaction term show that the effects of financial and trade 
openness indices are positive and significant for all dependent variables. Logarithm of GDP per capita is 
positive and significant for all dependent variables with the exception of the bond market development 
index. The institutional quality index is negatively significant for banking sector, bond and stock market 
development and positively significant for financial development whereas secondary school enrollment rate 
is positively significant for three dependent variables.  The interaction term between financial and trade 
openness is significant in three out of four cases with changing magnitudes. It is positive and significant for 
the banking sector development index, whereas it is negative and significant for bond and stock market 
development indices. This finding implies that a simultaneous opening of financial and goods markets leads 
to a decline in bond and stock market development rates. This could potentially be the result of the effects 
of financial openness and trade openness being picked up separately by each variable and not by the 
interaction term. Our results however agree with those of the literature. Baltagi, Demetriades and Law 
(2007) find the interaction term to be statistically significant together with financial and trade openness.20 
                                                          
18 Huang (2006) reports similar results to our initial estimations. He finds financial openness index constructed using 
the first principal components to be positive and significant for stock market, banking sector and financial 
development.  
19 One pitfall is that the link between financial openness and bond market development disappears as in the case with 
equally weighted indices.  
20 Using banking sector development measures as dependent variables, the authors find the interaction term to be 
significant and negative for private credit, liquid liabilities and domestic credit. 
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Law and Demetriades (2006) show the interaction term, trade openness and capital account openness to be 
positively significant for stock market development.  
 
1.6 Robustness checks and further issues 
 
We carry out a large number of robustness checks in order to examine the sensitivity of our results to 
alternative specifications and methods. Here, we only report some robustness checks. Below we discuss the 
results when heterogeneity is taken under examination.  
 
1.6.1 Robustness checks 
 
The first set of robustness checks highlights the importance of the number of observations used in our 
analysis. Due to the data availability, some indices include a larger number of variables in comparison to 
others. Equating the number of observations for each dependent variable used in our estimations Table 1.6 
depicts similar results to those of Table 1.4 (d). When the number of observations for each regression is 
equalized only minor changes occur.  
 
Secondly we examine whether the exclusion of control variables of secondary school enrollment rate and 
institutional quality index affect our proposed model. The exclusion of institutional quality index from our 
regressions, not reported here21, does not affect our initial findings. Similarly exclusion of the secondary 
school enrollment rate causes trade openness to lose significance for some dependent variables. These 
results show that even though the exclusion of institutional quality does not remarkably change our results, 
the exclusion of secondary school enrollment rate does. We thereby, stress the importance of including both 
of these control variables in our analysis to examine the link between financial openness and financial 
development. 
 
Further tests regarding the structure of the variables have been considered. In order to account for the fact 
causality might be driving the results between financial openness and financial development we run 
robustness checks to examine the simultaneity and the endogeneity issues. Treating all right hand side 
variables as predetermined does not alter our main findings. With predetermined variables we find that 
trade openness enters with a negative coefficient when banking sector and bond market development 
indices are used as dependent variables. Similarly treating financial and trade openness as predetermined 
variables does not change our findings. Treating openness variables as endogenous we find similar results to 
those reported in Table 1.4 (d). This thereby confirms that the assumption of treating right hand side 
regressors as exogenous variables is not a restrictive one for this analysis.22  
 
Another important issue concerns the time series versus cross sectional effects. Due to the twelve year 
period selected in our model we believe that there may be time series effects that are not picked up by our 
one lag structure. In order to account for these effects we estimate a higher lag model to observe the 
sensitivity of our findings to different lag structures. Table 1.7 depicts the results when three lags of the 
dependent variable are used as right hand side regressors and three lags of variables other than the 
dependent variable are used as instruments. The results show that adding further lags does not change our 
results. With further lags being used both as right hand side regressors and as instruments we find trade 
                                                          
21 The table of results for the exclusion of institutional quality index and secondary school enrollment rate are not 
reported here. The results are available in the Supplementary Appendix, Table 1.1.2. 
22 The results for variables being treated as predetermined and endogenous can be found in the Supplementary 
Appendix, Tables 1.1.3 and 1.1.4. 
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openness to be insignificant for banking sector development index and negatively significant for the bond  
market development index. Using other lag specifications and allowing for dependent variables to be used 
as instruments does not change our main findings. Our analysis with higher lags demonstrates that the 
qualitative nature of our results is robust to alternative specifications and estimation methods.  
 
We finally explore whether our benchmark results change when we consider not only time series effects but 
also cross sectional effects in our model. In order to observe the changes we add time series dummies and a 
country-specific time trend to account for differences across countries. The results are depicted in Table 
1.8.23 The results show that financial openness is no longer significant for banking sector and bond market 
development indices and trade openness is only significant for stock and bond market development. 
Logarithm of GDP per capita enters with negative signs in all cases. 
 
On a final note we examine the results when we alter the methods used in the estimation process. With a 
fixed effects model that includes country and year effects we find financial openness to be positive and 
significant for two dependent variables. The principal components type financial openness index is no longer 
found to be significant for the bond and the stock market. Control variables of trade openness, logarithm of 
GDP per capita, institutional quality and secondary school enrollment are not as significant as in our 
benchmark case. High R-squares reported in the fixed effects model should not be misleading; the fixed 
effects estimator is biased when a lagged dependent variable is included in the estimations. Similarly, 
coefficients losing significances calls for an intricate model that can account for panel effects.24 
 
1.6.2 Further issues 
 
Heterogeneity problems 
 
The use of developing and advanced countries together can create a drawback to our estimated model. 
Even though having a large number of observations in a joint sample leads to more efficient results we may 
not be able to fully differentiate whether the effects of financial openness on financial development follow 
due to the influence of advanced economies. In order to avoid complications and to clarify issues on 
heterogeneity we split our data set into developing and advanced countries and examine the results when 
the developing country sample is used in estimations.25 
 
The developing country sample includes 31 countries over the twelve year period. The findings from Table 
1.9 show that financial openness is positive and significant for banking sector, stock and bond market and 
financial development indices. The results are similar to those reported in Table 1.4 (d) in terms of sign and 
significance; however, trade openness, institutional quality and secondary school enrollment depict 
different magnitudes of coefficients. The results, overall, confirm that we do not have an endogeneity 
problem that is not explicitly recognized by our estimation methods. The link between financial openness 
and financial development follows even when a subsample of developing countries is used in our analysis. 
This strengthens the argument regarding the importance of opening up financial markets so as to enhance 
banking sector, bond and stock markets in developing countries.  
 
                                                          
23 For a full set of results with time dummies and the linear trend, and time dummies please see the Supplementary 
Appendix,Tables 1.1.5 and 1.1.6. 
24 The results for the fixed effects estimations are available in the Supplementary Appendix, Table 1.1.11. 
25 We rely on the World Bank’s income group definition when splitting our data set into developing and advanced 
countries. 
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We hereby reveal that financial openness influences financial development in both developing and 
advanced countries. Having shown that the discrepancies among countries in terms of financial 
development might arise as a result of not fully opening up financially, we leave the analysis of financial 
openness, economic growth and welfare to another study. 
 
Additional results 
 
To compare our results with earlier studies we run a series of regressions. To provide a better understanding 
of the effectiveness of our de facto type principal component indices we first present our results with de 
jure type capital account openness index of Chinn and Ito. Chinn and Ito’s capital account openness index is 
constructed using four binary dummy variables which represent restrictions on financial transactions across 
countries as reported in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 
(Baltagi, Demetriades and Law, 2009). The four binary variables (existence of multiple exchange rates, 
restrictions on current account, capital account transactions, and a variable for export proceeds) are 
summarized in an index using the first score of principal components (Chinn and Ito, 2006). Table 1.10 
depicts results with our principal component type development indices and the Chinn and Ito index of 
capital account openness.  Capital account openness index is found to be significant for banking sector and 
stock market development indices and negatively significant for bond market and financial development 
indices. These findings, which are different from our benchmark model of Table 1.4 (d), imply that the 
removal of restrictions from capital accounts and the allowance of capital movements across countries have 
a negative impact on bond market and overall financial development. It is interesting to note that the 
diagnostics fail to compete with the ones reported in Table 1.4 (d). In three out of four cases first order 
serial correlation is rejected and the Sargan test cannot reject the null hypothesis of over-identification 
although the Sargan test values remain to be less powerful in comparison to those of the benchmark case.  
 
To compare our previous results with the index measures to cases where a de facto type financial openness 
measure and individual financial development measures are used, we report estimations in Tables 1.11 and 
1.12 using the Chinn and Ito capital account openness index, our financial openness index and individual 
measures of financial development most frequently used in the literature. Once again the findings 
demonstrate that the principal component index provides higher significances for not only financial 
openness but also for other control variables used in our model. Yet, in both cases the findings for the first 
order serial correlation test and the Sargan test are weaker in contrast to those from Table 1.4 (d). This is a 
result of the use of individual measures of financial development in comparison to indices. Although the use 
of de facto type measures may be limiting in terms of interpretations they help in resolving issues related to 
the simultaneity hypothesis. The results using the discrete de facto type financial openness index shows that 
the link goes in the direction of financial openness to financial development. Given that our index measures 
are stronger in terms of robustness, statistical significances and interpretations in comparison to the de 
facto measures which help resolve causality issues, we strongly believe that our indices also carry this 
property. Our previous results using endogenous financial openness indices depict similar results to our 
benchmark regressions providing evidence that a causality issue is not undermining our analysis. 
 
Additionally we estimate our model with individual financial openness and financial development measures. 
The findings suggest mixed results.26 Depending on the choice of financial development measures, the three 
indicators of financial openness; foreign direct investment (% of GDP), international debt issues (% of GDP) 
and portfolio investment (% of GDP) alter signs. Comparisons to the literature should be taken with caution 
                                                          
26 Please refer to the Supplementary Appendix for these tables (Tables 1.1.9 (a), (b) and (c)). 
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due to a variety of reasons. Both models used in estimations and the choice of years and countries widely 
differ across studies.  
 
Chinn and Ito (2006) find their index of capital account openness to be positive and significant for private 
credit which agrees with our results. Baltagi, Demetriades and Law (2007) depict the Chinn and Ito index of 
capital account openness to be significant for logarithm of private credit and stock market capitalization. The 
findings for the control variables of logarithm of GDP per capita and trade openness match with our results. 
The authors also show that the capital account openness index of Chinn and Ito has a negatively significant 
coefficient when the number of countries used in the estimation process has been reduced. This finding 
corresponds to our results. 
 
Lastly we check the results when individual financial openness measures of foreign direct investment, 
international debt issues and portfolio investment are regressed against principal component type indices 
for financial development. Findings from the Supplementary Appendix27 suggest that foreign direct 
investment is positive and significant for all dependent variables of principal component type indices with 
the exception of the bond market, whereas international debt issues is positive and significant in all cases, 
and portfolio investment is positive and significant for stock market and overall financial development 
indices and negatively significant for the banking sector and bond market development indices. This 
supports our earlier argument on the choice of financial openness measures affecting the results. Using 
individual measures as dependent variables for financial development, or using individual variables as 
measures of financial openness (both de facto and de jure type individual measures) we cannot find the 
clear link that we observe between financial openness and financial development whilst using indices. The 
results clearly demonstrate that depending on the variables chosen, the relationship between financial 
openness and financial development alters. Nevertheless using principal components indices we can 
unmistakably find a positive link between financial openness and financial development which is robust to 
different lag structures, estimation techniques and subsamples. 
 
Partial effects and possible policy implications 
 
To calculate the total effect of opening up goods and financial markets we use partial derivatives of banking 
sector, bond and stock market and overall financial development with respect to trade and financial 
openness. Recalling Model (b) in equation (2) we evaluate the partial derivates of financial development 
with respect to trade and financial openness as: 
 
𝜕𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝜕𝑇𝑂𝑖𝑡
= 𝜆1 + 𝜆5𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 
𝜕𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝜕𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡
= 𝜆1 + 𝜆5𝑇𝑂𝑖𝑡 
 
Baltagi, Demetriades and Law (2007, 2009) express that if both derivatives are positive then an increase in 
financial or trade openness will enhance financial development, whereas if financial (trade) markets are 
closed then the marginal effect of trade (financial) openness is expected to be non-positive. This proposition 
suggests that when one market is closed, there will be oppositions within countries to prevent financial 
development from advancing (Baltagi, Demetriades and Law, 2009).  
 
                                                          
27 The results can be found in Tables 1.10 (a), (b) and (c). 
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Examining the results in Table 1.5 the partial derivative of the financial development index with respect to 
trade openness at the mean level of financial openness index is 0.006. The same partial derivative evaluated 
at the minimum level of financial openness index is 0.005, and evaluated at the maximum value is 0.006. 
Alternatively at the mean level of trade openness, the partial derivative of financial development index with 
respect to financial openness index is 0.482, 0.48 at the minimum level of trade openness and 0.489 at the 
maximum level of trade openness is 0.489.  
 
Our findings show that both partial derivatives are positive even for the most closed economies implying 
that opening both trade and financial markets may have a large impact on overall financial development. 
However bond and stock market development indices have negative coefficients for the interaction term of 
financial and trade openness. Examining the partial derivatives for both bond and stock market 
development indices we find positive values.28 Our results thereby suggest that a simultaneous opening 
could be beneficial in terms of banking sector, bond and stock markets and overall financial development. 
Nevertheless, possible implications of these results should be taken with great precaution.  
 
We have shown that our principal component financial openness index influences banking sector, bond and 
stock market and overall financial development. We have demonstrated a clear positive link between 
financial openness and financial development using different lag structures, time dummies, models, and 
specifications. However, the results for the coefficients reported so far all represent short-run effects due to 
the presence of the lagged dependent variable in the models. In order to obtain long-run effects particularly 
for the financial openness index in Table 1.4 (d) we divide financial openness coefficients by 1 – γ, where γ is 
the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable from our regressions. The findings show that the link 
between financial openness and development indices is positive even when examining the long-run 
coefficients.29 The results suggest that the financial openness index has a clear impact on the long-run 
financial development index. 
 
1.7 Concluding remarks 
 
The literature has broadly focused on the link between financial liberalization and economic growth 
nevertheless the relationship between financial liberalization and financial development lacked a thorough 
discussion. Our goal has been to construct comprehensive indicators for both financial openness and 
financial development and analyze this link.  
 
Using a panel data set of developing and advanced countries our results with aggregate indices with equal 
weights, coefficient of variation and two different principal component type methodologies show that the 
relationship between financial openness and financial development exists and that it is more significant than 
what the literature has previously acclaimed. Further examination of our benchmark results depict that the 
principal component indices with information from all components provide higher significances and more 
meaningful interpretations. In all estimations, independent of the development variables chosen, the 
                                                          
28 The partial derivative of bond market development index with respect to trade openness when financial openness 
index is at its minimum is equal to 0.002, whereas for the stock market development index with respect to trade 
openness with the financial openness index at its minimum is equal to 0.011. Similarly partial derivatives of bond and 
stock market development indices with respect to financial openness when trade openness is held at its minimum 
value, are equal to 0.157 and 0.367 respectively. 
29 The long-run coefficient for financial openness using the banking sector development index is 0.643. The coefficients 
for financial openness using the bond and stock market development indices are 0.505 and 0.107 whereas for the 
overall financial development index it is 0.715. 
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principal component index of financial openness is found to be positive and significant. The addition of an 
interaction term, which questions whether the simultaneous opening of financial and goods markets have 
additional effects on financial development, brings intriguing results. Our findings show that the interaction 
term is positively significant for the banking sector development index and negatively significant for bond 
and stock market development indices. By breaking the sample into developing and advanced countries we 
confirm that the link between financial openness and financial development exists even for developing 
countries.  
 
Comparisons with the literature stress the strength and effectiveness of our indices. Principal component 
type indices provide more robust and strong statistical conclusions on the link between financial openness 
and financial development. The partial derivatives and the long-run coefficients convey the positive link 
between financial openness and financial development validating our benchmark results. 
On a last note, we have shown that using indices the link between financial openness and financial 
development is unambiguous. To this end, future work would call for a model that can provide theoretical 
underpinnings for the effects of financial openness on financial development.  
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1.9 Appendix 
 
Abbreviations 
 
FO: Financial openness index 
BD: Banking sector development index 
BMD: Bond market development index 
SMD: Stock market development index 
FD: Financial development index 
INSQUA: Institutional quality index 
TO: Trade openness measure 
LOGGDPPC: Logarithm of GDP per capita 
SECSCHOOL: Secondary school enrollment rate 
INTTERM: Interaction term between financial and trade openness 
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Table 1.1: Summary of the variables used in the analysis 
 
Variable Obs.     Mean      Std. Dev.         Min        Max 
Financial Openness Indicators      
Foreign direct investment to GDP  653          13.192      71.824       -10.305         1095.3 
International debt issues to GDP 719      19.902      24.886             0      210.68 
Portfolio investment flows to GDP 699 0.9955          19.387      -24.785         311.84 
Financial Development Indicators 
                      Banking Sector Development 
 
 
    
Liquid Liabilities to GDP 687           70.819         51.865           12.852         393.69 
Private credit by domestic money banks 
and other financial institutions to GDP 
708       71.228      49.476        4.7678      202.42 
Deposit money bank assets to central 
bank and deposit money bank assets ratio 
663       91.468      11.496        22.975      99.999 
Total bank assets to GDP 642       82.393      47.929        12.418      257.47 
Domestic credit provided by the banking sector 719       91.076       60.658        -72.994         313.49 
                       Bond Market Development      
Private bond market capitalization to GDP 504       23.963          26.859            0      148.92 
Public bond market capitalization to GDP 504       35.095      23.525        0.5474      159.91 
 
                     Stock Market Development 
     
Stock market capitalization to GDP 730       68.240      66.006        2.0870      500.53 
Stock market turnover ratio 731       58.759      66.569        0.1383      622.43 
Stock market total value traded to GDP 730       46.491      65.769        0.0795      443.57 
Control Variables      
Trade Openness 711        83.772      62.479        14.933      462.46 
Logarithm of GDP per capita 732            8.664          1.4321        5.6921      10.937 
Equally weighted institutional quality index  732        0.6342      0.9484      -1.3181 2.1633 
Coefficient of variation type institutional quality index 732        0.6283      0.9613      -1.3394 2.1749 
First component institutional quality index 732     -3.59e-09        1.9586      -4.0485     3.1597 
Principal components institutional quality index 732     -2.08e-09        1.8783      -3.8859      3.0306 
Secondary school gross enrollment rate 596       88.663        26.891        19.232      161.66 
Interaction term  (equally weighted financial openness index) 608       1847.3       10355.7     -760.989      143629.1 
Interaction term (coefficient of variation type financial openness index) 608       989.78       8789.82     -4005.31      125179.3 
Interaction term (first component financial openness index) 608       33.774       421.10     -196.817      6023.6 
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Interaction term (principal components financial openness index) 608       31.503       327.88     -128.265      4689.3 
Aggregate Financial Openness Indicators           
Equally weighted financial openness index 627       12.085       36.155      -7.3472      507.54 
Coefficient of variation type financial openness index 627 4.7093       30.524      -16.324      465.46 
First component financial openness index 627 -1.17e-09       1.5197      -1.1943      20.337 
Principal components financial openness index 627 0.0406       1.2257      -0.9813      14.913 
Aggregate Financial Development Indicators      
Equally weighted banking sector development index 626       79.174        36.763      18.820      218.42 
Equally weighted bond market development index 504       29.529        20.682 0.9429      99.349 
Equally weighted stock market development index 730       57.855        53.003      2.7759      340.99 
Equally weighted financial development index 441           70.314        32.587      15.967      170.89 
Coefficient of variation type banking sector development index 626       77.359        40.313      17.026      232.38 
Coefficient of variation type  bond market development index 504       28.129        21.497     0.7058       103.39 
Coefficient of variation type stock market development index 730       56.454        54.016      2.4331       341.69 
Coefficient of variation type financial development index 441       65.964        35.554      10.034       191.89 
First component type banking sector development index 626      -1.11e-09        1.9075 -3.8257       6.9987 
First component type bond market development index 504      -9.38e-10        1.1598 -1.6291       4.1419 
First component type stock market development index 730        5.87e-10        1.4025 -1.4081       7.8323 
First component type financial development index 441      -1.26e-09        2.2544 -4.2956 5.9264 
Principal components banking sector development index 626      -0.0769        1.3031 -3.4472 4.3389 
Principal components bond market development index 504       -1.58e-09        0.8238 -0.9753 3.2082 
Principal components stock market development index 730        0.0006        0.9619 -0.9404 5.7544 
Principal components financial development index 441        0.2194        1.1417 -1.9449 3.3456 
 
Notes: The data above is for the period of 1996 – 2007.  The countries used in this analysis are as follows: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bangladesh, 
Brazil, Barbados, Botswana, Canada, Switzerland, Chile, China, Cote d’Ivoire, Colombia, Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, Egypt, Spain, Finland, France, U.K., Ghana, 
Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Indonesia, India, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Japan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, Luxembourg, Morocco, Mexico, 
Mauritius, Malaysia, Nigeria, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, 
Sweden, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, U.S., Venezuela, South Africa.  
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Table 1.2 (a): Pairwise correlations between equally weighted indices and control variables 
 
Variables FO BD BMD SMD FD INSQUA TO LOGGDP SECSC~ INTTERM 
FO 1.0000         
BD 0.2977*  1.0000        
BMD 0.3257*  0.6164*   1.0000       
SMD 0.0674  0.5725* 0.2768*  1.0000      
FD 0.3811*  0.9030* 0.6818* 0.8107*   1.0000     
INSQUA 0.2486*  0.6960* 0.5228* 0.4723*   0.6455*  1.0000    
TO 0.3653*  0.2065*    0.0446 0.2560*  0.2173* 0.3064*  1.0000   
LOGGDP~ 0.2713*  0.5975*  0.6126* 0.4350*   0.6184*   0.8048* 0.2388*   1.0000  
SECSC~ 0.1360*  0.4804*  0.4464* 0.3127*   0.3118*  0.7705*   0.0599   0.6836*    1.0000 
INTTERM 0.9829*  0.1834*    0.2028*   0.0350   0.2960*  0.1840*  0.4013*   0.1989*    0.0574      1.0000  
 
*5% significance levels of correlation coefficients are starred. LOGGDP~ : Logarithm of GDP per capita, SECSC~: Secondary school enrollment rate, EFO = 
Equally weighted financial openness index, BD = Equally weighted banking sector development index, BMD = Equally weighted bond market development 
index, SMD = Equally weighted stock market development index, FD = Equally weighted financial development index, INTTERM = Equally weighted interaction 
term between financial and trade openness, TO = Trade openness variable, INSQUA = Equally weighted institutional quality index. 
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Table 1.2 (b): Pairwise correlations between coefficient of variation type indices and control variables 
 
Variables FO BD BMD SMD FD INSQUA TO LOGGDP SECSC~ INTTERM 
FO 1.0000         
BD 0.1235*   1.0000        
BMD 0.1354*   0.6250*   1.0000       
SMD -0.0247   0.5651*   0.3239*  1.0000      
FD 0.1237*   0.8218*   0.6491* 0.8924*   1.0000     
INSQUA 0.1391*   0.6900*   0.5518* 0.4613*   0.6056*   1.0000    
TO 0.3018*   0.2075*   0.0584 0.2289*   0.1951*  0.3026*  1.0000   
LOGGDP~ 0.1581*   0.5950*   0.6289* 0.4306*   0.5777*   0.8041*  0.2388* 1.0000  
SECSC~ 0.0491*  0.4695*   0.4481* 0.3076*   0.2740*  0.7693*  0.0599   0.6836*    1.0000 
INTTERM 0.9930*   0.0957*   0.0862  -0.0244   0.0703  0.1324*  0.3112*   0.1506*    0.0301      1.0000  
 
*5% significance levels of correlation coefficients are starred. LOGGDP~ : Logarithm of GDP per capita, SECSC~: Secondary school enrollment rate, FO = 
Coefficient of variation type financial openness index, BD = Coefficient of variation type banking sector development index, BMD = Coefficient of variation type 
bond market development index, SMD = Coefficient of variation type stock market development index, FD = Coefficient of variation type financial development 
index, INTTERM = Coefficient of variation type interaction term between financial and trade openness, TO = Trade openness variable, INSQUA = Coefficient of 
variation type institutional quality index. 
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Table 1.2 (c): Pairwise correlations between first score indices and control variables 
 
Variables FO BD BMD SMD FD INSQUA TO LOGGDP SECSC~ INT~ 
FO 1.0000         
BD 0.3226*   1.0000        
BMD 0.3246*   0.6013*    1.0000       
SMD 0.0689   0.5776*    0.2682*   1.0000      
FD 0.3926*   0.9616*    0.6989* 0.6864*   1.0000     
INSQUA 0.2576*   0.7097* 0.5105*   0.4785*   0.6971*   1.0000    
TO 0.3416*   0.2191*    0.0406 0.2642*  0.2489*   0.3090*   1.0000   
LOGGDP~ 0.2811*   0.5978* 0.6050* 0.4426*  0.6795*   0.8050*   0.2388*   1.0000  
SECSC~ 0.1526*   0.4989*    0.4436* 0.3135*   0.3778* 0.7703*   0.0599   0.6836*    1.0000 
INTTERM 0.9761*   0.1684*    0.2907*   0.0067*  0.2904*   0.1650*   0.3101*   0.1854*    0.0590      1.0000  
 
*5% significance levels of correlation coefficients are starred. LOGGDP~ : Logarithm of GDP per capita, SECSC~: Secondary school enrollment rate, FO = First 
score principal components type financial openness index, BD = First score principal components type banking sector development index, BMD = First score 
principal components type bond market development index, SMD = First score principal components type stock market development index, FD = First score 
principal components type financial development index, INTTERM = First score principal components type interaction term between financial and trade 
openness, TO = Trade openness variable, INSQUA = First score principal components type institutional quality index. 
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Table 1.2 (d): Pairwise correlations between principal components (information from all components methodology) type indices 
and control variables 
 
Variables FO BD      BMD SMD FD INSQUA   TO LOGGDP SECSC~ INTTERM 
FO 1.0000         
BD 0.3707*   1.0000        
BMD 0.3338*   0.6110*    1.0000       
SMD 0.0617   0.4912*    0.3336*   1.0000      
FD 0.4061*   0.8912*    0.7783*  0.7054*   1.0000     
INSQUA 0.3176*   0.7243*  0.5584*   0.3946*   0.6761*   1.0000    
TO 0.3543*   0.2162*    0.0668   0.1072*  0.2052*   0.3097* 1.0000   
LOGGDP~ 0.3444*   0.5921*  0.6299*   0.3742*   0.6711*   0.8050* 0.2388* 1.0000  
SECSC~ 0.2091*  0.5271*   0.4419* 0.2792*   0.3644*   0.7701* 0.0599   0.6836*    1.0000 
INTTERM 0.9567*   0.2117*    0.2899*  -0.0208  0.3367*   0.1902* 0.3323*   0.2101*    0.0779      1.0000  
 
*5% significance levels of correlation coefficients are starred. LOGGDP~ : Logarithm of GDP per capita, SECSC~: Secondary school enrollment rate, PCAFO = 
Principal components type financial openness index, BD = Principal components type banking sector development index, BMD = Principal components type 
bond market development index, SMD = Principal components type stock market development index, FD = Principal components type financial development 
index, INTTERM = Principal components type interaction term between financial and trade openness, TO = Trade openness variable, INSQUA = Principal 
components type institutional quality index. 
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Table 1.3 (a): Summary of Principal Component Analysis for the Financial Openness Index 
 
Variables                                                                              Eigenvectors  
        PC1        PC2        PC3 
FDI (% of GDP) 0.6294 -0.2744 -0.7270 
International debt issues (% of GDP) 0.4777 0.8745 0.0836 
Portfolio flows (% of GDP) 0.6128 -0.3999 0.6815 
Eigenvalues 2.30949 0.617696 0.0728145 
                                     Cumulative Proportions:                              0.7698                           0.9757                           1.0000                           
                                     Number of observations: 627 
                                     Number of components:  3 
                                     Weights for variables*:           0.410387                       0.549835                       0.405954                       
                                     Weights for variables**:                             0.447601                       0.38914                         0.039879                       
 
   Notes: PC denotes the principal components of each individual variable. Weights for variables represent the weights used in constructing principal 
components (information from all components methodology) type indices. * represents the weights for the entire sample respectively for FDI, international debt 
issues and portfolio investment while ** represents the weights for these variables in the same order for the developing country sample. 
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Table 1.3 (b): Summary of Principal Component Analysis for the Banking Sector Development Index  
 
Variables                                                                              Eigenvectors    
        PC1        PC2        PC3        PC4        PC5 
Liquid liabilities (% of GDP) 0.4528 -0.1830 0.7837 0.2997 -0.2400 
Private credit (% of GDP) 0.4875 0.0420 -0.5170 0.0826 -0.6975 
Deposit bank assets 0.2803 0.9383 0.1194 -0.0350 0.1597 
Total bank assets (% of GDP) 0.4892 -0.2163 0.0418 -0.8197 0.2008 
Domestic credit (% of GDP) 0.4894 -0.1939 -0.3202 0.4799 0.6246 
Eigenvalues 3.6386 0.802872 0.342941 0.130476 0.0851069 
                Cumulative Proportions:                0.7277                      0.8883                       0.9569                       0.9830                       1.0000                       
                Number of observations: 626 
                Number of components:  5 
                Weights for variables*:                  0.357615                   0.316331                  0.364641                  0.306163                   0.326203 
                Weights for variables**:                0.36642                     0.341067                  0.337296                  0.326477                   0.311329 
 
 
Notes: PC denotes the principal components of each individual variable. Deposit bank assets: Deposit money bank assets to the sum of central bank 
assets and deposit money bank assets. Weights for variables represent the weights used in constructing principal components (information from all components 
methodology) type indices. * represents the weights for the entire sample respectively for liquid liabilities, private credit, deposit money bank assets to the sum 
of central bank assets and deposit money bank assets, total bank assets, and domestic credit while ** represents the weights for these variables in the same 
order for the developing country sample. 
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Table 1.3 (c): Summary of Principal Component Analysis for the Bond Market Development Index 
 
Variables                                         Eigenvectors                                                                            
        PC1        PC2 
Private bond market capitalization (% of GDP) 0.7071 0.7071 
Public bond market capitalization (% of GDP) 0.7071 - 0.7071 
Eigenvalues 1.3451 0.6549 
                                                               Cumulative Proportions:                                               0.6726               1.0000                      
                                                               Number of observations: 504 
                                                               Number of components:  2 
                                                               Weights for variables*:                                                0.7071                0.24402 
                                                               Weights for variables**:                                              0.707099           0.150402 
    
Notes: PC denotes the principal components of each individual variable. Weights for 
variables represent the weights used in constructing principal components (information from all components methodology) 
type indices.* represents the weights for the entire sample respectively for private bond market capitalization and public bond market capitalization while 
**represents the weights for these variables in the same order for the developing country sample. 
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Table 1.3 (d): Summary of Principal Component Analysis for the Stock Market Development index 
 
Variables  Eigenvectors  
        PC1        PC2        PC3 
Stock market capitalization (% of GDP) 0.5412 -0.6568 0.5250 
Stock market turnover ratio (in percentages) 0.4864 0.7538 0.4417 
Stock market total value traded (% of GDP) 0.6859 -0.0163 -0.7275 
Eigenvalues 1.96712 0.892612 0.140268 
                                                  Cumulative Proportions:                                            0.6557            0.9532                1.0000                       
                                                  Number of observations: 730 
                                                  Number of components:  3 
                                                  Weights for variables*:                                              0.183993        0.563871            0.410884 
                                                  Weights for variables**:                                            0.165746        0.550619            0.401326 
 
Notes: PC denotes the principal components of each individual variable. Weights for variables  
         represent the weights used in constructing principal components (information from all components methodology) type indices. 
* represents the weights for the entire sample respectively for stock market capitalization, stock market turnover ratio and stock market total value traded 
while ** represents the weights for these variables in the same order for the developing country sample. 
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Table 1.3 (e): Summary of Principal Component Analysis for the Financial Development Index 
 
Variables                                                                              Eigenvectors        
        PC1        PC2        PC3        PC4        PC5        PC6        PC7       PC8        PC9        PC10 
Liquid liabilities (% of GDP) 0.3720 -0.2704 0.0570 -0.2052 -0.3816 0.0306 0.3840 -0.0594 0.5541 -0.3722 
Private credit (% of GDP) 0.4104 0.0189 -0.1464 0.0798 -0.0399 -0.2824 -0.4926 -0.0913 -0.3125 -0.6110 
Deposit bank assets 0.2246 -0.0059 -0.4402 0.7114 -0.1708 0.4460 -0.0019 -0.0258 0.0882 0.1144 
Total bank assets (% of GDP) 0.3870 -0.2453 -0.0032 -0.0503 -0.3072 -0.1891 0.3383 0.3163 -0.5781 0.3297 
Domestic credit (% of GDP) 0.4092 -0.1736 0.0789 -0.1110 0.0140 -0.1785 -0.4777 -0.2876 0.3067 0.5889 
Private bond market~ 0.3026 0.0792 0.1332 0.3788 0.6392 -0.4006 0.3369 0.1469 0.1904 -0.0242 
Public bond market~ 0.2013 -0.3744 0.5442 0.0120 0.3120 0.6014 -0.1066 0.0204 -0.1935 -0.1217 
Stock market~ 0.2916 0.2609 -0.3952 -0.4584 0.2710 0.2995 -0.1135 0.5361 0.1278 0.0285 
Stock market turnover~ 0.1218 0.5728 0.5523 0.1992 -0.3808 0.0146 -0.1680 0.3496 0.1258 0.0302 
Stock total value traded~ 0.3058 0.5418 0.0157 -0.1927 0.0687 -0.2016 0.3182 -0.6108 -0.2312 0.0485 
Eigenvalues 5.0823 1.35905 1.07573 0.784147 0.673569 0.588792 0.160829 0.12706 0.102543       0.04597 
           
Cumulative Proportions: 0.5082 0.6441 0.7517 0.8301 0.8975 0.9564 0.9724 0.9851 0.9954 1.0000 
Num. of obs.: 441 
Num. of components: 10 
Weights for variables*: 
Weights for variables**: 
 
 
0.12784 
0.18507 
 
 
0.167244 
0.191976 
 
 
0.137605 
0.183899 
 
 
0.13228 
0.16247 
 
 
0.169106 
0.19464 
 
 
0.23718 
  0.161879 
 
 
0.163332 
0.155323 
 
 
0.14751 
0.20263 
 
 
0.193161 
0.12997 
 
 
 0.22733 
 0.23771 
 
Notes: PC denotes the principal components of each individual variable. Deposit bank assets: Deposit money bank assets to the sum of central bank assets and 
deposit money bank assets, Private bond market~: Private bond market capitalization (% of GDP), Public bond market~: Public bond market capitalization (% of 
GDP), Stock market~: Stock market capitalization (% of GDP), Stock market turnover ratio (in percentages), Stock total value traded~: Stock market total value 
traded (% of GDP). Weights for variables represent the weights used in constructing principal components (information from all components methodology) type 
indices. * represents the weights for liquid liabilities, private credit, deposit money bank assets to the sum of deposit money bank assets and central bank 
assets, total bank assets, deposit money bank assets to central bank assets, domestic credit, private bond market capitalization, public bond market 
capitalization, stock market capitalization, stock market turnover ratio and stock market total value traded for the entire sample while ** represents the 
weights for these variables in the same order for the developing country sample. 
 
 
 
 
. 
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Table 1.3 (f): Summary of Principal Component Analysis for the Institutional Quality Index 
 
Variables                                                                              Eigenvectors  
        PC1        PC2        PC3        PC4 
Government effectiveness 0.5021 -0.2055 -0.7095 0.4498 
Regulatory quality 0.4935 0.8576 0.1347 0.0533 
Rule of law 0.5003 -0.4158 0.6839 0.3303 
Control of corruption 0.5041 -0.2223 -0.1039 -0.8281 
Eigenvalues 3.8359 0.0882176 0.0458957 0.0458957 
                                 Cumulative Proportions:                0.9590                      0.9810                       0.9925                       1.0000                       
                                 Number of observations: 732 
                                 Number of components:  4 
                                 Weights for variables*:                  0.4722                      0.494113                   0.480928                   0.471117 
                                 Weights for variables**:               0.432668                  0.490725                    0.43863                     0.424311 
 
Notes: PC denotes the principal components of each individual variable. Weights for variables represent the weights used in constructing principal components 
(information from all components methodology) type indices. * represents the weights respectively for government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law 
and control of corruption for the entire sample while ** represents the weights for these variables in the same order for the developing country sample. 
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Table 1.4 (a): Equally weighted financial development and financial openness indices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Dependent Variables 
     
  ∆Banking sector 
development 
∆Bond market 
development 
∆Stock market 
development 
∆Financial 
development 
     
∆Dependent variable (Lagged) 0.731*** 
      (269.1) 
[0.00266] 
0.887*** 
     (76.47) 
[0.0116] 
0.376*** 
    (451.2) 
[0.000834] 
0.311*** 
     (42.54) 
[0.00731] 
∆Financial openness 0.343*** 
      (31.67) 
    [0.0108] 
0.005 
      (0.713) 
[0.00729] 
0.136*** 
    (21.43) 
[0.00635] 
0.801*** 
     (21.13) 
[0.0379] 
∆Trade Openness 0.024*** 
     (4.133) 
[0.00575] 
0.030*** 
      (5.885) 
[0.00512] 
0.712*** 
    (112.4) 
[0.00633] 
0.186*** 
     (16.90) 
[0.0110] 
∆Log GDP per capita 3.422*** 
     (2.677) 
    [1.278] 
-3.614***  
      (-3.845) 
[0.940] 
     50.53*** 
    (36.19) 
[1.396] 
14.24*** 
     (17.80) 
[0.800] 
∆Institutional Quality     -2.040*** 
     (-4.783) 
[0.427] 
-3.841*** 
      (-5.017) 
[0.766] 
    -25.76*** 
    (-54.09) 
[0.476] 
0.542 
     (0.329) 
[1.650] 
∆Secondary School Enrollment 0.006** 
      (2.283) 
[0.00266] 
 
0.008*** 
      (4.805) 
   [0.00171] 
 
-0.239*** 
     (-16.42) 
     [0.0145] 
 
-0.041*** 
     (-13.24) 
[0.00308] 
 
Number of observations:           333            301          376            262 
Number of groups:            50             41           54             38 
Arellano – Bond test for 
AR(1) in first differences: 
Arellano – Bond test for 
AR(2) in first differences: 
      z =  -2.07 
Pr > z = 0.0381 
      z =  -1.03 
Pr > z = 0.3011 
     z = -2.23 
Pr > z = 0.0255 
     z =  -1.48 
Pr > z = 0.1395 
      z =  -1.96 
Pr > z = 0.0500 
      z =  -0.97 
Pr > z = 0.3298 
     z =  -1.82 
Pr > z = 0.0681 
     z = -1.16 
Pr > z = 0.2445 
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Notes: All regressions are estimated using the Arellano – Bond dynamic panel GMM estimation with one lag of the dependent variable to be included in 
the model, 0 lags of the dependent variable and one lag of other variables to be used as instruments. The results reported here use the twostep estimator. 
(The estimations use Stata’s xtabond command). The financial openness, banking sector development, bond and stock market development, financial 
development variables and institutional quality measures are constructed using equal weights in indices. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics and the 
stars represent the significant t statistics for 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels respectively. The figures in brackets depict the standard errors for the 
coefficients. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sargan test:     Chi2(54)  
     = 48.43 
   Prob > chi2  
     = 0.6883 
 
    Chi2(54)  
     = 36.50 
    Prob > chi2  
     = 0.9674 
 
     Chi2(54)  
     = 51.02 
    Prob > chi2  
     = 0.5901 
 
     Chi2(54)  
      = 33.02 
    Prob > chi2  
      = 0.9892 
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Table 1.4 (b): Coefficient of variation type financial openness and financial development indices 
  
     
 Dependent Variables 
     
  ∆Banking sector 
development 
∆Bond market 
development 
∆Stock market 
development 
∆Financial 
development 
     
∆Dependent variable (Lagged) 0.799*** 
     (99.95) 
 [0.00800] 
0.883*** 
     (62.80) 
[0.0141] 
0.372*** 
    (538.4) 
[0.000691] 
0.296*** 
     (62.55) 
[0.00474] 
∆Financial openness -0.021*** 
     (-3.831) 
 [0.00548] 
-0.0509*** 
     (-7.189) 
[0.00708] 
0.102*** 
    (8.597) 
  [0.0119] 
0.749*** 
     (38.82) 
[0.0193] 
∆Trade openness 0.104*** 
     (17.46) 
 [0.00595] 
0.0415*** 
     (5.303) 
[0.00783] 
0.775*** 
    (115.7) 
[0.00670] 
0.521*** 
     (31.22) 
[0.0167] 
∆Log GDP per capita       4.875*** 
     (6.258) 
   [0.779] 
-3.427***  
    (-2.770) 
[1.237] 
      53.32*** 
    (46.46) 
  [1.148] 
 21.21*** 
     (14.45) 
[1.468] 
∆ Institutional Quality       -6.319*** 
     (-65.43) 
[0.0966] 
    -5.337*** 
    (-10.66) 
[0.501] 
    -27.96*** 
    (-49.14) 
 [0.569] 
    -11.94*** 
     (-3.424) 
[3.488] 
∆Secondary School Enrollment       -0.040*** 
     (-4.041) 
  [0.00989] 
 
0.0002 
    (0.194) 
[0.000984] 
 
-0.264*** 
     (-23.35) 
[0.0113] 
 
-0.149*** 
     (-24.93) 
[0.00598] 
 
Number of observations:           333          301          376         262 
Number of groups:            50           41           54          38 
Arellano – Bond test for 
AR(1) in first differences: 
Arellano – Bond test for 
      z =  -1.94 
 Pr > z =0.0522 
      z =  -1.06 
      z =  -2.48 
Pr > z = 0.0132 
      z =  -1.67 
      z =  -2.07 
 Pr > z =0.0389 
      z =  -0.86 
      z =  -1.86 
  Pr > z=0.0625 
      z =  -1.11 
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AR(2) in first differences:  Pr > z =0.2897  Pr > z =0.0943   Pr > z=0.3913   Pr > z=0.2677 
Sargan test:       Chi2(54)  
       = 44.48 
      Prob > chi2  
      =  0.8187 
      Chi2(54) 
      =  33.37 
     Prob > chi2 
     = 0.9878 
      Chi2(54) 
      = 50.18 
     Prob > chi2  
      =  0.6226 
       Chi2(54) 
       = 31.77 
      Prob > chi2  
      = 0.9932 
 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using the Arellano – Bond dynamic panel GMM estimation with one lag of the dependent variable to be included in the 
model, 0 lags of the dependent variable and one lag of other variables to be used as instruments. The results reported here use the twostep estimator. The 
indices are constructed using the coefficient of variation methodology. The financial openness, banking sector development, bond and stock market 
development, financial development variables and institutional quality measures are constructed using coefficient of variation type indices. Figures in 
parentheses are t-statistics and the stars represent the significant t statistics for 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels respectively. The figures in brackets depict 
the standard errors for the coefficients. 
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Table 1.4 (c): First component type financial openness and financial development indices 
 
  
 Dependent Variables 
     
  ∆Banking sector 
development 
∆Bond market 
development 
∆Stock market 
development 
∆Financial 
development 
     
∆Dependent variable (Lagged) 0.854*** 
      (89.51) 
[0.00954] 
0.865*** 
      (98.65) 
[0.00876] 
0.367*** 
       (321.8) 
[0.00114] 
0.696*** 
      (62.75) 
[0.0111] 
∆Financial openness 0.146*** 
      (13.23) 
[0.0110] 
0.0025 
      (0.306) 
[0.00830] 
0.0691*** 
      (9.956) 
[0.00694] 
0.540*** 
      (17.46) 
[0.0310] 
∆Trade openness 0.0026*** 
      (4.536) 
[0.00581] 
0.0014*** 
     (2.672) 
[0.000504] 
0.0206*** 
       (82.39) 
[0.000250] 
0.0077*** 
      (8.007) 
[0.000957] 
∆Log GDP per capita      0.0787 
      (1.184) 
[0.0665] 
-0.368***  
     (-12.32) 
[0.0298] 
0.883*** 
       (16.70) 
[0.0528] 
0.587*** 
      (12.36) 
[0.0475] 
∆Institutional Quality     -0.0696*** 
      (-4.401) 
[0.0158] 
-0.0803*** 
      (-20.10) 
[0.00400] 
-0.116*** 
       (-8.887) 
[0.0131] 
-0.0004 
     (-0.00870) 
[0.0502] 
∆Secondary School Enrollment        0.0007** 
      (2.223) 
[0.000309] 
 
0.0013*** 
       (5.595) 
[0.000229] 
 
-0.007*** 
       (-32.81) 
[0.000206] 
 
-0.0019*** 
      (-3.102) 
[0.000596] 
 
 Number of observations:          333          301          376          262 
Number of groups:           50           41           54           38 
Arellano – Bond test for 
AR(1) in first differences: 
Arellano – Bond test for 
      z =  -2.22 
 Pr > z=0.0266 
      z =  -1.36 
      z =  -2.15 
Pr > z =0.0313 
      z =  -1.36 
     z =  -2.06 
 Pr > z =0.0396 
      z =  -0.91 
      z =  -2.67 
  Pr > z=0.0075 
      z =   -1.82 
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AR(2) in first differences:  Pr > z=0.1733  Pr > z=0.1726   Pr > z=0.3652   Pr > z=0.0692 
Sargan test:       Chi2(54)  
      = 47.26 
     Prob > chi2  
     =  0.7300 
      Chi2(54) 
      =  33.82 
      Prob > chi2 
      = 0.9857 
      Chi2(54) 
      = 49.02 
     Prob > chi2  
      =  0.6666 
       Chi2(54) 
       = 31.87 
      Prob > chi2  
       = 0.9929 
 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using the Arellano – Bond dynamic panel GMM estimation with one lag of the dependent variable to be included in the 
model, 0 lags of the dependent variable and one lag of other variables to be used as instruments. The results reported here use the twostep estimator. The 
financial openness, banking sector development, bond and stock market development, financial development variables and institutional quality measures are 
constructed using first score of principal components. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics and the stars represent the significant t statistics for 1%, 5%, and 
10% confidence levels respectively. The figures in brackets depict the standard errors for the coefficients. 
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Table 1.4 (d): Principal components (information from all components methodology) type financial openness and financial 
development indices 
 
  
 Dependent Variables 
     
  ∆Banking sector 
development 
∆Bond market 
development 
∆Stock market 
development 
∆Financial 
development 
     
∆Dependent variable (Lagged) 0.847*** 
      (84.07) 
[0.0101] 
0.808*** 
      (60.21) 
[0.0134] 
0.230*** 
     (309.8) 
[0.000741] 
0.302*** 
      (80.46) 
[0.00376] 
∆Financial openness 0.0983*** 
       (12.86) 
[0.00765] 
0.0970*** 
      (16.51) 
[0.00588] 
0.0825*** 
     (6.954) 
[0.0119] 
0.499*** 
      (37.54) 
[0.0133] 
∆Trade openness 0.0017*** 
       (4.218) 
[0.000397] 
0.00064*** 
      (6.969) 
[0.000092] 
0.0104*** 
     (55.70) 
[0.000187] 
0.0052*** 
      (9.015) 
[0.000576] 
∆Log GDP per capita      0.131*** 
      (3.030) 
[0.0431] 
-0.147***  
      (-6.496) 
[0.00273] 
0.503*** 
     (19.32) 
[0.0260] 
0.477*** 
      (9.976) 
[0.0478] 
∆Institutional Quality      -0.0088 
      (-1.378) 
[0.00638] 
-0.0551*** 
      (-20.20) 
[0.00273] 
-0.106*** 
     (-13.01) 
[0.00812] 
0.0359*** 
      (5.299) 
[0.00678] 
∆Secondary School Enrollment      0.0008*** 
       (4.181) 
[0.000190] 
 
0.00001 
      (0.274) 
[0.000120] 
 
-0.0045*** 
     (-23.17) 
[0.000196] 
 
   0.0021*** 
      (5.550) 
[0.000386] 
 
Number of observations:           333             301          376          262 
Number of groups:            50              41           54           38 
Arellano – Bond test for 
AR(1) in first differences: 
       z =  -2.47 
 Pr > z =0.0134 
        z =  -2.39 
Pr > z =0.0168 
     z =  -1.90 
 Pr > z =0.0573 
      z =  -1.99 
  Pr >z=0.0468 
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Arellano – Bond test for 
AR(2) in first differences: 
       z =  -1.46 
 Pr > z =0.1435 
        z =  -1.66 
 Pr > z=0.0974 
     z =  -0.96 
  Pr > z=0.3386 
      z =   -1.07 
  Pr >z=0.2854 
Sargan test:       Chi2(54)  
      = 42.13 
     Prob > chi2  
     =  0.8795 
      Chi2(54) 
      =  37.89 
      Prob > chi2 
      = 0.9528 
      Chi2(54) 
      = 44.36 
     Prob > chi2  
      =  0.8222 
       Chi2(54) 
       = 33.49 
      Prob > chi2  
       = 0.9872 
 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using the Arellano – Bond dynamic panel GMM estimation with one lag of the dependent variable to be included in the 
model, 0 lags of the dependent variable and one lag of other variables to be used as instruments. The results reported here use the twostep estimator. The 
indicess are constructed following the principal component methodology that utilizes all components. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics and the stars 
represent the significant t statistics for 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels respectively. The figures in brackets depict the standard errors for the coefficients. 
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Table 1.5: Principal components type financial openness and financial development indices with an interaction term 
 
  
 Dependent Variables 
     
  ∆Banking sector 
development 
∆Bond market 
development 
∆Stock market 
development 
∆Financial 
development 
     
∆Dependent variable (Lagged) 0.848*** 
      (66.15) 
[0.0128] 
0.808*** 
      (59.66) 
[0.0135] 
0.239*** 
      (161.4) 
[0.00148] 
0.312*** 
     (31.20) 
[0.0100] 
∆Financial openness 0.0752*** 
      (2.722) 
[0.0276] 
0.170*** 
      (16.39) 
[0.0104] 
0.384*** 
      (19.58) 
[0.0196] 
0.480*** 
     (17.70) 
[0.0271] 
∆Trade openness 0.0015*** 
      (3.667) 
[0.000416] 
0.0011*** 
      (6.581) 
[0.000163] 
0.0102*** 
      (70.19) 
[0.000146] 
0.0055*** 
     (9.982) 
[0.000547] 
∆Log GDP per capita     0.149*** 
      (2.968) 
[0.0502] 
-0.131***  
     (-4.972) 
[0.0263] 
0.448*** 
      (13.12) 
[0.0341] 
0.486*** 
     (7.235) 
[0.0672] 
∆Institutional Quality     -0.0172 
      (-1.323) 
[0.0130] 
-0.0439*** 
      (-11.81) 
[0.00372] 
-0.0387** 
      (-5.265) 
[0.00735] 
0.0505*** 
     (4.214) 
[0.0120] 
∆Secondary School Enrollment 0.0009*** 
      (5.709) 
[0.000162] 
0.000135 
       (0.818) 
    [0.000165] 
-0.0031*** 
      (-9.851) 
[0.000316] 
0.00234*** 
     (7.839) 
[0.000299] 
∆Interaction term 0.00035* 
      (1.907) 
[0.000182] 
-0.00086*** 
       (-11.98) 
    [0.0000716] 
 
-0.0012*** 
      (-23.99) 
[0.0000487] 
 
0.00002 
     (0.0763) 
[0.000282] 
 
Number of observations:          333           301            376         262 
Number of groups:           50            41             54          38 
Arellano – Bond test for        z =  -2.50       z = -2.38      z =  -1.91      z =  -2.03 
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AR(1) in first differences: 
Arellano – Bond test for 
AR(2) in first differences: 
 Pr > z =0.0126 
       z =  -1.47 
 Pr > z =0.1415 
Pr > z = 0.0175 
      z =  -1.73 
 Pr > z =0.0844 
 Pr > z =0.0567 
      z =  -1.00 
  Pr > z=0.3163 
  Pr > z=0.0424 
      z =  -1.04 
  Pr > z=0.2990 
Sargan test:       Chi2(54)  
       = 47.62 
     
      Prob > chi2  
      =  0.7173 
      Chi2(54) 
      =  36.44 
     
     Prob > chi2 
     = 0.9680 
      Chi2(54) 
      = 47.84 
    
      Prob > chi2  
      =  0.7096 
       Chi2(54) 
       = 35.02 
      
      Prob > chi2  
      = 0.9790 
 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using the Arellano – Bond dynamic panel GMM estimation with one lag of the dependent variable to be included in the 
model, 0 lags of the dependent variable and one lag of other variables to be used as instruments. The results reported here use the twostep estimator. The 
indices are constructed following the principal component methodology that utilizes all components. The financial openness, banking sector development, bond 
and stock market development, financial development variables and institutional quality measures are constructed using principal component indices. Figures in 
parentheses are t-statistics and the stars represent the significant t statistics for 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels respectively. The figures in brackets depict 
the standard errors for the coefficients. 
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Table 1.6: Principal components type financial openness and financial development indices; Equal number of observations 
 
  
 Dependent Variables 
     
  ∆Banking sector 
development 
∆Bond market 
development 
∆Stock market 
development 
∆Financial 
development 
     
∆Dependent variable (Lagged) 0.843*** 
       (41.57) 
[0.0202678] 
0.844*** 
       (42.65) 
[0.0197798] 
0.1462*** 
        (27.40) 
[0.005337] 
0.302*** 
      (80.46) 
[0.0037564] 
∆Financial openness 0.0969*** 
       (8.00) 
[0.0121035] 
0.0860*** 
       (13.19) 
[0.0065188] 
0.4296*** 
        (21.70) 
[0.0197972] 
0.4995*** 
      (37.54) 
[0.0133043] 
∆Trade openness 0.00105* 
        (1.93) 
[0.0005445] 
0.00022** 
       (2.25) 
[0.0000996] 
0.0138*** 
        (23.92) 
[0.0005775] 
0.0052*** 
       (9.01) 
[0.0005763] 
∆Log GDP per capita       0.294*** 
        (3.75) 
[0.0783096] 
-0.1366***   
       (-8.42) 
[0.0162171] 
-0.0108 
        (-0.10) 
[0.1123693] 
0.4771*** 
       (9.98) 
[0.0478278] 
∆Institutional Quality      -0.0147 
         (-0.67) 
[0.0219016] 
-0.0534*** 
       (-8.88) 
[0.0060153] 
0.0139 
        (0.59) 
[0.0236854] 
0.0359*** 
       (5.30) 
[0.0067846] 
∆Secondary School Enrollment       0.0012*** 
          (7.03) 
[0.0001671] 
 
0.0008*** 
        (7.54) 
[0.0001072] 
 
-0.0061*** 
        (-5.23) 
[0.0011695] 
 
0.0021*** 
        (5.55) 
[0.0003861] 
 
Number of observations:            262             262            262            262 
Number of groups:             38              38             38             38 
Arellano – Bond test for 
AR(1) in first differences: 
Arellano – Bond test for 
AR(2) in first differences: 
       z =  -2.11 
 Pr > z=0.0346 
       z =  -1.48 
 Pr > z=0.1384 
      z =  -2.06 
Pr > z =0.0392 
      z =  -1.49 
 Pr > z=0.1369 
     z =  -1.71 
 Pr > z =0.0871 
      z =  -0.97 
  Pr > z=0.2396 
      z =  -1.99 
  Pr > z=0.0468 
      z =   -1.07 
  Pr > z=0.3333 
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Sargan test:       Chi2(54)  
      = 34.72 
     Prob > chi2  
     =  0.9808 
      Chi2(54) 
      =  29.38 
      Prob > chi2 
      = 0.9975 
      Chi2(54) 
      = 33.04 
     Prob > chi2  
      =  0.9891 
       Chi2(54) 
       = 33.49 
      Prob > chi2  
       = 0.9872 
 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using the Arellano – Bond dynamic panel GMM estimation with one lag of the dependent variable to be included in the 
model, 0 lags of the dependent variable and one lag of other variables to be used as instruments. The results reported here use the twostep estimator. The 
indices are constructed following the principal component methodology that utilizes all components. The indices are constructed following the principal 
component methodology that utilizes all components. The financial openness, banking sector development, bond and stock market development, financial 
development variables and institutional quality measures are constructed using principal component indices. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics and the stars 
represent the significant t statistics for 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels respectively. The figures in brackets depict the standard errors for the coefficients. 
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Table 1.7: Principal components type financial openness and financial development indices; Changing lag structure 
 
  
 Dependent Variables 
     
  ∆Banking sector 
development 
∆Bond market 
development 
∆Stock market 
development 
∆Financial 
development 
     
∆Dependent variable (Lag 1) 1.1399*** 
       (46.01) 
[0.0247731] 
0.4776*** 
       (20.75) 
[0.0230098] 
0.2363*** 
        (122.07) 
[0.0019359] 
0.3271*** 
       (41.72) 
[0.0078403] 
∆Dependent variable (Lag 2) -0.3948*** 
       (-20.27) 
[0.019475] 
-0.0416*** 
        (-7.32) 
[0.0056819] 
-0.1279*** 
        (-49.68) 
[0.0025747] 
-0.0764*** 
       (-6.38) 
[0.0119731] 
∆Dependent variable (Lag 3) 0.1837*** 
       (19.97) 
[0.0092001] 
0.3101*** 
        (57.05) 
[0.0054356] 
-0.0491*** 
        (-21.95) 
[0.0022359] 
-0.1181*** 
       (-10.58) 
[0.0111681] 
∆Financial openness 0.0947*** 
       (8.03) 
[0.01177981] 
0.1237*** 
        (13.86) 
[0.0089279] 
0.0689*** 
         (4.08) 
[0.168978] 
0.476*** 
       (12.13) 
[0.0392724] 
∆Trade openness 0.0004 
       (0.68) 
[0.000539] 
-0.0003** 
        (-2.42) 
[0.0001152] 
0.0131*** 
        (67.50) 
[0.0001944] 
0.0057*** 
       (6.82) 
[0.0008389] 
∆Log GDP per capita       0.0569* 
       (1.90) 
[0.0299644] 
-0.0807***   
        (-2.90) 
[0.0278365] 
-0.1367** 
        (-2.22) 
[0.0616486] 
0.617*** 
       (3.62) 
[0.1706641] 
∆Institutional Quality      -0.01106 
       (-0.45) 
[0.0246444] 
-0.04822*** 
        (-18.95) 
[0.0025442] 
-0.2413*** 
        (-8.50) 
[0.028378] 
-0.0129 
       (-0.50) 
[0.0257977] 
∆Secondary School Enrollment        0.0004 
        (1.48) 
[0.0002368] 
 
-0.0016*** 
         (-11.62) 
[0.0001344] 
 
-0.0027*** 
        (-5.13) 
[0.0004416] 
 
0.0005 
       (1.05) 
[0.0004206] 
 
Number of observations:             289             274            346          225 
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Number of groups:              49              40             53           37 
Arellano – Bond test for 
AR(1) in first differences: 
Arellano – Bond test for 
AR(2) in first differences: 
      z =  -3.04 
 Pr > z =0.0024 
      z =  0.67 
 Pr > z =0.5006 
      z =  -1.40 
Pr > z = 0.1628 
      z =  1.03 
 Pr > z =0.3012 
      z =  -1.96 
 Pr > z=0.0501 
      z =  1.38 
  Pr >z=0.1689 
      z =  -1.96 
  Pr >z=0.0498 
      z =   1.11 
  Pr >z=0.2668 
Sargan test:       Chi2(49)  
      = 44.27 
     Prob > chi2  
     =  0.6650 
      Chi2(49) 
      =  32.75 
      Prob > chi2 
      = 0.9640 
      Chi2(49) 
      = 47.93 
     Prob > chi2  
      =  0.5165 
       Chi2(49) 
       = 31.29 
      Prob > chi2  
       = 0.9771 
 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using the Arellano – Bond dynamic panel GMM estimation with 3 lags of the dependent variable to be included in the 
model, 0 lags of the dependent variable and 3 lags of other variables to be used as instruments. The results reported here use the twostep estimator. The indices 
are constructed following the principal component methodology that utilizes all components. The indices are constructed following the principal component 
methodology that utilizes all components. The financial openness, banking sector development, bond and stock market development, financial development 
variables and institutional quality measures are constructed using principal component indices. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics and the stars represent 
the significant t statistics for 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels respectively. The figures in brackets depict the standard errors for the coefficients. 
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Table 1.8: Principal component type financial openness and financial development indices with time dummies and a trend 
 
  
 Dependent Variables 
     
  ∆Banking sector 
development 
∆Bond market 
development 
∆Stock market 
development 
∆Financial 
development 
     
∆Dependent variable (Lagged) 0.8478*** 
        (48.95) 
[0.0173202] 
0.768*** 
       (23.53) 
[0.326304] 
0.1741*** 
       (27.61) 
[0.0063054] 
0.3197*** 
       (13.36) 
[0.023957] 
∆Financial openness -0.0304 
        (-1.38) 
[0.0219826] 
0.0009 
       (0.09) 
[0.0101114] 
0.0832** 
       (2.52) 
[0.0329683] 
0.3778*** 
       (9.68) 
[0.0390382] 
∆Trade openness 0.0005 
         (0.83) 
[0.0005959] 
0.0007* 
       (1.75) 
[0.0003802] 
0.0049*** 
       (7.38) 
[0.0006743] 
0.0002 
       (0.12) 
[0.0016972] 
∆Log GDP per capita       -0.8265*** 
         (-5.26) 
[0.1572273] 
-0.6568***   
       (-8.20) 
[0.0800554] 
-0.6226* 
       (-1.68) 
[0.3716739] 
-1.0856*** 
       (-2.69) 
[0.4041233] 
∆Institutional Quality      0.0006 
         (0.03) 
[0.017873] 
-0.0219** 
       (-2.28) 
[0.0095802] 
-0.0964** 
       (-2.60) 
[0.0370737] 
0.1053** 
       (2.34) 
[0.0450465] 
∆Secondary School Enrollment       0.0016*** 
         (3.11) 
[0.0005091] 
0.0012*** 
       (3.13) 
[0.003713] 
-0.0041*** 
       (-3.28) 
[0.0012646] 
0.0024* 
       (1.69) 
[0.0014215] 
     
Number of observations:             333             301            376          262 
Number of groups:              50              41             54           38 
Arellano – Bond test for 
AR(1) in first differences: 
Arellano – Bond test for 
AR(2) in first differences: 
       z =  -2.27 
 Pr > z=0.0231 
       z =  -1.51 
 Pr > z=0.1314 
      z =  -2.52 
Pr > z = 0.0116 
      z =  -1.18 
 Pr > z =0.2383 
     z =  -1.85 
 Pr > z=0.0642 
      z =  -1.20 
  Pr >z=0.2318 
      z =  -2.10 
  Pr > z=0.0357 
      z =   -1.10 
  Pr > z=0.2733 
Sargan test:       Chi2(54)        Chi2(54)       Chi2(54)        Chi2(54) 
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      = 31.23 
     Prob > chi2  
     =  0.9945 
      =  25.78 
      Prob > chi2 
      = 0.9996 
      = 45.95 
     Prob > chi2  
      =  0.7740 
       = 22.67 
      Prob > chi2  
       = 0.9999 
 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using the Arellano – Bond dynamic panel GMM estimation with one lag of the dependent variable to be included in the 
model, 0 lags of the dependent variable and one lag of other variables to be used as instruments. The results reported here use the twostep estimator. The 
indices are constructed following the principal component methodology that utilizes all components. The indices are constructed following the principal 
component methodology that utilizes all components. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics and the stars represent the significant t statistics for 1%, 5%, and 
10% confidence levels respectively. The figures in brackets depict the standard errors for the coefficients. 
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Table 1.9: Principal components type financial openness and financial development indices for the developing country sample 
 
  
 Dependent Variables 
     
  ∆Banking sector 
development 
∆Bond market 
development 
∆Stock market 
development 
∆Financial 
development 
     
∆Dependent variable (Lagged) 0.809*** 
       (31.16) 
[0.0259655] 
0.5387*** 
       (14.27) 
[0.0377382] 
0.2234*** 
       (31.09) 
[0.0071859] 
0.414*** 
       (5.07) 
[0.0816462] 
∆Financial openness 0.0334** 
       (2.09) 
[0.0160238] 
0.0055 
       (0.56) 
[0.0098091] 
0.0941*** 
       (6.28) 
[0.0149839] 
0.1138*** 
       (4.94) 
[0.0230477] 
∆Trade openness -0.0018** 
       (-2.55) 
[0.0006937] 
-0.0013*** 
       (-3.16) 
[0.0004178] 
0.0118*** 
       (16.48) 
[0.0007136] 
0.0029* 
       (1.70) 
[0.0016757] 
∆Log GDP per capita       0.5396*** 
       (3.98) 
[0.1357218] 
0.0541   
       (0.57) 
[0.0943717] 
0.3992** 
       (2.42) 
[0.1648696] 
0.7263*** 
       (5.81) 
[0.1250271] 
∆Institutional Quality      0.0038 
       (0.32) 
[0.0119641] 
-0.2643*** 
       (-18.88) 
[0.0140001] 
-0.072*** 
      (-3.11) 
[0.0231092] 
-0.1168*** 
       (-3.32) 
[0.0351751] 
∆Secondary School Enrollment       -0.0029 
       (-1.58) 
[0.0018469] 
 
0.0048*** 
       (6.39) 
[0.0007486] 
 
-0.006*** 
      (-5.44) 
[0.0011049] 
 
-0.0015 
       (-0.76) 
[0.0020077] 
 
Number of observations:             153             112            163            100 
Number of groups:              25              18             27             16 
Arellano – Bond test for 
AR(1) in first differences: 
Arellano – Bond test for 
AR(2) in first differences: 
       z =  -2.04 
 Pr > z =0.0416 
       z =  1.32 
 Pr > z =0.1854 
      z =  -1.90 
Pr > z = 0.0571 
      z =  1.33 
 Pr > z =0.1844 
     z =  -1.88 
 Pr > z =0.0603 
      z =  -1.31 
  Pr > z=0.1907 
      z =  -1.80 
  Pr > z=0.0726 
      z =   -0.08 
  Pr > z=0.9342 
Sargan test:       Chi2(54)        Chi2(54)       Chi2(54)        Chi2(54) 
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      = 21.00 
     Prob > chi2  
     =  1.0000 
      =  14.02 
      Prob > chi2 
      = 1.0000 
      = 18.40 
     Prob > chi2  
      =  1.0000 
       = 8.21 
      Prob > chi2  
       = 1.0000 
 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using the Arellano – Bond dynamic panel GMM estimation with one lag of the dependent variable to be included in the 
model, 0 lags of the dependent variable and one lag of other variables to be used as instruments. The results reported here use the twostep estimator. The 
indices are constructed following the principal component methodology that utilizes all components. The indices are constructed following the principal 
component methodology that utilizes all components. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics and the stars represent the significant t statistics for 1%, 5%, and 
10% confidence levels respectively. The figures in brackets depict the standard errors for the coefficients. 
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Table 1.10: Principal components type financial development indices and the Chinn and Ito index of capital account openness 
 
  
 Dependent Variables 
     
 ∆Banking sector 
development 
∆Bond market 
development 
∆Stock market 
development 
∆Financial 
development 
     
∆Dependent variable (Lagged) 0.690*** 0.908*** 0.225*** 0.388*** 
 (140.4) (94.97) (235.8) (59.98) 
 [0.00492] [0.00956] [0.000954] [0.00647] 
∆KAOPEN 0.0965*** -0.0304*** 0.0545*** -0.0273*** 
 (18.75) (-13.22) (5.969) (-6.925) 
 [0.00515] [0.00230] [0.00913] [0.00395] 
∆Trade openness 0.0038*** 0.0016*** 0.0123*** 0.0103*** 
 (20.82) (13.62) (74.08) (23.23) 
 [0.000180] [0.000116] [0.000166] [0.000442] 
∆Log GDP per capita 0.181*** -0.218*** 0.602*** 0.674*** 
 (4.442) (-10.62) (29.70) (15.10) 
 [0.0408] [0.0205] [0.0203] [0.0446] 
∆Institutional Quality -0.0873*** 
(-24.19) 
-0.0613*** 
(-20.42) 
-0.140*** 
(-19.23) 
-0.0425*** 
(-3.385) 
 [0.00361] [0.00300] [0.00726] [0.0125] 
∆Secondary School Enrollment 0.0001 
(0.734) 
-0.0002*** 
(-3.004) 
-0.0055*** 
(-28.48) 
-0.0004** 
(-2.447) 
 [0.000185] [7.04e-05] [0.000193] [0.000143] 
     
Number of observations: 373 318 420 276 
Number of groups: 54 41 57 38 
Arellano – Bond test for 
AR(1) in first differences: 
Arellano – Bond test for 
AR(2) in first differences: 
Sargan test: 
z = -1.06 
Pr > z = 0.2881 
z = 0.87 
Pr > z = 0.3831 
Chi2(54)= 51.66 
Prob > chi2 
z = -2.50 
Pr > z = 0.0124 
z = -2.03 
Pr > z = 0.0428 
Chi2(54)= 36.78 
Prob > chi2 
z = -1.93 
Pr > z = 0.0541 
z = -1.01 
Pr > z = 0.3112 
Chi2(54)= 51.03 
Prob > chi2 
z = -2.07 
Pr > z = 0.0387 
z = -0.45 
Pr > z = 0.6558 
Chi2(54)= 35.27 
Prob > chi2 
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= 0.5651 = 0.9648 = 0.5897 = 0.9773 
 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using the Arellano – Bond dynamic panel GMM estimation with one lag of the dependent variable to be included in the 
model, 0 lags of the dependent variable and one lag of other variables to be used as instruments. The results reported here use the twostep estimator. The 
indices for banking sector, bond and stock market and overall financial development are constructed following the principal component methodology that 
utilizes all components. KAOPEN is the Chinn and Ito index of capital account openness. The indices are constructed following the principal component 
methodology that utilizes all components. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics and the stars represent the significant t statistics for 1%, 5%, and 10% 
confidence levels respectively. The figures in brackets depict the standard errors for the coefficients. 
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Table 1.11: Individual financial development measures and the Chinn and Ito index of capital account openness 
 
  
 Dependent Variables 
  
 ∆Liquid 
Liabilities 
∆Private credit ∆Deposit bank 
assets 
∆Total bank 
assets 
∆Domestic 
credit 
∆Stock market 
capitalization 
∆Turnover 
ratio 
∆Value traded 
         
∆Dependent variable (Lagged) 0.601*** 0.609*** 0.150*** 0.561*** 0.982*** 0.500*** 0.0985*** 0.485*** 
 (52.84) (277.7) (173.2) (100.4) (243.7) (199.9) (137.5) (3,819) 
 [0.0114] [0.00219] [0.000865] [0.00559] [0.00403] [0.00250] [0.000716] [0.000127] 
∆KAOPEN 1.013*** 1.362*** -1.113*** 1.053*** 0.676*** -8.854*** 13.08*** -6.110*** 
 (6.273) (13.17) (-68.14) (6.970) (3.418) (-29.47) (37.62) (-27.17) 
 [0.162] [0.103] [0.0163] [0.151] [0.198] [0.300] [0.348] [0.225] 
∆Trade openness 0.0656*** 0.105*** -0.0283*** 0.187*** 0.0534*** 0.553*** 0.499*** 1.096*** 
 (10.17) (20.29) (-84.20) (39.09) (9.375) (35.09) (57.29) (1,256) 
 [0.00645] [0.00517] [0.000336] [0.00479] [0.00569] [0.0158] [0.00870] [0.000873] 
∆Log GDP per capita 6.465*** 7.489*** 17.83*** 3.550* -4.777*** 64.59*** -50.81*** 114.5*** 
 (9.703) (8.143) (208.3) (1.942) (-2.748) (40.68) (-61.01) (512.4) 
 [0.666] [0.920] [0.0856] [1.828] [1.738] [1.588] [0.833] [0.223] 
∆Institutional Quality -2.448*** 
(-16.67) 
-2.168*** 
(-22.12) 
0.0457** 
(2.406) 
-0.414*** 
(-3.957) 
-4.953*** 
(-30.60) 
-10.84*** 
(-31.90) 
-14.48*** 
(-92.57) 
-6.836*** 
(-42.26) 
 [0.147] [0.0980] [0.0190] [0.105] [0.162] [0.340] [0.156] [0.162] 
∆Secondary School 
Enrollment 
-0.0517*** 
(-13.58) 
-0.0759*** 
(-20.59) 
0.0801*** 
(35.14) 
0.0004 
(0.100) 
-0.0223*** 
(-6.438) 
-0.0150** 
(-2.080) 
-0.442*** 
(-99.89) 
-0.458*** 
(-129.5) 
 [0.00381] [0.00369] [0.00228] [0.00426] [0.00346] [0.00722] [0.00442] [0.00354] 
         
Number of observations: 399 408 386 376 411 420 420 420 
Number of groups: 56 56 55 54 57 57 57 57 
Arellano – Bond test for 
AR(1) in first differences: 
Arellano – Bond test for 
AR(2) in first differences: 
Sargan test: 
z = -0.78 
Pr > z =0.4337 
z = -1.85 
Pr > z =0.0641 
Chi2(54)=53.57 
Prob > chi2 
z = 0.31 
Pr > z = 0.7551 
z = -1.79 
Pr > z = 0.0732 
Chi2(54)= 52.70 
Prob > chi2 
z = -0.97 
Pr > z = 0.3325 
z = 1.07 
Pr > z = 0.2883 
Chi2(54)= 48.90 
Prob > chi2 
z = 0.93 
Pr > z = 0.3531 
z = -1.66 
Pr > z = 0.0961 
Chi2(54)= 49.00 
Prob > chi2 
z = -2.12 
Pr > z = 0.0339 
z = 1.23 
Pr > z = 0.2174 
Chi2(54)= 53.78 
Prob > chi2 
z = 0.18 
Pr > z = 0.8564 
z = -1.96 
Pr > z = 0.0495 
Chi2(54)= 52.34 
Prob > chi2 
z = -1.54 
Pr > z = 0.1224 
z = -1.07 
Pr > z = 0.2865 
Chi2(54)= 52.55 
Prob > chi2 
z = -2.02 
Pr > z = 0.0439 
z = 0.18 
Pr > z = 0.8570 
Chi2(54)= 53.93 
Prob > chi2 
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= 0.4909 = 0.5247 = 0.6708 = 0.6673 = 0.4828 = 0.5386 = 0.5306 = 0.4770 
 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using the Arellano – Bond dynamic panel GMM estimation with one lag of the dependent variable to be included in the 
model, 0 lags of the dependent variable and one lag of other variables to be used as instruments. The results reported here use the twostep estimator. The 
indices for banking sector, bond and stock market and overall financial development are constructed following the principal component methodology that 
utilizes all components. KAOPEN is the Chinn and Ito index of capital account openness, the dependent variables are: Liquid liabilities (% of GDP), Private credit 
by deposit money banks and other institutions (% of GDP), Deposit money bank assets to the sum of deposit money bank assets and central bank assets (in 
percentages), Total bank assets (%  of GDP), Domestic credit provided by the banking sector (% of GDP), Stock market capitalization (% of GDP), Stock market 
turnover ratio (in percentages), Stock market value traded (% of GDP). Figures in parentheses are t-statistics and the stars represent the significant t statistics 
for 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels respectively. The figures in brackets depict the standard errors for the coefficients. 
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Table 1.12: Principal component type financial openness index and individual financial development measures 
 
    
                                                          Dependent Variables   
         
  ∆Liquid 
liabilities 
∆Private credit ∆Deposit 
bank assets 
∆Total bank 
assets 
∆Domestic 
credit 
∆Stock market 
capitalization 
∆Turnover 
ratio 
∆Value traded 
         
∆Dependent variable (Lagged) 0.8998*** 
    (454.64) 
[0.0019791] 
0.6198*** 
      (143.51) 
[0.004319] 
0.7784*** 
     (481.82) 
[0.0016155] 
0.572*** 
      (149.82) 
[0.0038166] 
0.9748*** 
       (102.77) 
[0.0094847] 
 0.522*** 
     (173.98) 
[0.0029979] 
0.0998*** 
     (361.07) 
[0.0002764] 
0.5103*** 
        (1809.72) 
[0.000282] 
∆Financial openness 0.7643*** 
    (55.85) 
[0.0136861] 
3.7167*** 
      (45.67) 
[0.0813903] 
-1.158*** 
      (-76.08) 
[0.0152147] 
   9.509*** 
      (53.13) 
[0.1789926] 
0.0235 
       (0.21) 
[0.1123886] 
2.934*** 
      (27.67) 
[0.1060275] 
4.9186*** 
      (32.15) 
[0.1530111] 
       6.661*** 
        (52.82) 
[0.1261231] 
∆Trade openness 0.0730*** 
     (9.28) 
[0.0078662] 
0.1259*** 
      (14.75) 
[0.0085404] 
-0.0148*** 
      (-24.75) 
[0.0005986] 
0.1391*** 
      (17.76) 
[0.0077456] 
    0.1283** 
       (21.17) 
[0.0060617] 
0.7294*** 
      (71.12) 
[0.0102561] 
0.3289*** 
      (19.50) 
[0.0168636] 
1.0343*** 
        (350.27) 
[0.0029528] 
∆Log GDP per capitat   3.1754***  
     (2.86) 
[1.111859] 
   9.476*** 
      (6.58) 
[1.440603] 
5.831*** 
      (65.41) 
[0.0891392] 
0.212 
       (0.14) 
[1.530057] 
     -1.81506 
       (-1.26) 
[1.440914] 
  36.911***   
      (30.61) 
[1.205813] 
     -53.90*** 
      (-55.64) 
[0.9687153] 
       95.845*** 
        (129.62) 
[0.7394168] 
∆Institutional Quality -4.687*** 
     (-16.31) 
[0.2873217] 
-2.935*** 
      (-24.27) 
[0.1208917] 
1.0541*** 
      (49.91) 
[0.021122] 
2.631*** 
      (16.04) 
[0.16396] 
     -7.934*** 
       (-25.33) 
[0.313209] 
  -15.222*** 
      (-59.65) 
[0.2551843] 
    -12.961*** 
      (-46.04) 
[0.28153] 
-3.973*** 
        (-12.57) 
[0.3161314] 
∆Secondary School 
Enrollment 
-0.0948** 
     (-8.17) 
[0.0115953]  
 
  -0.0628*** 
      (-15.35) 
[0.0040934] 
 
0.00366*** 
      (17.00) 
[0.0002152] 
 
0.0695*** 
      (36.40) 
[0.0019105] 
 
     -0.092*** 
       (-21.28) 
[0.0042989] 
 
   -0.01422* 
      (-1.88) 
[0.0075512] 
 
     -0.427*** 
      (-27.43) 
[0.0155645] 
 
-0.392*** 
        (-119.80) 
[0.0032682] 
 
Number of observations:         357          365           344         335           368         376          376            376 
Number of groups:          53           53            51          50            54          54           54             54 
Arellano – Bond test for 
AR(1) in first differences: 
Arellano – Bond test for 
AR(2) in first differences: 
z =  -0.50 
Pr > z=0.6200 
z =  -1.63 
Pr>z=0.1024 
z =  -0.16 
Pr > z=0.8734 
z = -1.55 
Pr > z=0.1208 
z =  -2.88 
Pr >z=0.0039 
z =  -1.63 
Pr >z=0.1027 
z =  0.52 
Pr > z=0.5997 
z =  -1.29 
Pr > z=0.1982 
z =  -2.06 
Pr >z =0.0390 
z =  1.67 
Pr >z =0.0942 
z =  0.54 
Pr >z=0.5878 
z =  -2.20 
Pr >z=0.0275 
z =  -1.53 
Pr>z=0.1256 
z =  -1.06 
Pr>z=0.2914 
z =  -1.93 
Pr >z=0.0539 
z =  0.25 
Pr >z=0.8056 
Sargan test: Chi2(54) Chi2(54) Chi2(54) Chi2(54) Chi2(54) Chi2(54) Chi2(54) Chi2(54) 
76 
 
= 50.84 
Prob >chi2 
= 0.5970 
= 46.85 
Prob >chi2 
=  0.7441 
= 44.53 
Prob >chi2 
= 0.8175 
= 47.30 
Prob >chi2 
=  0.7286 
= 51.00 
Prob > chi2 
=  0.5908 
= 48.15 
Prob > chi2                
= 0.6984 
= 45.83 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.7776 
= 50.40 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.6139 
 
 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using the Arellano – Bond dynamic panel GMM estimation with one lag of the dependent variable to be included in the 
model, 0 lags of the dependent variable and one lag of other variables to be used as instruments. The results reported here use the twostep estimator. The 
indices are constructed following the principal component methodology that utilizes all components. The variables are: Liquid liabilities (% of GDP), Private 
credit by deposit money banks and other institutions (% of GDP), The ratio of deposit money bank assets to the sum of deposit money bank assets to central 
bank assets (in percentages), Total bank assets (% of GDP),  Domestic credit provided by the banking sector (% of GDP), Stock market capitalization (% of GDP), 
Stock market turnover ratio (in percentages),and Stock market total value traded (% of GDP). Figures in parentheses are t-statistics and the stars represent the 
significant t statistics for 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels respectively. The figures in brackets depict the standard errors for the coefficients. 
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1.10 Additional Appendices 
 
1.10.1 Data Appendix 
 
Financial openness indicators: 
 
Foreign direct investment: It is the sum of net inflows and outflows of foreign direct investment recorded as a percentage of GDP. This indicator 
brings together equity capital, reinvestment earning and other short and long-term capital. It is one of the most frequently used indicators in 
capital flows, financial openness/globalization literature. Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators Database (2007) 
 
Portfolio investment flows (% of GDP): These flows sum portfolio debt flows (public and publicly guaranteed and private nonguaranteed bond 
issues purchased by foreign investors) and non-debt-creating portfolio equity flows which are equal to the sum of country funds, depository 
receipts, and direct purchases of shares by foreign investors (World Bank, 2007). They exclude liabilities constituting foreign authorities’ 
reserves. Portfolio investment flows are used as an indicator for private capital flows. They are given as a percentage of GDP. Portfolio 
investment flows together with foreign direct investment represent the incoming stream of investment and capital opportunities that countries 
attract as a result of opening up their financial markets. Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators Database (2007) 
 
International debt issues (% of GDP): International debt flows measures the net flow of international bond issues relative to a country’s 
economic activity (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine, 2009). This variable increases in the income level. Examining country wide data we can see 
that high-income countries have the highest issues of international debt relative to GDP. This indicator measures “the degree to which a 
country’s financial system is interlinked with international financial markets.” (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine, 2009, 15). It helps in examining 
net flows of bond issues and in bringing a view from the bond market. Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine’s Database on Financial 
Development and Structure (2007) 
 
Financial development indicators 
 
a) Banking sector development indicators: 
 
Liquid liabilities (% of GDP):  It is the sum of currency, demand and interest bearing liabilities of banks and other financial intermediaries 
represented as a percentage of the GDP. Liquid liabilities is the broadest indicator of financial intermediation due its inclusion of three financial 
sectors (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine, 2009). Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine’s Database on Financial Development and Structure 
(2007) 
 
Private credit by deposit money banks and other institutions (% of GDP): It is an indicator for the overall development in private banking markets 
(Chinn and Ito, 2006). This variable refers to financial resources provided to the private sector by deposit money banks and other financial 
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institutions through loans, purchases of nonequity securities, and trade credits. Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine’s Database on Financial 
Development and Structure (2007) 
 
The ratio of deposit money bank assets to the sum of deposit money bank assets and central bank assets (in percentages): It is equal to the 
deposit money bank assets divided by the sum of deposit money bank assets and central bank assets. Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine’s 
Database on Financial Development and Structure (2007) 
 
Total bank assets (% of GDP): It is the sum of central bank assets to GDP and deposit money bank assets to GDP. It is used to represent the 
overall size of the banking sector. Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine’s Database on Financial Development and Structure (2007) 
 
Domestic credit provided by the banking sector (% of GDP): It includes credit extended to the private sector and general government, to the 
nonfinancial public sector in the form of investments in short- and long-term government securities, to banking and nonbank institutions and 
loans to state enterprises but excludes credit to the central government. Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators Database (2007) 
 
b) Stock market development indicators: 
 
Stock market capitalization (% of GDP): It is equal to the value of listed shares divided by GDP. It is an indicator of the size of the stock market. 
Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine’s Database on Financial Development and Structure (2007) 
 
Stock market turnover ratio (in percentages): It is used as the efficiency indicator of stock markets (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2001). Stock 
market turnover ratio measures “the activity or liquidity of a stock market relative to its size.” (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2001, 32). Note that 
small and active stock markets will have a larger turnover ratio based on the above definition whereas large and less liquid stock markets will 
have a lower turnover ratio. Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine’s Database on Financial Development and Structure (2007) 
 
Stock market total value traded (% of GDP): It is equal to the total shares traded on the stock market exchange divided by GDP. This indicator 
measures the activity or liquidity of the stock markets (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2001). Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine’s Database on 
Financial Development and Structure (2007) 
 
c) Bond market development indicators: 
 
Private bond market capitalization (% of GDP): It is equal to the total amount of outstanding domestic debt securities issued by financial 
institutions and corporations as a share of GDP. Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine’s Database on Financial Development and Structure 
(2007) 
 
Public bond market capitalization (% of GDP): It is equal to the total amount of public domestic securities issued by governments as a share of 
GDP. Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine’s Database on Financial Development and Structure (2007) 
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Control Variables 
 
Logarithm of GDP per capita: It is measured in constant 2000 US dollars and we take the logarithm. Source: World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators Database (2007) 
 
Trade openness (% of GDP): It is the sum of imports and exports of goods and services. Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
Database (2007) 
 
Secondary school gross enrolment rate (% of population): It is used as an indicator that controls for differences in educational attainment across 
countries. We take secondary school gross enrollment rate as a possible determinant for why we examine differences across countries in terms 
of grasping the benefits of financial liberalization. Source: World Bank’s Edstats Database  
 
Legal and institutional variable: They are used to measure economic institutions and the overall quality of legal systems. We employ four 
different measures to control for institutional, legal, political and economic factors that may affect the overall level of financial development. 
The four variables used reflect the “statistical compilation of responses on the quality of governance given by a large number of enterprise, 
citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries, as reported by a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-
governmental organizations, and international organizations.” 30 These indicators are government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, 
and control corruption and are measured through a range from-2.5 to 2.5 where higher values correspond to better governance outcomes. 
Source: World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators. 
 
                                                          
30 Please refer to the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) dataset. 1996 – 2009. World Bank. http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp (Excel 
sheet) 
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1.10.2 Supplementary Appendix 
 
Abbreviations 
 
BDE: Equally weighted banking sector development index 
BDC: Coefficient of variation type banking sector development index 
BDPC: First score principal components type banking sector development index 
BDPCA: Principal components type banking sector development index 
BMDE: Equally weighted bond market development index 
BMDC: Coefficient of variation type bond market sector development index 
BMDPC: First score principal components type bond market development index 
BMDPCA: Principal components type stock market development index 
SMDE: Equally weighted stock market development index 
SMDC: Coefficient of variation type stock market development index 
SMDPC: First score principal components type stock market development index 
SMDPCA: Principal components type stock market development index 
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Table 1.1.1 (a): Summary of pairwise correlations for the financial openness variables and indices 
 
 
 
 
Notes: FDI= Foreign direct investment (% of GDP), international debt issues (% of GDP), Portfolio investment = portfolio investment flows (% of GDP). The indices for financial 
openness are the equally weighted financial openness index, the coefficient of variation type financial openness index, first score principal components type financial openness index, 
and the principal components type financial openness index. * represents the significances at the %5 percent level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables FDI Int. debt 
issues 
Portfolio 
investment 
Equally 
weighted FO 
Coefficient of 
variation FO 
First component 
FO 
Principal 
components FO 
FDI    1.0000       
International debt issues 0.5409*    1.0000      
Portfolio investment 0.9224* 0.4588*     1.0000     
Equally weighted financial openness 0.9787* 0.6919* 0.9225*       1.0000    
Coefficient of variation financial openness 0.9815* 0.5426* 0.9783* 0.9768*      1.0000   
First component financial openness 0.9566* 0.7260* 0.9313* 0.9949* 0.9716*       1.0000  
Principal components financial openness 0.9165* 0.8134* 0.8810* 0.9791* 0.9300* 0.9906* 1.0000 
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Table 1.1.1 (b): Summary of pairwise correlations for the banking sector development variables and indices 
 
Variables Liquid 
Liabilities 
Private 
credit 
Deposit 
bank 
assets 
Total 
bank 
assets 
Domestic 
Credit 
BDE BDC BDPC BDPCA 
Liquid Liability  1.0000         
Private credit  0.6432* 1.0000        
Deposit bank assets  0.3487* 0.4864* 1.0000       
Total bank assets  0.8126*   0.8387* 0.3265* 1.0000      
Domestic credit  0.6475* 0.8826* 0.3343* 0.8730*  1.0000     
BDE 0.8612* 0.9314* 0.4676* 0.9405*  0.9522* 1.0000    
BDC 0.8667* 0.9290* 0.4433* 0.9392* 0.9548* 0.9995* 1.0000   
BDPC 0.8637* 0.9298* 0.5347* 0.9331* 0.9335* 0.9966* 0.9941* 1.0000  
BDPCA 0.8379* 0.9236* 0.6396* 0.9000* 0.9038* 0.9784* 0.9724* 0.9916* 1.0000 
 
 
Notes: Liquid liabilities (% of GDP), Private credit by deposit money banks and other institutions (% of GDP), The ratio of deposit money bank assets to the sum of deposit money bank 
assets and central bank assets (in percentages), Total bank assets (% of GDP), Domestic credit provided by the banking sector (% of GDP), BDE = Equally weighted banking sector 
development index,  BDC = Coefficient of variation type banking sector development index, BDPC = First score principal components type banking sector development index, BDPCA = 
Principal components type banking sector development index. * represents the significances at the %5 percent level. 
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Table 1.1.1 (c): Summary of pairwise correlations for the bond market development variables and indices 
 
Variables Private bond market 
capitalization 
Public bond market 
capitalizaton 
BMDE BMDC BMDPC BMDPCA 
Private bond market capitalization 1.0000      
Public bond market capitalization   0.3451*                 1.0000     
BMDE   0.8456* 0.7928* 1.0000    
BMDC   0.9232* 0.6794*   0.9858* 1.0000   
BMDPC   0.8201* 0.8201*   0.9989*  0.9770*   1.0000  
BMDPCA   0.9606* 0.5924*   0.9607*  0.9936*   0.9469* 1.0000 
 
 
Notes: Private bond market capitalization (% of GDP), Public bond market capitalization (% of GDP), BMDE = Equally weighted bond market development index, BMDC = Coefficient of 
variation type bond market development index, BMDPC = First score principal components type bond market development index, BMDPCA = Principal components type bond market 
development index. * represents the significances at the %5 percent level. 
 
Table 1.1.1 (d): Summary of pairwise correlations for the stock market development variables and indices 
 
Variables Stock market 
caitalization 
Stock market 
turnover 
Stock market total 
value traded 
SMDE SMDC SMDPC SMDPCA 
Stock market capitalization        1.0000       
Stock market turnover 0.1084* 1.0000      
Stock market total value traded 0.6862*   0.6003* 1.0000     
SMDE 0.7443*   0.7120*   0.9498* 1.0000    
SMDC 0.7156*   0.7279*   0.9593*    0.9987* 1.0000   
SMDPC 0.7591*   0.6822*               0.9620*     0.9987*    0.9978* 1.0000  
SMDPCA 0.5480*   0.8635*   0.9104*     0.9656*    0.9735*   0.9561* 1.0000 
 
 
Notes: Stock market capitalization: Stock market capitalization (% of GDP), Stock market turnover ratio (in percentages), Stock market total value traded (% of GDP), SMDE = Equally 
weighted stock market development index, ESMD = Equally weighted stock market development index, SMDC = Coefficient of variation type stock market development index, SMDPC = 
First score principal components type stock market development index, SMDPCA = Principal components type stock market development index. * represents the significances at the %5 
percent level. 
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Table 1.1.2: Principal component type financial development and financial openness indices excluding some controls variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ∆Banking sector development ∆Bond market development ∆Stock market 
development 
∆Financial development 
Models (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) 
∆Dependent 
variable 
(Lagged) 
.8487*** 
(86.08) 
[0.00986] 
.8642*** 
(102.40) 
[0.00844] 
.803***  
(87.11) 
[0.00922] 
.8034*** 
(91.92) 
[0.00874] 
.2349*** 
(350.41) 
[0.00067] 
.1794*** 
(135.76) 
[0.00132] 
.2969*** 
(68.48) 
[0.004336] 
.3285*** 
(47.14) 
[0.00697] 
∆Financial 
openness 
.1083*** 
(14.99) 
[0.00722] 
.0953*** 
(11.31) 
[0.00842] 
.1077*** 
(22.91) 
[0.00470] 
.0957*** 
(23.92) 
[0.00400] 
.0912*** 
(5.82) 
[0.01567] 
.1065*** 
(6.45) 
[0.01651] 
.4811*** 
(31.63) 
[0.015211] 
.4656*** 
(31.87) 
[0.014606] 
∆Trade 
openness 
.0019*** 
(5.16) 
[0.00036] 
-.0002 
(-1.16) 
[0.00018] 
.0004** 
(2.19) 
[0.00019] 
.0004*** 
(5.95) 
[0.00007] 
.0105*** 
(69.03) 
[0.00015] 
.0029*** 
(26.04) 
[0.00011] 
.0061*** 
(15.04) 
[0.000405] 
.0019*** 
(5.68) 
[0.00034] 
∆Log GDP per 
capita 
.1084*** 
(2.52) 
[0.04299] 
.2907*** 
(10.11) 
[0.02877] 
-.1535** 
(-6.69) 
[0.02294] 
-.0991** 
(-6.45) 
[0.01536] 
.4274** 
(24.71) 
[0.01729] 
1.379*** 
(74.86) 
[0.01842] 
0.453*** 
(18.70) 
[0.024189] 
.9191*** 
(22.70) 
[0.040488] 
∆Institutional 
Quality 
- -.0257*** 
(-2.37) 
[0.01084] 
-  -.063*** 
(-20.98) 
[0.00299] 
- -.1461*** 
(-11.48) 
[0.01273] 
- .0622*** 
(11.37) 
[0.00547] 
∆Secondary 
School 
Enrollment 
0.0008*** 
(4.20) 
[0.000187] 
- 0.0001** 
(0.98) 
[0.00014] 
- -.005*** 
(-20.98) 
[0.00021] 
- .0022*** 
(5.82) 
[0.00038] 
- 
Number of 
observations: 
333 424 301 386 376 499 262 328 
Number of 
groups: 
50 51 41 42 54 57 38 39 
Arellano – 
Bond test for 
AR(1) in first 
differences: 
 
z =  -2.48 
Pr > z=0.0132 
 
 
z = -3.05  
Pr > z=0.0023 
 
 
z =  -2.40 
Pr > z=0.0162 
 
 
z = -2.66   
Pr > z=0.0079 
 
 
z =  -1.91 
Pr > z=0.0559 
 
 
z = -2.55   
Pr > z =0.0108 
 
 
z =  -1.92 
Pr > z=0.0551 
 
 
z = -2.43 
Pr > z=0.0153 
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Regressions are estimated using the Arellano – Bond dynamic panel GMM estimation with one lag of the dependent variable to be included in the model, 0 lags of the dependent 
variable and one lag of other variables to be used as instruments. The results reported here use the twostep estimator. The indices are constructed following the principal component 
methodology that utilizes all components. Model (a) excludes the institutional quality index whereas Model (b) excludes the secondary school enrollment rate. Figures in parentheses 
are t-statistics and the stars represent the significant t statistics for 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels respectively. The figures in brackets depict the standard errors for the 
coefficients. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Arellano – 
Bond test for 
AR(2) in first 
differences: 
z =  -1.47 
Pr > z 
=0.1415 
z = -1.96 
Pr > z 
=0.0503 
z =  -1.67 
Pr > z 
=0.0940 
z =  -1.79 
Pr > z 
=0.0743 
z =  -0.94 
Pr > z 
=0.3463 
z =  -0.87 
Pr > z 
=0.3848 
z =  -1.08 
Pr > z 
=0.2799 
z = -0.54 
Pr > z 
=0.5911 
Sargan test: Chi2(54) =    
44.66 
Prob >chi2 = 
0.8136 
Chi2(54) =    
43.54 
Prob >chi2 = 
0.8449 
Chi2(54) =    
39.65 
Prob >chi2 = 
0.9279 
Chi2(54) =  
37.97 
Prob>chi2 = 
0.9518 
Chi2(54) =  
50.08 
Prob>chi2= 
0.6263 
Chi2(54)=   
51.07 
Prob>chi2= 
0.5881 
Chi2(54)=  
33.25 
Prob>chi2 = 
0.9882 
Chi2(54) =    
34.88 
Prob >chi2 = 
0.9799 
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Table 1.1.3: Principal component type financial openness and financial development indices, predetermined variables 
 
  
 Dependent Variables 
     
  ∆Banking sector 
development 
∆Bond market 
development 
∆Stock market 
development 
∆Financial 
development 
     
∆Dependent variable (Lagged) 0.8673*** 
       (105.88) 
[0.0081914] 
0.7507*** 
        (30.04) 
[0.024991] 
0.2811*** 
        (56.81) 
[0.0049475] 
0.3585*** 
       (32.57) 
[0.0110051] 
∆Financial openness 0.1249*** 
       (4.70) 
[0.0265703] 
0.1012*** 
        (10.62) 
[0.0095269] 
0.0959*** 
         (12.87) 
[0.0074586] 
0.5899*** 
       (7.44) 
[0.0793222] 
∆Trade openness -0.00032 
       (-0.60) 
[0.0005293] 
-0.0016*** 
        (-8.94) 
[0.0001787] 
0.0121*** 
         (55.33) 
[0.0002193] 
0.0036** 
       (2.58) 
[0.0013977] 
∆Log GDP per capita      0.328*** 
       (8.09) 
[0.0405353] 
0.1089*** 
         (5.77) 
[0.0188902] 
0.4732*** 
         (10.87) 
[0.0435262] 
0.4470***   
       (5.84) 
[0.0765868] 
∆Institutional Quality 0.0219 
       (0.70) 
[0.031476] 
-0.0022 
        (-0.42) 
[0.0051538] 
-0.2815*** 
         (-15.22) 
[0.0184928] 
     0.1116** 
        (2.57) 
[0.0435062] 
∆Secondary School Enrollment     0.0008 
       (1.49) 
[0.0005042] 
 
-0.0015*** 
        (-5.64) 
[0.0002618] 
 
-0.0090*** 
         (-12.24) 
[0.0007356] 
 
   0.0002 
         (0.38) 
[0.0005737] 
 
Number of observations:            333             301            376            262 
Number of groups:             50              41             54             38 
Arellano – Bond test for 
AR(1) in first differences: 
Arellano – Bond test for 
       z =  -2.65 
 Pr > z =0.0081 
       z =  -1.51 
        z =  -2.28 
Pr > z =0.0224 
        z =  -1.56 
     z =  -1.91 
 Pr > z =0.0560 
     z =  -0.96 
      z =  -2.06 
  Pr >z=0.0392 
      z =  -1.11 
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AR(2) in first differences:  Pr > z =0.1312  Pr > z=0.1179   Pr > z=0.3359   Pr >z=0.2991 
Sargan test:       Chi2(99)  
      = 47.44 
     Prob > chi2  
     =  1.0000 
      Chi2(99) 
      =  34.21 
      Prob > chi2 
      = 1.0000 
      Chi2(99) 
      = 52.59 
     Prob > chi2  
      =  1.0000 
       Chi2(99) 
       = 35.05 
      Prob > chi2  
       = 1.0000 
 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using the Arellano – Bond dynamic panel GMM estimation with one lag of the dependent variable to be included in the model, 0 lags of the 
dependent variable and one lag of other variables to be used as instruments. The results reported here use the twostep estimator. The indices are constructed following the principal 
component methodology that utilizes all components. All variables with the exception of the lag of the dependent variable are treated as being predetermined. Figures in parentheses 
are t-statistics and the stars represent the significant t statistics for 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels respectively. The figures in brackets depict the standard errors for the 
coefficients. 
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Table 1.1.4: Principal component type financial openness and financial development indices, endogenous variables 
 
     
 Dependent Variables 
     
  ∆Banking sector 
development 
∆Bond market 
development 
∆Stock market 
development 
∆Financial 
development 
     
∆Dependent variable (Lagged) 0.8218*** 
       (174.04) 
[0.0047217] 
0.7907*** 
        (98.46) 
[0.0080307] 
0.2457*** 
       (288.82) 
[0.0008506] 
0.2901*** 
       (107.68) 
[0.0026944] 
∆Financial openness 0.1664*** 
       (12.10) 
[0.0137494] 
0.1428*** 
        (10.30) 
[0.01386] 
0.4838*** 
       (27.84) 
[0.017376] 
0.587*** 
       (14.98) 
[0.039223] 
∆Trade openness 0.0047*** 
       (8.60) 
[0.0005462] 
-0.0009* 
        (-2.00) 
[0.0004647] 
0.0108*** 
        (50.59) 
[0.0002133] 
0.012*** 
       (12.95) 
[0.0009279] 
∆Log GDP per capita    0.0559 
       (1.48) 
[0.0376452] 
-0.0934*** 
        (-2.94) 
[0.0317837] 
0.2299*** 
        (9.21) 
[0.0249748] 
0.1718*   
       (1.94) 
[0.0885554] 
∆Institutional Quality 0.0206 
       (1.44) 
[0.0143207] 
-0.0334*** 
        (-7.99) 
[0.0041755] 
-0.0973*** 
        (-14.49) 
[0.0067176] 
    0.1024*** 
       (12.82) 
[0.0079898] 
∆Secondary School Enrollment     0.002*** 
       (7.29) 
[0.0002739] 
 
0.0003** 
        (2.54) 
[0.0001114] 
 
-0.0019*** 
        (-5.60) 
[0.0003296] 
 
      0.0035*** 
        (8.77) 
[0.0003994] 
 
Number of observations:            333             301            376            262 
Number of groups:             50              41             54             38 
Arellano – Bond test for 
AR(1) in first differences: 
Arellano – Bond test for 
z =  -2.31 
Pr > z =0.0208 
z =  -1.48 
z =  -2.41 
Pr > z =0.0158 
z =  -1.63 
z =  -1.97 
Pr > z =0.0494 
z =  -1.06 
z =  -1.94 
Pr >z=0.0519 
z =  -1.18 
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AR(2) in first differences: Pr > z =0.1397 Pr > z=0.1035 Pr > z=0.2907 Pr >z=0.2386 
Sargan test: Chi2(52) 
= 46.77 
Prob > chi2 
=  0.6792 
Chi2(52) 
= 35.35 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.9626 
Chi2(52) 
= 50.03 
Prob > chi2 
=  0.5519 
Chi2(52) 
= 34.74 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.9685 
 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using the Arellano – Bond dynamic panel GMM estimation with one lag of the dependent variable to be included in the model, 0 lags of the 
dependent variable and one lag of other variables to be used as instruments. The results reported here use the twostep estimator. The indices are constructed following the principal 
component methodology that utilizes all components. All variables with the exception of the lag of the dependent variable are treated as being endogenous. Figures in parentheses are 
t-statistics and the stars represent the significant t statistics for 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels respectively. The figures in brackets depict the standard errors for the coefficients. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
90 
 
Table 1.1.5: Principal components type financial openness and financial development indices with time dummies and a trend, complete results 
 
     
 Dependent Variables 
     
 ∆Banking sector 
development 
∆Bond market 
development 
∆Stock market 
development 
∆Financial 
development 
     
∆Dependent variable (Lagged) 0.848*** 0.768*** 0.174*** 0.320*** 
 (48.95) (23.53) (27.61) (13.36) 
 [0.0173] [0.0326] [0.00631] [0.0239] 
∆Financial openness -0.0303 0.0009 0.0832** 0.378*** 
 (-1.381) (0.0888) (2.523) (9.680) 
 [0.0220] [0.0101] [0.0330] [0.0390] 
∆Trade openness 0.0005 0.0007* 0.0049*** 0.0002 
 (0.828) (1.747) (7.381) (0.120) 
 [0.000596] [0.000380] [0.000674] [0.00170] 
∆Log GDP per capita -0.826*** -0.657*** -0.623* -1.086*** 
 (-5.257) (-8.205) (-1.675) (-2.686) 
 [0.157] [0.0801] [0.372] [0.404] 
∆Institutional Quality 0.0006 
(0.0317) 
-0.0219** 
(-2.285) 
-0.0964*** 
(-2.599) 
0.105** 
(2.339) 
 [0.0179] [0.00958] [0.0371] [0.0450] 
∆Secondary School Enrollment 0.0016*** 
(3.107) 
0.0012*** 
(3.125) 
-0.0041*** 
(-3.275) 
0.0024* 
(1.686) 
 [0.000509] [0.000371] [0.00126] [0.00142] 
∆t 0.0359*** 0.0280*** 0.0803*** 0.0686*** 
 (8.054) (11.89) (6.004) (4.977) 
 [0.00446] [0.00235] [0.0134] [0.0138] 
∆year 1998 dummy 0.0196* 0.0786*** -0.0752*** 0.0217 
 (1.828) (14.55) (-2.936) (1.422) 
 [0.0107] [0.00540] [0.0256] [0.0153] 
∆year 1999 dummy 0.00137 0.0501*** 0.0315 0.0781*** 
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 (0.133) (7.451) (1.408) (3.551) 
 [0.0103] [0.00673] [0.0223] [0.0220] 
∆year 2000 dummy -0.0442*** 0.0277*** 0.276*** 0.203*** 
 (-3.173) (3.107) (9.444) (4.466) 
 [0.0139] [0.00893] [0.0292] [0.0454] 
∆year 2001 dummy -0.0640*** -0.0009 -0.0574*** -0.043 
 (-4.462) (-0.129) (-2.769) (-1.423) 
 [0.0143] [0.00676] [0.0207] [0.0302] 
∆year 2002 dummy -0.0802*** 0.0100 -0.138*** -0.116*** 
 (-5.728) (1.390) (-7.136) (-4.765) 
 [0.0140] [0.00722] [0.0193] [0.0243] 
∆year 2003 dummy -0.0902*** 0.0038 -0.321*** -0.217*** 
 (-7.458) (0.512) (-13.98) (-8.703) 
 [0.0121] [0.00744] [0.0230] [0.0249] 
∆year 2004 dummy -0.100*** 0.00775 -0.321*** -0.178*** 
 (-9.573) (1.069) (-21.34) (-11.19) 
 [0.0105] [0.00725] [0.0150] [0.0159] 
∆year 2005 dummy -0.0533*** -0.0295*** -0.270*** -0.145*** 
 (-6.774) (-3.930) (-20.31) (-8.534) 
 [0.00786] [0.00752] [0.0133] [0.0169] 
∆year 2006 dummy -0.0435*** -0.0298*** -0.248*** -0.106*** 
 (-6.820) (-4.667) (-22.98) (-8.387) 
 [0.00638] [0.00639] [0.0108] [0.0127] 
     
Number of observations: 333 301 376 262 
Number of groups: 50 41 54 38 
Arellano – Bond test for 
AR(1) in first differences: 
Arellano – Bond test for 
AR(2) in first differences: 
Sargan test: 
z = -2.27 
Pr > z = 0.0231 
z = -1.51 
Pr > z = 0.1314 
Chi2(54)= 31.23 
Prob > chi2 
z = -2.52 
Pr > z = 0.0116 
z = -1.18 
Pr > z = 0.2383 
Chi2(54)= 25.78 
Prob > chi2 
z = -1.85 
Pr > z = 0.0642 
z = -1.20 
Pr > z = 0.2318 
Chi2(54)= 45.95 
Prob > chi2 
z = -2.10 
Pr > z = 0.0357 
z = -1.10 
Pr > z = 0.2733 
Chi2(54)= 22.67 
Prob > chi2 
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= 0.9945 = 0.9996 = 0.7740 = 0.9999 
 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using the Arellano – Bond dynamic panel GMM estimation with one lag of the dependent variable to be included in the model, 0 lags of the 
dependent variable and one lag of other variables to be used as instruments. The results reported here use the twostep estimator. The indices are constructed following the principal 
component methodology that utilizes all components. The model above includes a linear time trend and time dummies. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics and the stars represent 
the significant t statistics for 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels respectively. The figures in brackets depict the standard errors for the coefficients. 
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Table 1.1.6: Principal components type financial openness and financial development indices with time dummies 
 
  
 Dependent Variables 
     
 ∆Banking sector 
development 
∆Bond market 
development 
∆Stock market 
development 
∆Financial 
development 
     
∆Dependent variable (Lagged) 0.840*** 0.771*** 0.176*** 0.322*** 
 (37.94) (21.42) (31.83) (8.378) 
 [0.0221] [0.0360] [0.00554] [0.0385] 
∆Financial openness -0.0264 0.0006 0.0669** 0.363*** 
 (-1.099) (0.0611) (2.087) (8.688) 
 [0.0241] [0.00934] [0.0321] [0.0417] 
∆Trade openness 0.0006 0.0006 0.0053*** 0.000322 
 (1.018) (1.646) (8.231) (0.183) 
 [0.000582] [0.000387] [0.000640] [0.00176] 
∆Log GDP per capita -0.747*** -0.649*** -0.708* -0.774 
 (-4.632) (-8.377) (-1.907) (-1.495) 
 [0.161] [0.0775] [0.371] [0.518] 
∆Institutional Quality -0.0098 
(-0.352) 
-0.0211** 
(-2.161) 
-0.0782** 
(-2.443) 
0.0801** 
(2.113) 
 [0.0280] [0.00975] [0.0320] [0.0379] 
∆Secondary School Enrollment 0.0014** 
(2.519) 
0.0012*** 
(3.122) 
-0.0044*** 
(-3.584) 
0.00296* 
(1.663) 
 [0.000544] [0.000374] [0.00123] [0.00178] 
∆year 1998 dummy 0.0519*** 0.105*** 0.0078 0.104*** 
 (5.054) (14.29) (0.396) (3.703) 
 [0.0103] [0.00733] [0.0198] [0.0281] 
∆year 1999 dummy 0.0668*** 0.105*** 0.207*** 0.228*** 
 (7.156) (12.26) (6.847) (5.167) 
 [0.00933] [0.00856] [0.0303] [0.0441] 
∆year 2000 dummy 0.0578*** 0.111*** 0.543*** 0.417*** 
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 (3.776) (10.79) (9.463) (5.068) 
 [0.0153] [0.0103] [0.0574] [0.0822] 
∆year 2001 dummy 0.0670*** 0.109*** 0.282*** 0.240*** 
 (3.556) (8.853) (4.761) (3.036) 
 [0.0188] [0.0123] [0.0592] [0.0792] 
∆year 2002 dummy 0.0808*** 0.148*** 0.289*** 0.239*** 
 (3.520) (11.52) (4.528) (2.689) 
 [0.0230] [0.0128] [0.0638] [0.0890] 
∆year 2003 dummy 0.111*** 0.170*** 0.177*** 0.196* 
 (4.674) (13.16) (2.650) (1.969) 
 [0.0239] [0.0129] [0.0667] [0.0998] 
∆year 2004 dummy 0.132*** 0.201*** 0.261*** 0.302** 
 (4.536) (14.29) (3.090) (2.416) 
 [0.0290] [0.0141] [0.0843] [0.125] 
∆year 2005 dummy 0.210*** 0.192*** 0.395*** 0.399*** 
 (6.318) (10.70) (4.025) (2.903) 
 [0.0332] [0.0179] [0.0982] [0.137] 
∆year 2006 dummy 0.257*** 0.219*** 0.503*** 0.494*** 
 (6.721) (9.968) (4.278) (3.116) 
 [0.0383] [0.0220] [0.118] [0.159] 
∆year 2007 dummy 0.335*** 0.277*** 0.836*** 0.645*** 
 (7.848) (12.01) (6.341) (3.900) 
 [0.0427] [0.0231] [0.132] [0.165] 
     
Number of observations: 333 301 376 262 
Number of groups: 50 41 54 38 
Arellano – Bond test for 
AR(1) in first differences: 
Arellano – Bond test for 
AR(2) in first differences: 
Sargan test: 
z = -2.23 
Pr > z = 0.0260 
z = -1.51 
Pr > z = 0.1319 
Chi2(54)= 37.16 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.9610 
z = -2.55 
Pr > z = 0.0107 
z = -1.19 
Pr > z = 0.2332 
Chi2(54)= 26.05 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.9995 
z = -1.86 
Pr > z = 0.0626 
z = -1.19 
Pr > z = 0.2329 
Chi2(54)= 48.30 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.6930 
z = -1.99 
Pr > z = 0.0460 
z = -1.13 
Pr > z = 0.2592 
Chi2(54)= 21.53 
Prob > chi2 
= 1.0000 
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Notes: All regressions are estimated using the Arellano – Bond dynamic panel GMM estimation with one lag of the dependent variable to be included in the model, 0 lags of the 
dependent variable and one lag of other variables to be used as instruments. The results reported here use the twostep estimator. The indices are constructed following the principal 
component methodology that utilizes all components. The model above includes time dummies. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics and the stars represent the significant t statistics 
for 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels respectively. The figures in brackets depict the standard errors for the coefficients. 
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Table 1.1.7: Principal components type financial openness and financial development indices with developing country interaction term 
 
     
 
     
 ∆Banking sector 
development 
∆Bond market 
development 
∆Stock market 
development 
∆Financial 
development 
     
∆Dependent variable (Lagged) 0.851*** 0.803*** 0.228*** 0.288*** 
 (73.06) (61.80) (289.0) (19.18) 
 [0.0116] [0.0130] [0.000790] [0.0150] 
∆Financial openness 0.104*** 0.0960*** 0.0871*** 0.515*** 
 (11.99) (13.04) (4.432) (25.68) 
 [0.00867] [0.00736] [0.0197] [0.0201] 
∆Trade openness 0.0016*** 0.0004*** 0.0103*** 0.0064*** 
 (4.052) (2.860) (52.30) (10.10) 
 [0.000402] [0.000136] [0.000196] [0.000638] 
∆Log GDP per capita 0.107** -0.138*** 0.538*** 0.376*** 
 (2.372) (-5.980) (12.08) (6.990) 
 [0.0450] [0.0230] [0.0445] [0.0538] 
∆Institutional Quality -0.0116 
(-1.163) 
-0.0539*** 
(-17.10) 
-0.115*** 
(-10.96) 
0.0315*** 
(2.672) 
 [0.00996] [0.00315] [0.0105] [0.0118] 
∆Secondary School 
Enrollment 
0.00101*** 
(5.867) 
8.56e-05 
(0.757) 
-0.0043*** 
(-15.39) 
0.0031*** 
(6.095) 
 [0.000173] [0.000113] [0.000278] [0.000500] 
∆Interaction term  -0.0331** -0.0160 -0.0576*** -0.304*** 
 (-2.226) (-1.322) (-3.165) (-8.666) 
 [0.0149] [0.0121] [0.0182] [0.0351] 
     
Number of observations: 333 301 376 262 
Number of groups: 
Arellano – Bond test for 
50 
        z = -2.53 
41 
       z = -2.44 
54 
        z = -1.90 
38 
      z = -1.97 
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AR(1) in first differences: 
Arellano – Bond test for 
AR(2) in first differences: 
Sargan test: 
Pr > z = 0.011 
        z = -1.47 
Pr > z = 0.1405 
Chi2(54)= 45.18 
  Prob > chi2  
  = 0.7982 
Pr > z = 0.0146 
       z = -1.64 
Pr > z = 0.1002 
Chi2(54)= 33.68 
Prob > chi2 
  = 0.9864 
   Pr > z = 0.0570 
        z = -0.96 
   Pr > z = 0.3371 
   Chi2(54)= 43.97 
   Prob > chi2 
     = 0.8332 
Pr > z = 0.0492 
      z = -1.07 
Pr > z = 0.2853 
Chi2(54)= 32.81 
Prob > chi2  
   = 0.9899 
     
 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using the Arellano – Bond dynamic panel GMM estimation with one lag of the dependent variable to be included in the model, 0 lags of the 
dependent variable and one lag of other variables to be used as instruments. The results reported here use the twostep estimator. The indices are constructed following the principal 
component methodology that utilizes all components. The model above includes time dummies. The interaction term is equal to the product of financial openness and developing 
country dummy that takes on a value of one for developing countries and a value of zero for advanced countries. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics and the stars represent the 
significant t statistics for 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels respectively. The figures in brackets depict the standard errors for the coefficients. 
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Table 1.1.8: Principal components type financial openness and financial development indices with developing country and institutional quality 
interaction terms 
 
     
 Dependent Variables 
     
 ∆Banking sector 
development 
∆Bond market 
development 
∆Stock market 
development 
∆Financial 
development 
     
∆Dependent variable (Lagged) 0.847*** 0.795*** 0.225*** 0.288*** 
 (92.06) (69.41) (242.9) (50.99) 
 [0.00920] [0.0114] [0.000928] [0.00564] 
∆Financial openness 0.330*** 0.171*** 0.237*** 0.584*** 
 (18.00) (18.29) (12.47) (11.90) 
 [0.0183] [0.00936] [0.0190] [0.0490] 
∆Trade openness 0.001*** 0.0001 0.0095*** 0.0067*** 
 (3.126) (0.492) (47.84) (6.391) 
 [0.000319] [0.000243] [0.000198] [0.00105] 
∆Log GDP per capita 0.141*** -0.130*** 0.536*** 0.365*** 
 (3.457) (-5.795) (14.29) (4.163) 
 [0.0409] [0.0224] [0.0375] [0.0877] 
∆Institutional Quality -0.0030 
(-0.256) 
-0.0349*** 
(-7.451) 
-0.0862*** 
(-10.75) 
0.0435*** 
(4.889) 
 [0.0118] [0.00469] [0.00802] [0.00890] 
∆Secondary School Enrollment 0.001*** 
(4.459) 
1.38e-05 
(0.103) 
-0.00387*** 
(-13.53) 
0.0026*** 
(8.552) 
 [0.000203] [0.000135] [0.000286] [0.000303] 
∆Interaction term of dev. countries -0.585*** -0.167*** -0.301*** -0.487*** 
 (-13.75) (-15.72) (-11.97) (-5.587) 
 [0.0426] [0.0106] [0.0252] [0.0872] 
∆Interaction term of ins. quality -0.134*** -0.0434*** -0.0589*** -0.0493** 
 (-14.51) (-9.702) (-12.55) (-2.278) 
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 [0.00925] [0.00447] [0.00469] [0.0216] 
     
Number of observations: 333 301 376 262 
Number of groups: 50 41 54 38 
Arellano – Bond test for 
AR(1) in first differences: 
Arellano – Bond test for 
AR(2) in first differences: 
Sargan test: 
z = -2.63 
Pr > z = 0.0086 
z = -1.41 
Pr > z = 0.1587 
Chi2(54)= 43.06 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.8573 
z = -2.44 
Pr > z = 0.0146 
z = -1.71 
Pr > z = 0.0869 
Chi2(54)= 31.76 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.9932 
z = -1.90 
Pr > z = 0.0573 
z = -0.96 
Pr > z = 0.3357 
Chi2(54)= 43.25 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.8525 
z = -1.96 
Pr > z = 0.0499 
z = -1.01 
Pr > z = 0.3117 
Chi2(54)= 31.33 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.9943 
 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using the Arellano – Bond dynamic panel GMM estimation with one lag of the dependent variable to be included in the model, 0 lags of the 
dependent variable and one lag of other variables to be used as instruments. The results reported here use the twostep estimator. The indices are constructed following the principal 
component methodology that utilizes all components. The model above includes time dummies. Two interaction terms are the Interaction term for financial openness and institutional 
quality and the interaction term for financial openness and developing country dummy that takes on a value of one for developing countries and a value of zero for advanced countries. 
Figures in parentheses are t-statistics and the stars represent the significant t statistics for 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels respectively. The figures in brackets depict the standard 
errors for the coefficients. 
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Table 1.1.9 (a): Individual financial openness measures and individual financial development measures 
 
  
 Dependent Variables 
  
 ∆Liquid liabilities ∆Private credit ∆Deposit bank 
assets 
∆Total bank 
assets 
∆Domestic credit ∆Stock market 
capitalization 
∆Turnover 
ratio 
∆Value traded 
         
∆Dependent variable (Lagged) 1.049*** 0.660*** 0.0541*** 0.551*** 1.004*** 0.528*** 0.104*** 0.519*** 
 (551.4) (219.6) (102.2) (341.5) (327.6) (177.6) (800.3) (1,545) 
 [0.00190] [0.00300] [0.000529] [0.00161] [0.00307] [0.00297] [0.000130] [0.000336] 
∆FDI -0.0359*** 0.0290*** 0.0116*** 0.141*** -0.0184*** 0.0332*** 0.0088* 0.0415*** 
 (-152.4) (99.40) (55.02) (77.89) (-38.58) (58.49) (1.716) (137.8) 
 [0.000235] [0.000291] [0.000212] [0.00182] [0.000477] [0.000567] [0.00515] [0.000301] 
∆Trade openness 0.0645*** 0.168*** -0.0303*** 0.150*** 0.135*** 0.745*** 0.372*** 1.061*** 
 (16.52) (20.29) (-50.73) (35.68) (29.16) (87.66) (26.55) (1,313) 
 [0.00390] [0.00827] [0.000597] [0.00420] [0.00463] [0.00850] [0.0140] [0.000808] 
∆Log GDP per capita -2.464*** 11.10*** 18.38*** 8.125*** -3.920*** 39.92*** -46.70*** 103.2*** 
 (-3.186) (8.564) (129.4) (5.684) (-3.099) (39.42) (-45.21) (177.6) 
 [0.773] [1.296] [0.142] [1.429] [1.265] [1.013] [1.033] [0.581] 
∆Institutional Quality -3.053*** -3.675*** -1.152*** -0.911*** -7.063*** -16.31*** -13.39*** -7.296*** 
 (-22.92) (-69.32) (-33.13) (-6.467) (-46.21) (-111.9) (-53.48) (-82.08) 
 [0.133] [0.0530] [0.0348] [0.141] [0.153] [0.146] [0.250] [0.0889] 
∆Secondary School 
Enrollment 
-0.0434*** 
(-5.146) 
-0.0718*** 
(-15.11) 
0.122*** 
(95.66) 
0.0014 
(0.356) 
-0.0661*** 
(-9.210) 
-0.0221** 
(-1.996) 
-0.440*** 
(-42.10) 
-0.434*** 
(-131.1) 
 [0.00843] [0.00475] [0.00127] [0.00396] [0.00717] [0.0111] [0.0105] [0.00331] 
         
Number of observations: 371 379 354 344 382 391 391 391 
    Number of groups: 55 55 53 52 56 56 56 56 
Arellano – Bond test for 
AR(1) in first differences: 
Arellano – Bond test for 
z = -1.69 
Pr > z =0.0907 
z = -2.11 
z = -0.26 
Pr > z = 0.7952 
z = -1.49 
z = -0.93 
Pr > z = 0.3542 
z = 1.07 
z = 0.47 
Pr > z = 0.6392 
z = -1.35 
z = -2.12 
Pr > z = 0.0341 
z = 1.47 
z = 0.45 
Pr > z = 0.6544 
z = -2.22 
z = -1.53 
Pr > z =0.1261 
z = -1.04 
z = -1.91 
Pr > z = 0.0557 
z = 0.28 
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AR(2) in first differences: 
Sargan test: 
Pr > z =0.0349 
Chi2(54)=52.65 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.5264 
Pr > z = 0.1366 
Chi2(54)= 49.57 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.6457 
Pr > z = 0.2863 
Chi2(54)=49.99 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.6298 
Pr > z =0.1770 
Chi2(54)= 48.89 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.6711 
Pr > z = 0.1427 
Chi2(54)= 53.06 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.5108 
Pr > z = 0.0261 
Chi2(54)=52.38 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.5372 
Pr > z =0.2963 
Chi2(54)=50.39                   
Prob > chi2 
= 0.6145 
Pr > z = 0.7794 
Chi2(54)=53.43 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.4963 
 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using the Arellano – Bond dynamic panel GMM estimation with one lag of the dependent variable to be included in the model, 0 lags of the 
dependent variable and one lag of other variables to be used as instruments. The results reported here use the twostep estimator. The indices are constructed following the principal 
component methodology that utilizes all components. The variables are defined as follows: FDI = Foreign direct investment (% of GDP), Liquid liabilities (%of GDP), Private credit by 
deposit money banks and other institutions (% of GDP), The ratio of deposit money bank assets to the sum of deposit money bank assets to central bank assets (in percentages), Total 
bank assets (% of GDP),  Domestic credit provided by the banking sector (% of GDP), Stock market capitalization (% of GDP), Stock market turnover ratio (in percentages), Stock market 
total value traded (% of GDP). Figures in parentheses are t-statistics and the stars represent the significant t statistics for 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels respectively. The figures in 
brackets depict the standard errors for the coefficients. 
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Table 1.1.9 (b): Individual financial openness measures and individual financial development measures 
 
  
 Dependent Variables 
  
 ∆Liquid 
liabilities 
∆Private credit ∆Deposit bank 
assets 
∆Total assets ∆Domestic 
credit 
∆Stock market 
capitalization 
∆Turnover 
ratio 
∆Value traded 
         
∆Dependent variable (Lagged) 0.723*** 0.532*** 0.0550*** 0.507*** 0.894*** 0.511*** 0.105*** 0.463*** 
 (398.5) (345.2) (51.17) (265.1) (211.9) (414.1) (139.0) (2,591) 
 [0.00181] [0.00154] [0.00107] [0.00191] [0.00422] [0.00123] [0.000756] [0.000179] 
∆International debt issues 0.190*** 0.230*** -0.121*** 0.280*** 0.226*** 0.0890*** 0.462*** 0.401*** 
 (70.15) (90.63) (-26.34) (47.14) (169.5) (11.88) (27.27) (112.9) 
 [0.00271] [0.00253] [0.00458] [0.00594] [0.00134] [0.00749] [0.0169] [0.00355] 
∆Trade openness 0.0754*** 0.100*** -0.0061*** 0.0588*** 0.0673*** 0.646*** 0.277*** 0.948*** 
 (15.98) (38.09) (-3.422) (9.130) (9.224) (42.40) (30.34) (430.7) 
 [0.00472] [0.00263] [0.00179] [0.00644] [0.00729] [0.0152] [0.00912] [0.00220] 
∆Log GDP per capita -2.744*** -1.355 22.42*** 0.112 -9.110*** 49.64*** -48.54*** 87.20*** 
 (-4.145) (-1.024) (88.18) (0.0625) (-9.495) (30.20) (-80.53) (166.2) 
 [0.662] [1.324] [0.254] [1.796] [0.959] [1.644] [0.603] [0.525] 
∆Institutional Quality 0.255 
(1.138) 
2.060*** 
(18.65) 
-2.836*** 
(-50.77) 
3.933*** 
(23.29) 
-2.669*** 
(-12.08) 
-13.09*** 
(-30.05) 
-1.945*** 
(-5.171) 
2.943*** 
(11.46) 
 [0.224] [0.110] [0.0559] [0.169] [0.221] [0.436] [0.376] [0.257] 
∆Secondary School Enrollment -0.0259*** 
(-4.563) 
0.0155*** 
(7.503) 
0.0451*** 
(59.99) 
0.0907*** 
(21.04) 
0.0145*** 
(4.255) 
0.0909*** 
(16.88) 
-0.395*** 
(-37.40) 
-0.288*** 
(-203.4) 
 [0.00567] [0.00206] [0.000752] [0.00431] [0.00342] [0.00538] [0.0106] [0.00142] 
         
Number of observations: 398 407 383 374 411 421 421 421 
     Number of groups: 56 56 54 53 57 57 57 57 
Arellano – Bond test for 
AR(1) in first differences: 
Arellano – Bond test for 
z = -0.02 
Pr > z =0.9842 
z = -2.23 
z = 1.20 
Pr > z = 0.2320 
z = -1.74 
z = -0.95 
Pr > z = 0.3410 
z = 1.11 
z = 0.90 
Pr > z = 0.3670 
z = -1.56 
z = -2.18 
Pr > z = 0.0290 
z = 1.64 
z = 0.48 
Pr > z = 0.6306 
z = -2.42 
z = -1.56 
Pr > z =0.1190 
z = -1.04 
z = -1.98 
Pr > z = 0.0479 
z = 0.17 
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AR(2) in first differences: 
Sargan test: 
Pr > z =0.0260 
Chi2(54)=50.55 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.6082 
Pr > z = 0.0826 
Chi2(54)= 51.73 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.0.5623 
Pr > z = 0.2676 
Chi2(54)= 48.14 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.6987 
Pr > z =0.1780 
Chi2(54)= 44.84 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.8084 
Pr > z = 0.1016 
Chi2(54)=55.32 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.4246 
Pr > z = 0.0157 
Chi2(54)=50.50 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.6102 
Pr > z =0.2970 
Chi2(54)=53.45                   
Prob > chi2 
= 0.4956 
Pr > z= 0.8665 
Chi2(54)=52.17 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.5451 
 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using the Arellano – Bond dynamic panel GMM estimation with one lag of the dependent variable to be included in the model, 0 lags of the 
dependent variable and one lag of other variables to be used as instruments. The results reported here use the twostep estimator. The indices are constructed following the principal 
component methodology that utilizes all components. The variables are defined as follows: International debt issues (% of GDP), Liquid liabilities (%of GDP), Private credit by deposit 
money banks and other institutions (% of GDP), The ratio of deposit money bank assets to the sum of deposit money bank assets to central bank assets (in percentages), Total bank 
assets (% of GDP),  Domestic credit provided by the banking sector (% of GDP), Stock market capitalization (% of GDP), Stock market turnover ratio (in percentages), Stock market total 
value traded (% of GDP). Figures in parentheses are t-statistics and the stars represent the significant t statistics for 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels respectively. The figures in 
brackets depict the standard errors for the coefficients. 
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Table 1.1.9 (c): Individual financial openness measures and individual financial development measures 
 
  
 Dependent Variables 
  
 ∆Liquid 
liabilities 
∆Private credit ∆Deposit bank 
assets 
∆Total bank 
assets 
∆Domestic 
credit 
∆Stock market 
capitalization 
∆Turnover ratio ∆Value traded 
         
∆Dependent variable (Lagged) 0.935*** 0.649*** 0.842*** 0.633*** 1.039*** 0.495*** 0.109*** 0.471*** 
 (353.1) (272.4) (783.5) (199.9) (228.4) (204.1) (238.7) (2,199) 
 [0.00265] [0.00238] [0.00107] [0.00317] [0.00455] [0.00243] [0.000459] [0.000214] 
∆Portfolio investment flows 0.0032*** 0.0715*** -0.0191*** -0.0610*** -0.117*** 0.0829*** 0.0372*** 0.0629*** 
 (8.028) (108.6) (-19.46) (-14.35) (-54.08) (72.63) (4.871) (30.26) 
 [0.000400] [0.000658] [0.000983] [0.00425] [0.00216] [0.00114] [0.00764] [0.00208] 
∆Trade openness 0.0853*** 0.183*** -0.0367*** 0.228*** 0.155*** 0.717*** 0.401*** 1.070*** 
 (11.81) (69.06) (-65.54) (57.89) (23.31) (47.34) (36.66) (1,117) 
 [0.00722] [0.00266] [0.000560] [0.00394] [0.00667] [0.0151] [0.0109] [0.000958] 
∆Log GDP per capita -0.0284 4.256*** 3.835*** 4.754*** -7.497*** 46.98*** -35.98*** 105.0*** 
 (-0.0239) (7.658) (35.75) (6.441) (-7.321) (41.72) (-36.20) (288.0) 
 [1.188] [0.556] [0.107] [0.738] [1.024] [1.126] [0.994] [0.365] 
∆Institutional Quality -4.191*** 
(-28.53) 
-2.873*** 
(-23.55) 
0.839*** 
(44.32) 
-0.640*** 
(-6.542) 
-5.622*** 
(-33.87) 
-14.38*** 
(-40.02) 
-10.83*** 
(-73.11) 
-7.262*** 
(-51.78) 
 [0.147] [0.122] [0.0189] [0.0979] [0.166] [0.359] [0.148] [0.140] 
∆Secondary School Enrollment -0.0939*** 
(-9.628) 
-0.0941*** 
(-14.81) 
0.0094*** 
(27.68) 
0.0184*** 
(4.822) 
-0.0341*** 
(-6.356) 
0.0357*** 
(3.957) 
-0.491*** 
(-123.1) 
-0.435*** 
(-175.9) 
 [0.00975] [0.00636] [0.000341] [0.00383] [0.00537] [0.00903] [0.00399] [0.00247] 
         
Number of observations: 395 403 376 366 406 414 414 414 
Number of groups: 56 56 54 53 57 57 57 57 
Arellano – Bond test for 
AR(1) in first differences: 
Arellano – Bond test for 
z = -0.77 
Pr > z =0.4430 
z = -2.03 
z = 0.06 
Pr > z = 0.9527 
z = -1.73 
z = -1.95 
Pr > z = 0.0510 
z = 0.36 
z = 0.68 
Pr > z = 0.4969 
z = -1.58 
z = -2.10 
Pr > z = 0.0354 
z = 1.22 
z = 0.38 
Pr > z = 0.7016 
z = -2.19 
z = -1.54 
Pr > z =0.1235 
z = -1.04 
z = -1.88 
Pr > z = 0.0600 
z = 0.22 
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AR(2) in first differences: 
Sargan test: 
Pr > z =0.0424 
Chi2(54)=50.95 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.5929 
Pr > z = 0.0836 
Chi2(54)= 52.60 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.5285 
Pr > z = 0.7221 
Chi2(54)= 51.49 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.5716 
Pr > z =0.1138 
Chi2(54)= 50.89 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.5949 
Pr > z = 0.2209 
Chi2(54)= 55.09 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.4331 
Pr > z = 0.0286 
Chi2(54)=54.87 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.4414 
Pr > z =0.2968 
Chi2(54)=53.23                  
Prob > chi2 
= 0.5042 
Pr > z = 0.8255 
Chi2(54)=54.51 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.4548 
 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using the Arellano – Bond dynamic panel GMM estimation with one lag of the dependent variable to be included in the model, 0 lags of the 
dependent variable and one lag of other variables to be used as instruments. The results reported here use the twostep estimator. The indices are constructed following the principal 
component methodology that utilizes all components. The variables are defined as follows: Portfolio investment flows (% of GDP), Liquid liabilities (%of GDP), Private credit by deposit 
money banks and other institutions (% of GDP), The ratio of deposit money bank assets to the sum of deposit money bank assets to central bank assets (in percentages), Total bank 
assets (% of GDP),  Domestic credit provided by the banking sector (% of GDP), Stock market capitalization (% of GDP), Stock market turnover ratio (in percentages), Stock market total 
value traded (% of GDP). Figures in parentheses are t-statistics and the stars represent the significant t statistics for 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels respectively. The figures in 
brackets depict the standard errors for the coefficients. 
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Table 1.1.10 (a): Principal component type financial development indices and individual financial openness measures 
 
  
 Dependent Variables 
     
 ∆Banking sector 
development 
∆Bond market 
development 
∆Stock market 
development 
∆Financial 
development 
     
∆Dependent variable (Lagged) 0.603*** 0.902*** 0.230*** 0.392*** 
 (88.31) (95.77) (345.2) (46.45) 
 [0.00682] [0.00942] [0.000666] [0.00844] 
∆FDI 0.0034*** -0.0004*** 0.000507*** 0.0076*** 
 (15.46) (-15.34) (5.158) (7.847) 
 [0.000221] [2.59e-05] [9.82e-05] [0.000974] 
∆Trade openness 0.0044*** 0.002*** 0.0109*** 0.0080*** 
 (20.53) (12.06) (82.18) (11.87) 
 [0.000213] [0.000166] [0.000133] [0.000677] 
∆Log GDP per capita 0.465*** -0.221*** 0.527*** 0.755*** 
 (13.17) (-10.20) (26.40) (15.70) 
 [0.0353] [0.0217] [0.0199] [0.0481] 
∆Institutional Quality -0.0788*** -0.0847*** -0.142*** -0.0782*** 
 (-8.799) (-26.95) (-28.58) (-3.703) 
 [0.00896] [0.00314] [0.00496] [0.0211] 
∆Secondary School Enrollment -0.0004* 
(-1.683) 
-0.0003*** 
(-3.924) 
-0.0049*** 
(-36.27) 
-0.0002 
(-0.604) 
         [0.000230] [6.61e-05] [0.000136] [0.000329] 
     
Number of observations: 342 301 391 262 
Number of groups: 52 41 56 38 
Arellano – Bond test for 
AR(1) in first differences: 
Arellano – Bond test for 
z = -1.04 
Pr > z = 0.2975 
z = 0.92 
z = -2.49 
Pr > z = 0.0129 
z = -1.66 
z = -1.88 
Pr > z = 0.0596 
z = -0.95 
z = -2.16 
Pr > z = 0.0309 
z = -0.53 
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AR(2) in first differences: 
Sargan test: 
Pr > z = 0.3563 
Chi2(54)= 46.51 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.7556 
Pr > z = 0.0972 
Chi2(54)= 34.35 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.9830 
Pr > z = 0.3445 
Chi2(54)= 51.28 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.5799 
Pr > z = 0.5942 
Chi2(54)= 32.87 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.9897 
 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using the Arellano – Bond dynamic panel GMM estimation with one lag of the dependent variable to be included in the model, 0 lags of the 
dependent variable and one lag of other variables to be used as instruments. The results reported here use the twostep estimator. The indices are constructed following the principal 
component methodology that utilizes all components. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics and the stars represent the significant t statistics for 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels 
respectively, and the figures in brackets depict the standard errors for the coefficients. 
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Table 1.1.10 (b): Principal component type financial development indices and individual financial openness measures 
 
  
 Dependent Variables 
     
 ∆Banking sector 
development 
∆Bond market 
development 
∆Stock market 
development 
∆Financial 
development 
     
∆Dependent variable (Lagged) 0.668*** 0.780*** 0.226*** 0.296*** 
 (125.0) (91.54) (296.0) (66.57) 
 [0.00534] [0.00852] [0.000763] [0.00445] 
∆International debt issues 0.0049*** 0.0029*** 0.0053*** 0.0108*** 
 (13.08) (18.70) (14.51) (16.36) 
 [0.000371] [0.000156] [0.000363] [0.000661] 
∆Trade openness 0.0016*** 0.0002 0.0096*** 0.0055*** 
 (6.530) (1.060) (58.09) (13.93) 
 [0.000239] [0.000176] [0.000165] [0.000392] 
∆Log GDP per capita 0.251*** -0.0977*** 0.598*** 0.497*** 
 (6.067) (-4.865) (27.58) (10.55) 
 [0.0413] [0.0201] [0.0217] [0.0471] 
∆ Institutional Quality -0.0077 
(-1.010) 
-0.0368*** 
(-9.382) 
-0.0386*** 
(-5.404) 
0.0629*** 
(4.003) 
 [0.00761] [0.00392] [0.00714] [0.0157] 
∆Secondary School Enrollment 0.0015*** 
(9.834) 
0.0006*** 
(8.425) 
-0.0042*** 
(-18.33) 
0.0037*** 
(14.33) 
 [0.000155] [6.88e-05] [0.000230] [0.000258] 
     
Number of observations: 371 318 421 276 
Number of groups: 53 41 57 38 
Arellano – Bond test for 
AR(1) in first differences: 
Arellano – Bond test for 
z = -1.05 
Pr > z = 0.2924 
z = 0.87 
z = -2.29 
Pr > z = 0.0222 
z = -2.06 
z = -1.94 
Pr > z = 0.0523 
z = -1.00 
z = -1.97 
Pr > z = 0.0494 
z = -0.59 
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AR(2) in first differences: 
Sargan test: 
Pr > z = 0.3865 
Chi2(54)= 51.89 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.5561 
Pr > z = 0.0390 
Chi2(54)= 33.05 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.9891 
Pr > z = 0.3181 
Chi2(54)= 54.86 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.4419 
Pr > z = 0.5545 
Chi2(54)= 35.89 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.9726 
 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using the Arellano – Bond dynamic panel GMM estimation with one lag of the dependent variable to be included in the model, 0 lags of the 
dependent variable and one lag of other variables to be used as instruments. The results reported here use the twostep estimator. The indices are constructed following the principal 
component methodology that utilizes all components. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics and the stars represent the significant t statistics for 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels 
respectively. The figures in brackets depict the standard errors for the coefficients. 
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Table 1.1.10 (c): Principal component type financial development indices and individual financial openness measures 
 
  
 Dependent Variables 
     
 ∆Banking sector 
development 
∆Bond market 
development 
∆Stock market 
development 
∆Financial 
development 
     
∆Dependent variable (Lagged) 0.962*** 0.903*** 0.221*** 0.385*** 
 (63.78) (86.65) (434.8) (41.06) 
 [0.0151] [0.0104] [0.000509] [0.00938] 
∆Portfolio investment -0.0061*** -0.001*** 0.0007* 0.0068*** 
 (-17.50) (-5.218) (1.921) (12.19) 
 [0.000349] [0.000132] [0.000356] [0.000556] 
∆Trade openness 0.0013*** 0.0018*** 0.0118*** 0.0110*** 
 (3.057) (24.72) (121.6) (18.67) 
 [0.000419] [7.11e-05] [9.73e-05] [0.000590] 
∆Log GDP per capita -0.0703*** -0.219*** 0.584*** 0.612*** 
 (-4.080) (-9.552) (62.51) (9.003) 
 [0.0172] [0.0229] [0.00935] [0.0680] 
∆Institutional Quality -0.0207* 
(-1.798) 
-0.065*** 
(-17.15) 
-0.103*** 
(-16.06) 
-0.0737*** 
(-5.133) 
 [0.0115] [0.00379] [0.00639] [0.0144] 
∆Secondary School 
Enrollment 
0.0004** 
(2.333) 
-4.36e-05 
(-0.473) 
-0.0054*** 
(-28.97) 
-0.0009*** 
(-4.697) 
 [0.000188] [9.24e-05] [0.000186] [0.000200] 
     
Number of observations 364 316 414 275 
Number of groups: 53 41 57 38 
Arellano – Bond test for 
AR(1) in first differences: 
Arellano – Bond test for 
z = -2.88 
Pr > z = 0.0040 
z = -1.73 
z = -2.48 
Pr > z = 0.0132 
z = -2.10 
z = -1.88 
Pr > z = 0.0598 
z = -0.96 
z = -2.09 
Pr > z = 0.0367 
z = -0.77 
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AR(2) in first differences: 
Sargan test: 
Pr > z = 0.0840 
Chi2(54)= 51.27 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.5803 
Pr > z = 0.0356 
Chi2(54)= 34.36 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.9829 
Pr > z = 0.3348 
Chi2(54)= 52.91 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.5166 
Pr > z = 0.4387 
Chi2(54)= 35.37 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.9766 
 
 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using the Arellano – Bond dynamic panel GMM estimation with one lag of the dependent variable to be included in the model, 0 lags of the 
dependent variable and one lag of other variables to be used as instruments. The results reported here use the twostep estimator. The indices are constructed following the principal 
component methodology that utilizes all components. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics and the stars represent the significant t statistics for 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels 
respectively. The figures in brackets depict the standard errors for the coefficients. 
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Table 1.1.11: Principal component type financial openness and financial development indices, fixed effects in levels 
 
     
 Dependent Variables 
     
 Banking sector 
development 
Bond market 
development 
Stock market 
development 
Financial 
development 
     
Dependent variable (Lagged) 0.935*** 0.965*** 0.299*** 0.607*** 
 (36.73) (34.38) (6.135) (11.06) 
 [0.0255] [0.0281] [0.0487] [0.0549] 
Financial openness 0.068* 0.0098 0.059 0.212*** 
 (1.834) (0.520) (1.124) (3.704) 
 [0.0372] [0.0189] [0.0528] [0.0572] 
Trade openness -0.004*** -0.0004 0.0063** -0.0032 
 (-2.868) (-0.838) (2.542) (-1.496) 
 [0.00121] [0.000481] [0.00247] [0.00210] 
Log GDP per capita 0.252 -0.105 -0.770* -0.341 
 (1.301) (-1.159) (-1.707) (-1.015) 
 [0.194] [0.0907] [0.451] [0.336] 
 Institutional Quality 0.047 
(1.238) 
-0.0538*** 
(-2.637) 
0.136 
(1.242) 
0.081 
(1.276) 
 [0.0376] [0.0204] [0.109] [0.0637] 
Secondary School Enrollment -0.0002 
(-0.137) 
0.0003 
(0.409) 
-0.007** 
(-2.039) 
-0.006 
(-0.300) 
 [0.00137] [0.000613] [0.00324] [0.00213] 
     
Number of observations 409 365 463 320 
R-squared 0.990 0.994 0.851 0.976 
 
 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using fixed effects with country and year effects which are not reported here. The indices are constructed following the principal component 
methodology that utilizes all components. The model above includes country and time dummies. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics and the stars represent the significant t statistics 
for 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels respectively. The figures in brackets depict the standard errors for the coefficients. 
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Table 1.1.12: Principal component type financial openness and financial development indices with global degree of financial development 
 
     
 Dependent Variables 
     
 ∆Banking sector 
development 
∆Bond market 
development 
∆Stock market 
development 
∆Financial 
development 
     
∆Dependent variable (Lagged) 0.842*** 0.814*** 0.0972*** 0.0904*** 
 (72.46) (91.00) (58.61) (6.430) 
 [0.0116] 0.00895 0.00166 0.0141 
∆Financial openness 0.0885*** 0.0876*** 0.0123* 0.467*** 
 (6.789) (19.28) (1.740) (27.18) 
 [0.0130] 0.00454 0.00708 0.0172 
∆Trade openness 0.00162*** 0.000547*** 0.00631*** -0.00128 
 (4.573) (2.967) (17.76) (-1.501) 
 [0.000354] 0.000184 0.000355 0.000850 
∆Log GDP per capita 0.0861* -0.174*** -0.953*** -0.139 
 (1.795) (-6.351) (-14.83) (-1.321) 
 [0.0480] 0.0274 0.0642 0.105 
∆Institutional Quality -0.0148 -0.0478*** -0.0305** 0.0607*** 
 (-1.563) (-9.562) (-2.136) (2.776) 
 0.00947 0.00500 0.0143 0.0219 
∆Secondary School Enrollment 0.00100*** 7.04e-05 -0.00363*** 0.00232*** 
 (6.337) (0.538) (-6.113) (3.788) 
 0.000158 0.000131 0.000594 0.000611 
∆ Global degree of financial development 0.0244** 0.0113*** 0.874*** 0.558*** 
 (2.060) (3.444) (59.44) (17.22) 
 0.0119 0.00329 0.0147 0.0324 
     
Number of observations: 333 301 376 262 
Number of groups: 50 41 54 38 
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Arellano – Bond test for 
AR(1) in first differences: 
Arellano – Bond test for 
AR(2) in first differences: 
z = -2.46 
Pr > z =0.0138                      
z = -1.45 
Pr > z =0.1417 
z = -2.39 
Pr > z =0.0169 
z = -1.68 
 Pr > z=0.0929 
z = -1.73 
Pr > z =0.0845 
z = -1.22 
Pr > z=0.2217 
z =-1.27 
Pr >z=0.2057 
z =-1.17 
  Pr >z=0.2423 
Sargan test: Chi2(54) 
= 43.29 
Prob > chi2 
=  0.8515 
Chi2(54) 
=  37.39 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.9585 
Chi2(54) 
= 52.50 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.5326 
Chi2(54) 
= 32.59 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.9907 
 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using the Arellano – Bond dynamic panel GMM estimation with one lag of the dependent variable to be included in the model, 0 lags of the 
dependent variable and one lag of other variables to be used as instruments. The results reported here use the twostep estimator. The indices are constructed following the principal 
component methodology that utilizes all components. The global degree of financial development is calculated as:  
𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 = ∑ 𝐹𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑖
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡
∑ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑖
 
GDPi,t  is the Gross domestic product of countries in 2000 constant US dollars (WDI database) and FD i,t is the principal components financial development index. Figures in parentheses 
are t-statistics and the stars represent the significant t statistics for 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels respectively. The figures in brackets depict the standard errors for the 
coefficients. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
Financial Harmonization and Industrial Growth:  
Evidence from Europe 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes the growth effects of the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) of the 
European Commission, a set of measures and directives that aim to harmonize European financial 
markets. Using a panel of 25 countries and 30 industries, we find that the standard specification 
predicts harmonization to lower growth, though the negative effect is mitigated for industries 
that depend more on external finance. We then show that this seemingly surprising result is due 
to omitted variable bias. We would expect early adopters to bear more of the costs and 
experience less of the benefits of harmonization. Once we control for the relative timing of 
adoption, harmonization is shown to have a positive effect on growth. This finding is robust to 
including further controls, splitting up the sample into different groups of countries, and 
extending the model to a dynamic setting. 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
The European Union, with the hopes of integrating countries and creating a unified European financial 
market has taken two important measures over the last two decades. The first, well known, measure is of 
course the introduction of the Euro. Since its establishment in 1999, the Euro has not only grown to be a 
leading currency in the world’s financial markets, but has also greatly contributed to unifying European 
financial markets. The second, less well known, measure is the so-called Financial Services Action Plan 
(FSAP), aimed at harmonizing European financial markets through the imposition and adoption of 
regulatory and legislative frameworks. With the strategic objectives of ensuring “a single EU market for 
wholesale financial services”, creating “open and secure retail markets, and state-of-the-art prudential 
rules and supervision” and establishing “wider conditions for an optimal single financial market”, the FSAP 
intends to harmonize and reduce the costs of cross-border financial intermediation and transactions. 
(Hartmann, Maddaloni, and Manganelli, 2003, 34; Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Peydro, 2010 a).  
 
The European Commission has argued that financial harmonization, by reducing the cost of cross-border 
financial business, should increase economic growth (FSA, 2003; London Economics, 2002). However, no 
in-depth study of the outcomes of the FSAP has been undertaken. Therefore, an important question 
remains to be examined: how effective have these FSAP measures been on growth across countries and 
industries? This paper aims to answer this question. When analyzing the effect of FSAP on growth, we will 
take an industry perspective. Given that different industries depend on external finance in varying 
degrees, it is likely that the impact of FSAP on growth will be industry-dependent. We therefore examine 
the effects of financial harmonization policies of the FSAP on industrial growth in a panel of twenty five 
EU member states and thirty industries for the period of 1971 – 2007.  
 
Based on the view of the European Commission, we would expect harmonization to have a positive impact 
on growth rates across industries and countries. In contrast, when regressing growth on financial 
harmonization, we find a negative impact. However, we do find the negative effect to be mitigated in 
industries that depend more on external finance. In principle, the negative effect of harmonization on 
growth may be due to different reasons. First, while harmonization may refer to integration, thus lowering 
the cost of cross-country financial activity, it may also refer to uniformity, often implying adoption costs 
without clear benefits. For example, Boyfield, Robinson and Mullally (2006) have reported that the 
additional costs faced by the British economy after the implementation of the FSAP measures amounted 
to more than 14 billion pounds. We therefore classify the different directives of the FSAP into those that 
mainly are aimed towards uniformity, those that are mainly aimed towards integration, and those that do 
not fall under either category. Consistent with our prior, the directives that focus on uniformity continue 
to have a significant negative effect, while those that focus on integration cease to have a significant 
effect.  
 
Second, the timing in the adoption of the FSAP directives may be crucial in determining their effects on 
growth. In particular, being an early adopter may not be advantageous, because the country would bear 
the costs of adoption, without reaping the benefits of harmonization, since the other countries would be 
lagging behind. Controlling for the relative timing of adoption in our estimations, we find that 
harmonization now has a beneficial effect on growth. In addition, we find evidence of early adoption 
having a negative impact on growth. We then carry out a number of robustness checks to examine 
whether our main result --- harmonization having a positive effect on growth and the relative timing of 
adoption having a negative effect --- holds up. The results are mostly robust to splitting up our sample 
into EU-15, Euro and non-EU 15 countries, and to introducing additional control variables, such as legal 
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and governmental measures, and financial and stock market development indicators. We lastly analyze 
the consistency of our benchmark model through the use of a dynamic panel GMM model. The dynamic 
Arellano – Bond model derives similar conclusions reporting that harmonization is positively significant 
on industrial growth when the harmonization difference measure is included in the estimations. 
 
Our paper is related to different strands of the literature. First is the literature that has examined the 
effect of deregulation on growth and volatility. For example, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996, 1998) and 
Strahan (2002) study the impact of branching deregulation and interstate banking on growth. The results 
reveal that following state-level branching deregulation, real per-capita economic growth across the U.S. 
states increased significantly. Policy changes that allow for higher integration, better bank monitoring and 
screening across states are found to be a possible explanation. In a more recent study, De Avila (2010), 
examining the effects of financial deregulation in Europe, shows that the process of capital control lifting 
and the harmonization of banking laws have enhanced the growth rates of European economies. 
Harmonization is found to be beneficial for growth through the increase in the level and efficiency of 
financial intermediation, whereas the liberalization of capital controls increased growth through 
improvements in financial intermediation. Different from our study, De Avila (2010) is limited to a cross-
country analysis, therefore not taking into account cross-industrial variation. In addition, his focus is on 
the European Commission directives on banking integration that were established prior to the FSAP.  
 
Second is the literature that has analyzed the link between external finance dependence and growth. An 
important paper is Rajan and Zingales (1998) which studies the role of external finance on industrial 
growth. The authors find financial development to be an influential factor on the rate of growth of 
industries by reducing the cost of external finance. This effect is especially stronger in those firms with 
greater financial dependence. Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that industries which require higher levels 
of external finance develop faster in countries with more established financial markets. Similarly, Gupta 
and Yuan (2003), using the Rajan and Zingales external finance dependence measure, demonstrate that 
stock market liberalizations lead to higher growth rates in industries that depend more heavily on external 
finance. Given this evidence, we are interested in seeing whether the benefits of financial harmonization 
are greater in those industries with greater external finance dependence. Our analysis thereby brings 
together the literatures on financial deregulation and external finance dependence.  
 
Third, there are some papers that have studied the FSAP measures. Kalemli – Ozcan, Papaioannou, and 
Peydro (2010 a) analyze the link between financial integration and business cycle synchronization. The 
authors’ analysis, using bilateral panel instrumental variables to link legislative harmonization policies to 
output synchronization, depicts a negative relationship for the country-pairs selected in the sample. In an 
attempt to examine the Euro’s effect on financial integration Kalemli – Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Peydro 
(2010 b) reveal the legislative-regulatory harmonization policies in financial markets established under 
the FSAP to be a contributing factor for cross-border lending, despite these policies’ inability to explain 
the Euro’s impact on financial integration. Neither of these papers assesses the impact on growth, and 
neither uses industrial data.  
 
Compared to the existing literature, one important finding is that controlling for the relative timing of 
adoption is essential. Clearly, adopting harmonization measures when others do not, does not amount to 
true harmonization. We would expect early adopters to face more of the costs and less of the benefits in 
comparison to late adopters. Our results indicate that not controlling for the relative timing of adoption 
leads to a serious omitted variable bias. Indeed, failing to control for this important variable changes the 
impact of harmonization on growth from positive to negative.  
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we explain in detail our data. Section 3 
provides a discussion of the empirical model. Section 4 depicts our results and some robustness checks. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.2 Data 
 
The data used in this paper come from a variety of sources. Our panel consists of annual industry-level 
data from twenty-five European economies over the period 1970 – 2007. The countries used in our 
analysis are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.1 Below we discuss the indicators employed in 
the analysis in further detail. 
 
2.2.1 Measure of Industrial Growth 
 
The industrial data for growth come from the EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts dataset.  This 
dataset provides industrial data for 25 EU member countries for 107 different industries (sectors). Having 
industry-level data is essential for exploiting cross-industrial variation in external finance dependence, 
while having cross-country variation is important in identifying the effects of harmonization on growth. 
The time period covered in the EU KLEMS dataset is 1970 – 2007 for EU 15 countries and 1995 – 2007 for 
10 new EU member states. From the EU KLEMS dataset we use gross value added in constant Euros.2 
Gross value added growth in country i, industry s, and time t, is defined as: 
 
𝐺𝑉𝐴𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 = log  (𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖,𝑠,𝑡) − log (𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1) 
 
where 𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 is gross value added in country i, industry s, and time t.
3 
 
2.2.2 Measure of Financial Harmonization 
 
Harmonization measures used in our analysis are based on the information from the Financial Services 
Action Plan. The Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) was launched by the European Union and the 
European Commission at the end of 1998 as a major 5-year program with the goals of establishing “a 
single EU wholesale market for financial services, open and secure retail markets, and state-of-the-art 
prudential and supervisory regulations.” (Kalemli – Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Peydro, 2010 b, 79). A single 
wholesale market should in principle allow for higher levels of finance to be raised across the EU, while 
open and secure retail financial services markets should provide customers with a safer and cheaper 
integrated financial market that reduces charges on cross-border payments, removes barriers to retail 
                                                          
1 Our panel has three dimensions; countries (I), industries (sectors) (S), and time (T). We, therefore, have I*S*T, i.e. 
25*107*37 = 98975 observations. Due to missing observations for the external finance measure of Rajan and 
Zingales (1998) we drop some sectors from our analysis. Thus, most of our regressions are estimated with a sample 
of 17380 observations. 
2 For the time period before the introduction of the Euro, the EU KLEMS uses the 1999 official fixed Euro exchange 
rates of the Euro countries to convert local currencies into Euros. Consistent with this, for the non-Euro countries 
for the time period before the introduction of the Euro, we take the 1999 official fixed Euro exchange rates with 
the local currencies to convert them into Euros. For further information please refer to Table 2.1 in the Appendix. 
3 While most of the growth literature focuses on log differences to approximate growth rates, the deregulation 
literature often uses the direct ratio of 𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖,𝑠,𝑡/𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1. We have experimented with this alternative measure, 
and the results do not qualitatively change.   
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financial services, and allows a larger scale of electronic commerce to take place across the EU (HM 
Treasury, The Financial Services Authority, and the Bank of England, 2004). State-of-the-art prudential 
rules and supervision, on the other hand, should offer faster changes in the regulatory environment that 
benefit customers in financial services.  
 
Broadly speaking, the FSAP is aimed at removing barriers to entry into the financial sector, increasing 
competition, and harmonizing information (Malcolm, Tilden, and Wilsdon, 2009). However, just like any 
other legislative measure taken at the country level, the FSAP comes with costs and benefits. Boyfield, 
Robinson and Mullally (2006) state that the benefits involve increasing investment opportunities in 
securities markets across borders, easing the framework for investment firms, augmenting internalization, 
stimulating competition between banks and thereby reducing the cost of trading and the cost of capital, 
increasing investor confidence, market liquidity, and free flow of capital, allowing for more transparency, 
and greater competition. The costs on the other hand entail compliance costs due to complexity, 
possibility of creating barriers to entry for smaller firms, further costs that involve execution of the 
directives, and costs of implementation of these directives across countries. The goal of the European 
Commission through the FSAP is to form a unified financial market that can act as an essential element 
for growth, employment and improved competition in the overall European system (European 
Commission, 2005). If so, the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) should have had a positive impact on 
growth, and one of the aims of this study is to explore whether this is indeed the case.  
 
The FSAP consists of 29 legislative acts, 27 directives and 2 regulations in corporate law, banking, payment 
systems and corporate governance (Kalemli – Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Peydro, 2010 a). The most 
important of these are the 27 directives, which will be the focus of the remainder of our analysis. The 
directives amend previous laws, replace out-of-date proposals or offer new legislative measures for the 
EU member countries. Since the establishment of the FSAP in 1998, the European Commission has passed 
21 out of the 27 directives by the end of 2003, with the remaining 6 directives being passed into legislation 
during the period of 2004 – 2006 (Kalemli – Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Peydro, 2010 a).  
 
Unlike the EU regulations that are enforceable across countries immediately after their announcement, 
the FSAP directives are enforceable only after the member states pass legislations that adopt the EU law 
domestically (Kalemli – Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Peydro, 2010 a). The implementation stage of the FSAP 
directives involves the European Commission’s proposal on legislative directives and regulations, which 
then will have to be adopted by “co-decision” of the Council of Ministers of the Member States and the 
European Parliament (HM Treasury, The Financial Services Authority, and the Bank of England, 2003). The 
FSAP directives are incorporated into the national law of each EU member state either through 
introduction or through amendment of national laws within a time frame of 18 to 24 months of their date 
of original publication. The implementation process of the FSAP directives works through three stages; 
transposition of the EU legislation into national law, adjustment for necessary arrangements and ensuring 
that the newly adopted regulations are working effectively and efficiently. Due to differences across 
countries in modifying their existing internal institutional structures and frameworks to adopt the EU law 
(and due to the discretion in when to adopt these directives), the transposition of the FSAP directives may 
take several years, creating variation in terms of the dates of implementation of these directives in 
different countries.4 For example, the 1998 Settlement Finality Directive (1998/26/EC) of the FSAP under 
                                                          
4 The member states are given a time frame to transpose the directives into national law. However, some countries 
do not follow the timing of the FSAP directives that is set by the European Commission. This could occur due to 
parliamentary delays, oppositions from firms and businesses within the countries, difficulty in removal or 
alteration of existing laws, and possible technical obstacles. There are sanctions, however, to ensure compliance of 
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the securities category was implemented into domestic law in Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Ireland, 
the Netherlands, Spain and the U.K. within a year of its circulation. However, France, Italy and Luxembourg 
did not adopt this directive until 2001, while Cyprus, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland 
had not transposed the directive till the end of our sample period (Kalemli – Ozcan, Papaioannou, and 
Peydro, 2010 a, b).5 It is this cross-country variation in the timing of the adoption of different directives 
which will allow us to identify their effect on growth.   
 
We assemble harmonization indices for EU countries using adoption dates of different directives in 
different countries from the European Commission’s Financial Services Action Plan. Following the 
methodology by Kalemli – Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Peydro (2010 b), we construct country and time-
variant and industry-invariant indices of harmonization that summarize the information provided by the 
27 FSAP directives. In particular, for each of the 27 directives listed under the FSAP we define a dummy 
variable that takes on a value of one on and after the date that the country under examination has 
transposed the directive into national law and a value of zero otherwise.  We sum all 27 directives to 
create our next variable, lexi,t (Kalemli – Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Peydro, 2010 a, b): 
 
𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑘
27
𝑘=1
 
 
We construct our financial harmonization index by: 
 
𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = ln (1 + 𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡) 
 
where k represents all 27 directive dummies, i represents the countries, and t represents the years in the 
sample. Following Kalemli – Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Peydro (2010 b), we use the logarithmic 
transformation of the sum of the directives for countries. For robustness we construct two different 
indices that include the initial twenty-one directives that were put into force by the European Commission 
before the official completion of the FSAP, and the six directives that correspond to the banking initiatives 
of the FSAP (Kalemli – Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Peydro, 2010 b).6 Table 2.2 in the Appendix provides a 
time-line of adoption of the 27 directives for all countries in our sample, while Table 2.3 presents the 
descriptions and categories for these directives.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
the member states with the adoption of the directives. By the former Article 171 (now Article 228) of the European 
Treaty and Article 143 of the Euratom Treaty the European Commission can impose tailored sanctions depending 
on the severity of non-compliance of the Member States with the rules and regulations. For more information 
please refer to the European Commission’s Application of EU Law website, 
http://ec.europa.eu/eu law/infringements/infringements 260 en.htm  
5 Please refer to Table 2.2 in the Supplementary Appendix for further explanation of the directives in the Financial 
Services Action Plan.  
6 The first alternative harmonization index which includes twenty one directives excludes the directives 
implemented prior to 2004. It is constructed as: 𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑟𝑜𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑘21
𝑘=1  and 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
∗ = ln (1 +
𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑟𝑜𝑖,𝑡). The second alternative to the harmonization index highlights the importance of the 7 banking directives 
of the FSAP. The banking harmonization index is then formed as: 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑘7
𝑘=1  and 
𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
∗∗ = ln (1 + 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡). 
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2.2.3 Measure of External Finance Dependence 
 
 One of the aims of our model is to examine how the effect of harmonization on growth is mediated by 
an industry’s dependence on external finance. Following Rajan and Zingales (1998), we take a measure of 
an industry’s dependence on external funds in the U.S. and apply it to our European sample. The external 
finance dependence measure is calculated by computing the external financing needs of U.S. companies 
during 1970s using data from Compustat. It exclusively concentrates on the amount of desired investment 
that cannot be financed through internal cash flows within the same company. The external finance 
dependence measure for a firm is constructed as: 
 
𝑒𝑥𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠,𝑡 =
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑠,𝑡 − 𝑐𝑓𝑜𝑠,𝑡
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑠,𝑡
 
 
where 𝑒𝑥𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠,𝑡 is the external finance dependence measure, 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑠,𝑡 is capital expenditures, and 
𝑐𝑓𝑜𝑠,𝑡  is cash flow from operations of a firm in industry s. In order to obtain the firm’s overall dependence 
on external finance in 1970s Rajan and Zingales sum the external finance measure over 10 years (from 
1970 to 1980) and divide it by the sum of capital expenditures over the same period. To obtain a measure 
of finance dependence at the sectoral level, 𝑒𝑥𝑓𝑠 Rajan and Zingales (1998) use the industry median. By 
doing so, they reduce the effects of outliers and temporal fluctuations.  
 
Applying the U.S. industry measures of external finance dependence to the corresponding European 
industries is reasonable if, as argued by Rajan and Zingales (1998), there is a technological reason for why 
some industries depend more on external finance than others. That is, if the machinery industry requires 
a larger initial scale and a longer period of gestation before the admittance of cash flows into the sector, 
in comparison to the textile industry in the U.S., this would also be true for the two industries in France 
(Rajan and Zingales, 1998). With the assumption that these technological differences are similar across 
countries, the Rajan and Zingales measure of external finance dependence can be used for different 
countries. 
 
We use the external finance measure of Rajan and Zingales (1998) for two additional reasons.7 Firstly, we 
rely our analysis on a well cited paper by Rajan and Zingales. Secondly, if we were to use country-specific 
measures of finance dependence for Europe, there would be an issue of endogeneity, because growth 
may affect external dependence. By using the U.S. measure, external finance dependence becomes 
exogenous to the growth process of different European countries. 
 
There is, nonetheless, a drawback of using this measure. Our sample includes a larger group of industries 
than what the Rajan and Zingales measure captures.8 Although this leads to the exclusion of some 
industries from our estimations, we have no reason to believe that it substantially alters our results.  
 
 
                                                          
7 A number of studies in the literature employ the Rajan and Zingales measure of external finance due to its 
exogeneity.  Gupta and Yuan (2003), (2009), Claessens and Laeven (2005), Guiso et al. (2004), Cetorelli (2001) and 
Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) are some examples. 
8 The Rajan and Zingales measure of external finance dependence is based on the information obtained using 
mostly manufacturing sectors. Table 2.1 in the Supplementary Appendix presents correspondences of industries in 
our analysis to the ones in Rajan and Zingales (1998). 
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2.2.4 Interaction term of the harmonization index and external finance 
dependence 
 
Given our harmonization index and the external finance dependence measure of Rajan and Zingales 
(1998), we construct our interaction term which will help us to identify the simultaneous effect of 
harmonization and external finance dependence on growth as follows: 
 
(𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑒𝑥𝑓𝑠)𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 
 
where i represents the countries, s represents the industries, t represents the years in the 
sample,9 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is the harmonization index constructed using the directives of the FSAP and  
𝑒𝑥𝑓𝑠 is the industry-variant external finance dependence measure of Rajan and Zingales.  
 
With the interaction term that has country, industry and time variability, we account for the effects of 
harmonization on industries that require external financing on growth rates.  
 
2.2.5 Other control variables 
 
In order to thoroughly examine the relationship between financial harmonization and industrial growth, 
there may be a need to control for a number of legal and institutional variables, as well as financial and 
stock market development indicators. Control variables described in detail below are country and time-
variant and cover the period of 1996 – 2007. 
 
We employ a series of legal and institutional variables from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators dataset. We use three different measures to control for institutional, legal, political and 
economic factors that may affect the overall level of growth. The three indicators --- government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, and rule of law --- are constructed using subjective and perceptions-
based data that reflect views of a range of respondents, agencies and organizations. They are measured 
in a range from -2.5 to 2.5, where higher values correspond to better governance outcomes.10  
 
To measure financial development we employ the ratio of deposit money bank assets to the sum of deposit 
money bank assets and central bank assets from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine’s (2000) Financial 
Development and Structure Database. This variable demonstrates the weight of deposit money bank 
assets among total assets and indicates the importance of private lending. For stock market development 
we make use of stock market turnover ratio also from the Financial Development and Structure Database. 
This variable is measured as the ratio of the value of total shares traded to stock market capitalization and 
depicts the efficiency of stock markets in transaction.  
 
Control variables help in further explaining the effect of harmonization on industrial growth. The timing 
of implementation of harmonization policies could be driven by the state of financial and stock market 
developments across countries. The ease in adopting FSAP directives into national law can be induced by 
                                                          
9 Similarly for robustness checks we construct two additional interaction terms that depend on the different 
harmonization indices, i.e (𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
∗ × 𝑒𝑥𝑓𝑠)𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 and (𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
∗∗ × 𝑒𝑥𝑓𝑠)𝑖,𝑠,𝑡  
10 Please refer to the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) dataset. 1996 – 2011. World Bank. 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/resources.htm. The institutional quality variables used in our analysis 
do not fluctuate widely across time. Due to the relatively small fluctuation structure of these indicators, we take 
the averages of two consecutive years to replace the missing years’ data for these three legal/institutional 
variables. 
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the quality of regulatory and legislative institutions. In order to control for these potential influences, to 
verify the robustness of our benchmark model, to analyze the possibility of extending our model to a 
dynamic one, and to account for factors that may not be fully encountered in a fixed effects setting, we 
include the variables discussed above. 
 
2.3 Empirical Specification 
 
Our analysis is based on a model that measures the effects of financial harmonization and external finance 
dependence on industrial growth. We follow the literature (Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), (1998), Strahan 
(2002), Morgan, Rime and Strahan (2004), and Kalemli – Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Peydro (2010 a, b)) and 
use a model which assumes that the effects of harmonization and external finance dependence will 
impact growth not only through the harmonization index but also through the interaction term.11 Our 
benchmark model will control for average differences across countries and time in harmonization policies 
and across industries in external finance dependence. It will allow us to analyze the influence of 
harmonization policies through the index measure and through the interaction term separately.  
 
We present a benchmark model to measure the effect of external finance dependence and financial 
harmonization on industrial growth across countries and over time.  
 
𝐺𝑉𝐴𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 = 𝜆𝑖 + 𝜇𝑠 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜑𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑒𝑥𝑓𝑠)𝑖,𝑠,𝑡
+ 𝑣𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 
 
where the dependent variable in the above equation is gross value added growth, 𝜆𝑖 represents country 
fixed effects, 𝜇𝑠 represents industry fixed effects, 𝜃𝑡  represents time fixed effects, 𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1 is the lagged 
logarithm of gross value added in levels, 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is the index measure created using the FSAP 
directives,  and the interaction term is the product of the financial harmonization index and the external 
finance dependence measure of Rajan and Zingales.12 
 
In the above equation our main focus is on the coefficients of the harmonization index and the interaction 
term. We would expect to find positive and significant coefficients for both terms which would imply a 
positive effect of financial harmonization and financial deepening (measured by external finance 
dependence) on gross value added growth. Our analysis is based on the examination of how much 
industries benefit in terms of growth from harmonization of financial markets within the EU given that 
these industries require external finance. Similar to the work presented in Rajan and Zingales (1998), we 
can make predictions about within country differences between industries and across time using an 
interaction term that reveals time, country and industry specifics. This method allows correcting for 
country, industry, and time characteristics and avoids any potential omitted variable bias and model 
specification (Rajan and Zingales, 1998).  
 
Although the literature (Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), (1998), Strahan (2002), and Kalemli – Ozcan, 
Papaioannou, and Peydro, 2010 b) does not suggest the use of a dynamic model, there are studies that 
                                                          
11 We extend our benchmark model into an Arellano-Bond type dynamic panel data model to control for issues 
regarding endogeneity and autocorrelation.  
12 The above model in levels with fixed effects is consistent when 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1, 𝑣𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1) = 0. This implies lag of 
gross value added to have no correlation with the lag of the error term. This does not however suggest lagged growth 
rate to be uncorrelated with the lagged error term. That is, 𝑐𝑜𝑣(∆𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1, 𝑣𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1) ≠ 0. This assumption is 
sufficient to guarantee the efficiency of our benchmark model. 
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examine whether the results of the benchmark model correspond to those using instruments in 
estimations. In our benchmark setting, there may also be concerns regarding the effect of anticipation of 
financial harmonization policies. That is, countries may initiate adopting harmonization measures with 
hopes of enhancing growth. In order to account for this possibility, we extend our analysis to include a 
dynamic specification. Using a dynamic setting, we can calculate the speed of adjustment of the 
harmonization policies as well as accounting for long-run effects of the variables in our model.  The 
dynamic panel data model used in our analysis is specified as follows13:  
 
∆𝐺𝑉𝐴𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛾∆𝐺𝑉𝐴𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1 + ∆𝜏𝑡+ 𝛼1∆𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼2(∆𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 × ∆𝑒𝑥𝑓𝑠)𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 + ∑ 𝜌𝑘∆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡,𝑘
6
𝑘=1
+ ∆𝑢𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 
 
where 𝐺𝑉𝐴𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 is the country, industry and time-variant gross value added growth, 𝜏𝑡 represents the 
time fixed effects, 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is the harmonization index of the FSAP measures, the interaction 
term is the  product of the harmonization index and external finance dependence measure of Rajan and 
Zingales, and 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡,𝑘 are control variables for harmonization differences, financial and stock market 
development, and legal and institutional measures that are country and time-variant. As before, we would 
expect to find positive values for both 𝛼1 and 𝛼2.  
 
The above model no longer has country or industry specific effects, the dynamic panel data model 
accounts for these individual effects. The Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data model takes the first 
differences of all terms in order to elude the Nickell bias that occurs when the lagged dependent variable 
is correlated with the error term. The moment conditions that stem from the above model require that: 
 
𝐸[𝐺𝑉𝐴𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−𝑘∆𝑢𝑖,𝑠,𝑡] = 0 for ∀𝑘 ≥ 2 
 
With this condition the lagged dependent variable of gross value added growth is guaranteed to be 
uncorrelated with the first difference of the error term even though the first difference of the 
dependent variable could indeed be correlated with the first difference of the error term.  
 
By using one lag of the dependent variable as a regressor, we allow gross value added growth rates across 
European countries to partially adjust to their long-run equilibrium value within one year. First differences 
in the dynamic data model wipe out country and industry-variant and time-invariant specific effects. The 
dynamic panel data model thereby avoids any potential correlation of possible fixed effects with the right 
hand side regressors. We convey our main findings for both the benchmark and dynamic panel data 
models in detail in the next section. 
 
2.4 Results 
 
We report our results using 25 EU member countries for 1971 – 2007. In our regressions with the 
benchmark model we use fixed effects estimations with country, industry, and time specific effects, 
whereas for the dynamic panel data model we use the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel specification. 
 
                                                          
13 We include time dummies in our dynamic panel data model to account for possible trends. Time dummies are 
also used as IV type instruments in the dynamic panel data model estimations. 
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2.4.1 Benchmark model  
 
The results from Table 2.5 illustrate the effects of the harmonization index and the interaction term on 
gross value added growth in a fixed effects estimation with country, industry, and time effects. We would 
expect to find a positive effect of financial harmonization and the interaction term on growth. Previous 
discussions had conveyed that through the Financial Services Action Plan, European economies would 
achieve an increase in the real GDP by 1.1% over a decade (FSA, 2003; London Economics, 2002). However, 
columns (1) – (3) of Table 2.514, each using a different harmonization index depending on the number of 
directives included, report negative coefficients for harmonization on gross value added growth.15 This 
implies that as countries adopt the directives of the FSAP, industrial growth becomes negatively impacted 
directly by the process of financial harmonization. Although the negative impact is only statistically 
significant for banking integration directives in column (3), this finding clearly runs counter to our initial 
expectations. The aim of the FSAP is to create policies that will be implemented by member countries to 
achieve an optimal single financial market. Nevertheless, interaction terms constructed using different 
financial harmonization indices, are found to be positive and significant. They convey that the additional 
need for external finance dependence along with the adoption of harmonization policies bring an 
enhancement to growth. The lagged values of gross value added are shown to be negatively significant in 
all columns complying with our initial expectations that European countries experience slower growth 
perspectives in upcoming years.  
 
Given that harmonization has a negative direct effect and a positive indirect effect (through the 
interaction term), we move on to calculating the total effects of harmonization. This can be done by using 
the following partial derivative: 
 
𝜕𝐺𝑉𝐴𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑖,𝑠,𝑡
𝜕𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑒𝑥𝑓𝑠 
 
Since our primary concern is on the impact of harmonization policies implemented through the FSAP, we 
observe total effects using the above equation.  Examining the summary statistics reported in Table 2.4 
and the coefficients from the first column of Table 2.5, we calculate that at the mean level of external 
finance dependence, the partial derivative of gross value added growth across industries with respect to 
the harmonization index is equal to -0.0094. At the minimum level of external finance dependence, the 
partial derivative takes on a value of -0.0148, whereas at the maximum level of external finance 
dependence, the partial derivative is -0.0027. The results show that the total effect of harmonization 
policies is negative for growth. The positive interaction terms simply convey that the negative effect of 
harmonization policies is somewhat mitigated in industries with higher external finance dependence. The 
coefficient of harmonization from column (3) of banking directives implies that growth across countries 
and industries has decreased by 2 % after the implementation of the FSAP directives (exp (-0.025) 
=0.9753). 
 
                                                          
14 In this benchmark specification we do not control for other covariates; the inclusion of country, industry and 
time fixed effects accounts for most of the usual control variables used in standard growth regressions. We 
introduce further controls to our model in later specifications. 
15 The t-statistics reported in the tables are based on country and industry-specific (clustered) heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation. Country and industry clustering allows to control for errors that can be correlated across 
countries within an industry, and across industries within a country, as well as providing standard errors that are 
robust to heteroskedasticity. Using clustering in a fixed effects model thereby gives a consistent estimation of a 
panel with cluster-variance while controlling for endogeneity.  
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Taken together, our results are puzzling. The negative effect of harmonization, particularly that of the 
banking directives, on industrial growth is difficult to explain given the initial objectives of the FSAP. Our 
findings demonstrate that the effect of the FSAP directives on growth is not as beneficial as the policy 
makers had initially expected. These findings could be due to different factors. 
 
Integration versus uniformity  
 
A first possibility is that not all these directives served to reduce costs through market integration. 
Harmonization is a broad term that could capture different realities. On the one hand, harmonization 
could refer to integration, thus lowering the cost of cross-border financial activity. On the other hand, 
harmonization could simply mean uniformity, without necessarily implying the lowering of costs. We 
therefore take the directives in Table 2.316 and classify them into three groups: those that imply 
integration, those that imply uniformity, and those that fall under the others category. The first category 
of directives, those that promote integration, is made up of directives which aim to improve the efficiency 
of payments, eliminate tax distortions, simplify regulation, create a single passport for securities, increase 
competition, remove barriers and restrictions, expand investment options and reduce the cost of capital. 
The main goal of this category of directives is to lower the costs of cross-border financial activity. The 
second category of directives, those that promote uniformity, seeks to improve risk management, 
harmonize cross-border supervision, encourage innovation, improve prudential regulation and rules, and 
increase consumer confidence and protection. Although these directives may also contribute to removing 
some restrictions, they are more aimed towards making rules and regulation more uniform, and often 
involve increasing the costs of cross-border financial activity.17 The third category consists of all other 
directives which are not easily classifiable under the two former categories.18 
 
Columns (1) – (3) of Table 2.6 report the same specification as Table 2.5, but employ a different 
harmonization index for each of the three categories of directives. Using the same indexing strategy as 
discussed earlier, the findings demonstrate that the uniformity index has a negative impact on industrial 
growth. Both integration and others indices are not found to be significant. This result shows that not all 
harmonization is the same: harmonization that effectively improves market integration ceases to have a 
significant negative impact, whereas harmonization which is mainly aimed at making countries “similar” 
continues to have a negative effect on growth. Including the effect of the interaction term reinforces this 
dichotomy, as it is found to be positively significant for those directives that promote integration, whereas 
it is insignificant for those directives that promote uniformity for the industries with higher dependence 
on external funds. Taken together, this suggests that harmonization thought of as integration has an 
overall positive effect19, whereas harmonization thought of as uniformity has an overall negative effect 
on industrial growth. More broadly speaking, some directives may lower the cost of cross-border financial 
                                                          
16 The Supplementary Appendix provides a more in depth guide for the FSAP directives and the different categories 
that they fall under. Please refer to the Appendix and the Supplementary Appendix for further information on 27 
directives of the FSAP. 
17 Increasing costs refer to mostly cost of compliance and capital costs that are born on investors and issuers across 
countries.  
18 Note that the classification of the directives under each category can be regarded as being subjective. However, 
the main goal through this analysis is to examine whether the effect of financial harmonization on industrial 
growth is amplified when directives that aim to implement similar objectives are grouped together under an index.  
19 The positive effect of integration directives holds for industries that have a higher dependence (at the maximum 
level) on external finance, in other words, at the maximum level of external finance dependence, harmonization 
that implies integration has a positive impact on industrial growth. 
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activity, whereas others may increase it. Grouping all directives together under the common wording of 
“harmonization” may thus be misleading. 
 
EU-15 versus the rest 
 
A second possibility for the negative effect of harmonization in our benchmark specification is that the 
new member states of the EU exhibit different behavior from the original EU-15 members, and that this 
difference is not adequately picked up by the country-fixed effects. One of the biggest criticisms for the 
FSAP measures is that they have been implemented without further consideration of the structural basis 
of integration in securities, retail and financial markets across the EU.20 This suggests that the FSAP 
measures may not be as effective in markets that are not completely integrated.  Truly integrated markets 
should in fact benefit from financial harmonization through the reduction in costs of investment, 
enhancements in consumer protection, improvements in allocation of investment resources, and 
innovation. However, without a well-integrated financial market, financial harmonization policies could 
only provide small benefits to EU member countries.  
 
We thereby believe that EU-15 countries which have been a part of the union for a longer period of time 
may have a different response to the implementation of the FSAP policies in comparison to newer 
members of the EU. Similarly being a part of a monetary union might have an additional influence on 
growth. Another issue is that the FSAP was largely negotiated when the new member states were not yet 
a part of the EU, raising the possibility that their specific needs were not sufficiently taken into account. 
If so, we would expect the effect of financial harmonization to have a positive impact on the growth rate 
of EU-15 countries, unlike the negative effect that is depicted for the entire sample. 
 
In order to further analyze this issue, we divide our sample set into subgroups. In column (4) of Table 2.6 
we report the results for the EU-15 countries. Column (4) shows that the harmonization index is in fact 
positively significant. This implies that for EU-15 countries financial harmonization has a positive impact 
on industrial growth. In column (5) we examine the case with Euro countries. In the Euro countries the 
effects of financial harmonization should be enhanced due to the existence of a monetary union. 
Consistent with this view, in column (5), we find that the harmonization index is not only positive but also 
very significant. Lastly column (6) shows that for the case of non-EU 15 countries the effect of financial 
harmonization is negative. The interaction terms are positive but not significant in any of the regressions 
reported in columns (4) to (6). Overall, this suggests that the Euro and the EU-15 countries benefitted the 
most, whereas the new member states seem to have suffered a negative effect from the FSAP.21  
 
Relative timing (speed) of adoption 
 
A third possibility for our initial finding of a negative effect of harmonization on growth might be related 
to the relative timing of adoption. For example, if Czech Republic adopts a directive, and no other country 
adopts the same directive, then we cannot talk about harmonization. In that case Czech Republic would 
simply bear the cost of adopting the directive, without attaining any benefits from it. Not controlling for 
this would introduce a bias. Given that there exist significant differences across EU member countries in 
the timing of adoption, this is a potential issue. Recall that the FSAP directives need to be transposed into 
                                                          
20 Please refer to Alexander (2002). 
21 We have also checked for the influence of the Euro’s effect on industrial growth rates by including a euro 
dummy in our estimations. The results reported in the Supplementary Appendix show that the euro dummy is not 
significant in our analysis. 
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national law before they become effective. This has to be done within a specified period of time, but some 
countries do so faster than others.  
With this in mind, we consider whether there is a disadvantage from adopting these directives earlier. In 
order to check for this possibility, we construct a new variable which we call the harmonization difference: 
 
𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡 
 
where 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is the harmonization index of country i in year t, and 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡 is 
the average index of harmonization across countries in year t. The harmonization difference is a measure 
that depicts how many FSAP directives are adopted by each country relative to the average rate of 
adoption for all countries per year. Using this variable we can analyze the impact of being an early versus 
a late adopter on industrial growth. Column (7) of Table 2.6 reports the results when this new variable is 
included in our full sample. As expected, our findings show that there is a negative effect of being an early 
adopter. The interpretation of this result is as follows: the FSAP directives aim to unify financial markets 
across the EU. However, this could only be mutually beneficial for countries when they all implement 
these directives.  
 
More importantly, once we control for the harmonization the difference, the harmonization index is now 
positive and significant. The positive effect of harmonization is carried through both the harmonization 
index and the interaction term which imply that the growing need of external finance, together with the 
ongoing process of transposition of the directives brings an enhancement to industrial growth. With the 
inclusion of the harmonization difference measure, the harmonization index acts like an average 
harmonization indicator that generates the impact of harmonization across countries at the average level.  
Figure 1 shows details of the harmonization process for 25 countries in our sample. The harmonization 
process in EU-15 countries proceeded gradually, whereas for new EU member countries it happened more 
suddenly in big jumps. As a result, the difference between the harmonization index and the average 
harmonization per year is largest for the non-EU 15 countries. In order to further investigate this, we split 
our sample into EU-15 countries, Euro countries and non-EU 15 countries. 
 
Table 2.7 presents our findings for three different samples. Column (1) reports the results for EU-15 
countries. The harmonization index is found to be positively significant implying that the adoption of the 
FSAP directives by EU-15 countries augments growth. The coefficient on the harmonization difference 
measure is negative but not significant indicating that being an early adopter does not have a clear 
negative effect on industrial growth. Similarly the harmonization index is found to be positive and 
significant and the harmonization difference measure negative but insignificant for Euro countries in 
column (2). Interaction terms in both columns demonstrate that for EU-15 and Euro countries the effects 
of harmonization do not appear stronger for industries that the depend more on external finance, the 
coefficients being statistically insignificant.22 Column (3) depicts the results for non-EU 15 countries. 
Harmonization index is no longer significant whereas the harmonization difference is negatively significant 
suggesting that among the non-EU 15 countries it is clearly more beneficial to be a late adopter than an 
early one.  
 
Taken together, our results imply that, once we control for the relative timing of adoption, harmonization 
has a positive effect on growth, though that effect is not always statistically significant. The sign of the 
                                                          
22 At the mean level of external finance dependence across industries, the total effect of harmonization for EU-15 
and Euro countries is found to be positive. The total effect for the non-EU 15 countries at the mean level of 
external finance is negative, implying that the total impact of harmonization on industrial growth is not beneficial.   
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harmonization index changes conditional on the inclusion of the harmonization difference measure that 
accounts for the relative timing of adoption. As for being an early adopter, our results show that this is 
true for all cases, but only statistically significant for the non-EU 15 countries, and for the entire sample.  
 
Exclusion of some countries 
 
A fourth possibility for our initial finding might be the result of the bias introduced by the inclusion of 
some countries in our sample. Figure 1 demonstrates that there are two countries which require closer 
analysis. Latvia and Poland seem to have adopted some FSAP directives much earlier than other non-EU 
15 countries. In fact, the data from the European Commission suggest that they adopted some of these 
measures much before becoming part of the EU. This could potentially be the result of the amendment 
of some existing directives that had already been transposed into domestic law prior to the 
implementation of the Financial Services Action Plan. In order to verify whether these two countries 
create any biases for the effects of harmonization on industrial growth, we exclude them from our sample 
and reanalyze our benchmark model. The results in columns (4) and (5) of Table 2.7 are similar to those 
reported in Tables 2.5 and 2.6. Harmonization index is still found to be negatively influential on growth 
rates when we exclude Latvia and Poland from our sample. Once again, the inclusion of the harmonization 
difference measure causes the harmonization index to become positively significant, indicating that 
harmonization is beneficial for growth, but that being an early adopter is not.  
 
We also examine the sensitivity of our results when we exclude four countries that might bring potential 
biases due to their large share of foreign banks and liabilities. In order to observe whether the effects of 
external finance dependence of industries and the enhancement of harmonization policies on industrial 
growth are triggered by the inclusion of countries with greater banking shares, we exclude Cyprus, Malta, 
Luxembourg and the U.K. from our estimations. Column (6) depicts insignificant effects for the 
harmonization index and the interaction term. In column (7) the harmonization index is found to be 
positively significant and the harmonization difference measure negatively significant which correspond 
to the results found in column (7) of Table 2.6, implying that the exclusion of countries with a larger share 
of foreign banks and liabilities does not alter our main findings. 
 
Competing explanations 
 
So far we have conveyed four reasons for why we observe a negative relationship between financial 
harmonization following the FSAP policies and industrial growth rates across European countries. A 
negative relationship could occur as a result of harmonization capturing different realities such as 
integration and uniformity, as a result of the FSAP policies aiming to create benefits for those that have 
been a part of the EU for a longer period of time and the likely impact of some countries with larger 
banking shares which may potentially bias the results, or due to the fact that there is a difference in terms 
of timing of adoption of the FSAP directives which has to be considered in estimations regarding this link. 
We have shown that EU-15 and Euro countries have a positive coefficient for financial harmonization. 
Similarly the exclusion of countries that have larger banking shares does not alter our initial findings for 
the negative result. The two remaining reasons for the initial negative effect of harmonization on growth 
thereby are the nature of harmonization and its timing. In order to study which one of these competing 
explanations is dominant, we test our results using indices for integration, uniformity and other directives 
taking into account the relative timing of adoption of the FSAP directives in our regressions. The results 
reported in Table 2.8 show that with the inclusion of the relative timing of adoption, financial 
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harmonization becomes positively significant. The results reveal that the negative effect occurs as a result 
of not accounting for the speed of adoption.23  
 
The findings from Table 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 with the inclusion of the harmonization difference depict that 
being an early adopter could lead to lower growth perspectives for all 25 countries, and for different 
subgroups of countries. In order to correctly examine the impact of early versus late adoption we need to 
include further controls into the model. 
 
Adding controls 
 
Adding further controls may be important to avoid omitted variable bias. Given that we already have 
country, industry and time fixed effects, we focus on controls that are country and time variant. Firstly, in 
order to account for the structural features of the banking systems in European countries, we follow the 
methodology proposed by Kalemli – Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Peydro (2010 b) and use control variables 
for bank’s overhead costs, bank’s profitability and banking concentration from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and 
Levine’s Financial Development and Structure Database (2000). Given that there exist concerns regarding 
the implementation of the FSAP and its dependence on local conditions of the banking systems, we 
believe that the inclusion of these variables can provide a better picture for the link between 
harmonization policies and industrial growth. The results, not reported here24, do not have any systematic 
effects on our model. Secondly, in order to account for differences in legal, institutional and governmental 
structures, as well as stock market and overall financial development, we include country and time-variant 
measures in our model.  
 
Table 2.9 reports the results for the entire sample, EU-15 countries, and non-EU 15 countries when control 
variables for financial and stock market development and legal and institutional quality are used. The 
short period availability of financial development indicators and legal variables reduces our sample size 
to the 1996 – 2007 period. Columns (1), (3) and (5) show that, when not controlling for the harmonization 
difference measure, the harmonization index is found to be negatively significant for all countries and for 
non-EU 15 countries and positive but insignificant for EU-15 countries. The inclusion of the harmonization 
difference measure in columns (2), (4) and (6) leads to a change in the sign of harmonization indices.25 
The coefficients of the interaction terms imply that the simultaneous effect of harmonization and external 
finance dependence has a negative impact on industrial growth. Overall the results depict that 
harmonization is beneficial for all countries conditional on the relative timing of adoption, and with the 
inclusion of further controls that account for outside effects. However, being an early adopter of the FSAP 
directives proves to have a disadvantageous effect on growth. This is now true for all groups of countries, 
though the effect is statistically insignificant for the EU-15 subgroup.   
 
Legal origins 
 
Lastly, we consider whether the results of our benchmark model alter with the inclusion of legal origins 
of countries. Legal origins refer to the differences across countries in terms of their legal systems which 
are structured according to families of law. Depending on the historical background and development of 
legal families, on the characteristics of the functioning of legal matters, and on distinctive institutions each 
                                                          
23 Further robustness checks using integration, uniformity and other directives with control variables strengthen 
the argument that the relative timing of adoption is the dominant factor behind the initial negative effect of 
financial harmonization on industrial growth. 
24 Please see Supplementary Appendix Table 2.2.3 for the results. 
25 The change in the sign occurs for all countries, and for non-EU 15 countries. 
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country has a differing legal tradition. As La Porta et al. present in their series of articles (1997, 1998, and 
2008) the most popular legal traditions are the common law and the civil law from which several sub-
traditions such as the French, German, socialist and Scandinavian legal origins arise.26 Although for our 
particular study, there is not much difference between the French, German and British laws that 
implement the EU legislation proposed under the FSAP, the way these provisions will be carried out into 
the domestic law, the manner that the directives will be monitored and enforced may show vast 
differences across member countries. This remains to be a factor too strong to forgo. This implies that 
together with governmental and institutional factors, differences in legal origins across countries may 
highly influence the link between financial harmonization and growth. Our analysis with the addition of 
legal origins, although not reported here, finds the effect of financial harmonization index to be negative 
but insignificant on industrial growth for all countries.27 Once again, the signs of harmonization indices 
across all countries, EU-15 countries, and non-EU 15 countries change when the harmonization difference 
measure is included in the model. Although the legal origin dummies for the U.K., France, Germany, 
Socialist regimes, and Scandinavian countries appear to be significant in some regressions, the results 
obtained are similar to the ones found in the benchmark case, and to those found in Table 2.8. 
 
2.4.2 Dynamic panel data model  
 
We include a dynamic panel data model in order to examine the partial adjustment property of 
harmonization policies, to analyze possible long-run effects of harmonization and to determine whether 
a dynamic setting would add to the relationship between harmonization and growth. The results of the 
dynamic panel data model should not be thought to overcast the findings of our benchmark model. Firstly, 
even if governments of countries in the EU anticipate higher growth rates following harmonization, it is 
unlikely that the officials in each industry could determine the timing of adoption in their own country as 
well as in other countries.28 Secondly, and more importantly, if countries harmonize because of expected 
growth, early harmonization should be beneficial. In fact, we find the opposite which we report in the 
following section. 
 
Table 2.10 depicts the results of 4 different dynamic Arellano-Bond GMM type panel models.  Due to the 
use of control variables, the estimation period is reduced to 1996 – 2007. The lagged dependent variable 
in column (1) has a negative and significant coefficient. The harmonization index in the dynamic panel 
data model is found to have a positively significant effect when the harmonization difference measure 
and other control variables are included in the model. Harmonization difference measure is found to be 
negative and significant. Columns (2) and (3) report the results for EU-15 countries and columns (4) and 
(5) report the results for non-EU 15 countries. In column (2), the lagged dependent variable is negative 
and significant, implying that previous growth perspectives lead to a slowdown in current growth. The 
variables of interest on the other hand are found to have insignificant coefficients.29 Column (4) shows 
that for non-EU 15 countries none of the variables of interest is significant. In order to correct for this 
                                                          
26 Please refer to La Porta et al. (2008). Legal origins dummies are obtained from the original La Porta et al. (1998) 
study and they are created by assigning a value of 1 for countries that have a specified legal tradition such as civil 
or common law, and 0 otherwise. 
27 Please see the Supplementary Appendix, Table 2.2.4 for the results using controls and legal origins. 
28 Both Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Klenow (1998) argue that there is low correlation across industrial growth 
rates. This low correlation in industrial growth stands as an additional reason for why causality (or the endogeneity 
of harmonization) is not a problem in our analysis. 
29 Column (3) uses government effectiveness and deposit money bank assets to central bank assets ratio as 
additional instruments. The inclusion of these variables as instruments does not bring significant changes to our 
estimations. 
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problem in column (5) we report results for non-EU 15 countries with controls using additional 
instruments.30  Harmonization index is then found to be positive and significant. The harmonization 
difference is also negatively significant implying that being an early adopter for non-EU 15 countries is not 
beneficial. In all estimations the Arellano-Bond tests of serial correlation show that we do not have any 
problems with the error terms in our regressions, whereas the Sargan tests do not report 
overidentification problems regarding the instruments to be used in the estimation of the model in all 
columns.31 
 
We have experimented with different control variables that are common to growth regressions. The 
inclusion of secondary school enrollment rate to account for differences in human capital across countries, 
government expenditures, or health expenditures does not alter the results reported by the dynamic 
panel data model.  
 
To analyze the long-run effects of harmonization policies and the interaction term we divide each 
coefficient by 1 – γ, where γ represents the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable in our model. The 
results show that the harmonization index has a positive coefficient for growth when we consider its long-
run impact.32 This suggests that, given the shorter sample, and the control variables selected, the effect 
of harmonization will be positive in the long-run. The interaction term has a negative effect on growth, 
suggesting that in the long-run, the benefits of harmonizing in a full sample of European economies may 
not work through the simultaneous effect of external finance dependence of industries. Overall, the 
results of interest confirm our findings from the benchmark model in that harmonization has a positive 
effect on growth once we take into account the harmonization difference measure and other controls.  
 
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
Starting with the adoption of the Euro in 1999, the European Union has taken initiatives in building a more 
integrated and harmonized financial market among its member states. With the establishment of the 
Financial Services Action Plan, the European Commission has taken a further step to integrate the 
European countries through legislative and regulatory terms in banking, insurance and securities markets. 
                                                          
30 The instruments used in the dynamic panel data model estimations fall under two categories; GMM and IV type 
instruments. GMM type instruments consist of endogenous variables such as the lagged dependent or explanatory 
variables. IV type instruments on the other hand are explanatory variables that are exogenous as well as additional 
set of instruments which are not part of the original equation. All columns use the 4th lag of the logarithm of gross 
value added in levels as GMM type instruments; whereas columns (1), (2) and (3) use political stability measure 
from the Worldwide Governance Indicators dataset, lag of the harmonization index, lag of the interaction term, 
and time dummies as IV type instruments. Column (4) in addition to these IV type instruments uses the ratio of 
deposit money bank assets to the sum of deposit money bank and central bank assets, stock market turnover 
ratio, and government effectiveness as instruments. For a further explanation of the variables please refer to the 
Supplementary Appendix. We make use of political stability as an instrument due to its exogeneity with industrial 
growth. Our estimations including this variable as a control does not depict significant results, which then 
strengthens our argument for using it as an instrument. 
31 The lags of instruments used for the dynamic panel data model specification are of vital importance. Due to the 
static nature of the problem, using a dynamic panel data model with an incorrect specification can bias our 
findings. In order to account for this we experiment with various lag structures and instruments. 
32 The EU-15 countries have a negative coefficient for harmonization that is insignificant in column (3) and a 
positive but insignificant coefficient in column (4). We believe that this alteration can be a result of the instruments 
selected in the analysis. Given that the coefficients are insignificant in either case we restrain from concluding that 
the long-run impact of harmonization in EU-15 countries is negative or positive.  
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Since the goal of the FSAP is to enhance growth in Europe, this paper has assessed whether this has been 
the case or not. When using a standard specification --- regressing growth on harmonization controlling 
for country, industry and time fixed effects --- we find that harmonization did not have the expected 
effect. Instead, growth seems to have been negatively impacted by the introduction of the FSAP. However, 
this standard specification, used in other papers on financial deregulation and harmonization, fails to 
control for an important factor: the relative timing of adoption. Indeed, we would only expect 
harmonization to be beneficial if all countries adopt the directives. That is, adopting when others do not, 
would not imply true harmonization, putting early adopters at a disadvantage. Once we control for the 
relative timing of adoption, we find that harmonization has the expected positive effect on growth, 
whereas being an early adopter (mostly) has a negative effect. These results are shown to be robust to 
including different controls, splitting up the sample into different subgroups of countries, and extending 
the model to a dynamic specification.  
 
This paper suggests several promising areas of future research. First, as time passes, and more data 
become available for a longer time period, a more in-depth dynamic analysis of the impact of the FSAP 
could be carried out. Of particular interest would be to see whether the different behavior of the non-EU 
15 countries33 that we uncovered gets mitigated over time. Second, our paper has gone beyond the simple 
cross-country analysis common to many studies by including industrial data. A next natural step would be 
to use firm-level data. Doing so would allow us to better measure the interaction between the impact of 
the FSAP and the dependence on external finance at the firm-level. Third, our paper shows that the 
relative timing of adoption is key to understand the impact of harmonization policies on growth. This 
suggests that controlling for this relative timing should be useful for other studies that have analyzed the 
impact of deregulation or harmonization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
33 Another topic of interest is to uncover the channels that affect the EU-15 countries and explain their different 
behavior in some of our estimations. 
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2.7 Appendix 
 
Table 2.1: Currency units 
 
Country Currency Comments 
Austria Euro The entire series is obtained from the EU KLEMS dataset which has the data in Euros 
from 1999 onwards. For the data in years before 1999 EU KLEMS has used the 1999 
official fixed Euro conversion rate (13.7603 ATS to EURO) 
Belgium Euro The entire series is obtained from the EU KLEMS dataset which has the data in Euros 
from 1999 onwards. For the data in years before 1999 EU KLEMS has used the 1999 
official fixed Euro conversion rate (40.3399 BEF to EURO) 
Cyprus Cypriot Pound The entire series is obtained from the EU KLEMS dataset which has the data in Cypriot 
Pounds throughout the period. The data is converted to Euros using the exchange rates 
from Eurostat for the period after 1999, and using the 1999 official fixed exchange rate 
of Cypriot Pound to Euros (0.57884 CYP to EURO) for the period prior to 1999 
Czech Republic Czech Koruna The entire series is obtained from the EU KLEMS dataset which has the data in Czech 
Korunas throughout the period. The data is converted to Euros using the exchange rates 
from Eurostat for the period after 1999, and using the 1999 official fixed exchange rate 
of Czech Koruna to Euros (36.884 CZK to EURO) for the period prior to 1999 
Denmark Danish Krone The entire series is obtained from the EU KLEMS dataset which has the data in Danish 
Krones throughout the period. The data is converted to Euros using the exchange rates 
from Eurostat for the period after 1999, and using the 1999 official fixed exchange rate 
of Danish Krone to Euros (7.4355 DKK to EURO) for the period prior to 1999 
Estonia Estonian Kroon The entire series is obtained from the EU KLEMS dataset which has the data in Estonian 
Kroons throughout the period. The data is converted to Euros using the exchange rates 
from Eurostat for the period after 1999, and using the 1999 official fixed exchange rate 
of Estonian Kroon to Euros (15.6466 EEK to EURO) for the period prior to 1999 
Finland Euro The entire series is obtained from the EU KLEMS dataset which has the data in Euros 
from 1999 onwards. For the data in years before 1999 EU KLEMS has used the 1999 
official fixed Euro conversion rate (5.94573 FIM to EURO) 
France Euro The entire series is obtained from the EU KLEMS dataset which has the data in Euros 
from 1999 onwards. For the data in years before 1999 EU KLEMS has used the 1999 
official fixed Euro conversion rate (6.55957 FRF to EURO) 
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Germany Euro The entire series is obtained from the EU KLEMS dataset which has the data in Euros 
from 1999 onwards. For the data in years before 1999 EU KLEMS has used the 1999 
official fixed Euro conversion rate (1.95583 DEM to EURO) 
Greece Euro The entire series is obtained from the EU KLEMS dataset which has the data in Euros 
from 1999 onwards. For the data in years before 1999 EU KLEMS has used the 1999 
official fixed Euro conversion rate (340.750 GRD to EURO) 
Hungary Hungarian 
Forint 
The entire series is obtained from the EU KLEMS dataset which has the data in 
Hungarian Forints throughout the period. The data is converted to Euros using the 
exchange rates from Eurostat for the period after 1999, and using the 1999 official fixed 
exchange rate of Hungarian Forint to Euros (252.77 HUF to EURO) for the period prior 
to 1999 
Ireland Euro The entire series is obtained from the EU KLEMS dataset which has the data in Euros 
from 1999 onwards. For the data in years before 1999 EU KLEMS has used the 1999 
official fixed Euro conversion rate (0.787564 IEP to EURO) 
Italy Euro The entire series is obtained from the EU KLEMS dataset which has the data in Euros 
from 1999 onwards. For the data in years before 1999 EU KLEMS has used the 1999 
official fixed Euro conversion rate (1936.27 ITL to EURO) 
Latvia Latvian Lats The entire series is obtained from the EU KLEMS dataset which has the data in Latvian 
Lats throughout the period. The data is converted to Euros using the exchange rates 
from Eurostat for the period after 1999, and using the 1999 official fixed exchange rate 
of Latvian Lats to Euros (0.6256 LVL to EURO) for the period prior to 1999 
Lithuania Lithuanian Lita The entire series is obtained from the EU KLEMS dataset which has the data in 
Lithuanian Litas throughout the period. The data is converted to Euros using the 
exchange rates from Eurostat for the period after 1999, and using the 1999 official fixed 
exchange rate of Lithuanian Lita to Euros (4.2641 LTL to EURO) for the period prior to 
1999 
Luxembourg Euro The entire series is obtained from the EU KLEMS dataset which has the data in Euros 
from 1999 onwards. For the data in years before 1999 EU KLEMS has used the 1999 
official fixed Euro conversion rate (40.3399 LUF to EURO) 
Malta Maltese Lira The entire series is obtained from the EU KLEMS dataset which has the data in Maltese 
Liras throughout the period. The data is converted to Euros using the exchange rates 
from Eurostat for the period after 1999, and using the 1999 official fixed exchange rate 
of Maltese Lira to Euros (0.4258 MTL to EURO) for the period prior to 1999 
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Netherlands Euro The entire series is obtained from the EU KLEMS dataset which has the data in Euros 
from 1999 onwards. For the data in years before 1999 EU KLEMS has used the 1999 
official fixed Euro conversion rate (2.20371 NLG to EURO) 
Poland Polish Zloty The entire series is obtained from the EU KLEMS dataset which has the data in Polish 
Zloties throughout the period. The data is converted to Euros using the exchange rates 
from Eurostat for the period after 1999, and using the 1999 official fixed exchange rate 
of Polish Zloty to Euros (4.2274 PLN to EURO) for the period prior to 1999 
Portugal Euro The entire series is obtained from the EU KLEMS dataset which has the data in Euros 
from 1999 onwards. For the data in years before 1999 EU KLEMS has used the 1999 
official fixed Euro conversion rate (200.482 PTE to EURO) 
Slovakia Euro The entire series is obtained from the EU KLEMS dataset which has the data in Euros 
from 1999 onwards. For the data in years before 1999 EU KLEMS has used the 1999 
official fixed Euro conversion rate (44.1230 SKK to EURO) 
Slovenia Slovenian Tolar The entire series is obtained from the EU KLEMS dataset which has the data in 
Slovenian Tolars throughout the period. The data is converted to Euros using the 
exchange rates from Eurostat for the period after 1999, and using the 1999 official fixed 
exchange rate of Slovenian Tolar to Euros (4.2274 SIT to EURO) for the period prior to 
1999 
Spain Euro The entire series is obtained from the EU KLEMS dataset which has the data in Euros 
from 1999 onwards. For the data in years before 1999 EU KLEMS has used the 1999 
official fixed Euro conversion rate (166.386 ESP to EURO) 
Sweden Swedish Krona The entire series is obtained from the EU KLEMS dataset which has the data in Swedish 
Kronas throughout the period. The data is converted to Euros using the exchange rates 
from Eurostat for the period after 1999, and using the 1999 official fixed exchange rate 
of Swedish Krona to Euros (8.8075 SEK to EURO) for the period prior to 1999 
UK British Pound 
Sterling 
The entire series is obtained from the EU KLEMS dataset which has the data in British 
Pounds throughout the period. The data is converted to Euros using the exchange rates 
from Eurostat for the period after 1999, and using the 1999 official fixed exchange rate 
of British Pound to Euros (0.65874 GBP to EURO) for the period prior to 1999 
 
Sources: EU KLEMS dataset http://www.euklems.net/ and Timmer, Marcel, Ton van Moergastel, Edwin Stuivenwold, Gerard Ypma, Mary O’Mahony, and Mari 
Kangasniemi. (2007). “EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts, Version 1”, EU KLEMS, pp. 56. The currency unit refers to the units obtained from the EU 
KLEMS dataset. As expressed previously any currency that is not converted into Euros in the original EU KLEMS dataset is converted into Euros using 1999 fixed 
exchange rates for the periods prior to 1999, and official bilateral exchange rates as reported in Eurostat for the periods after 1999. 
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Table 2.2: Timing of the FSAP Directives for the EU Member Countries 
 
Directives AT BE CY CZ DK EE FI FR DE GR HU    IE IT LV 
               
1998/26/EC 1999 1999 Not Yet Not Yet 2000 2004  1999 2001  1999 2000 Not Yet 1999 2001 Not Yet 
2000/46/EC 2002 2003 2004 2003 2005 2006 2003 2003 2002 2003 2004 2002  2002  2004 
2000/64/EC  2003 2004 2002 2004 2004 2001 2004 2006 2002 2004 2002 Not Yet Not Yet 2004 
2001/17/EC 2003 2004 2004 2004 2006 2005 2004 2005 2003 Not Yet 2004 2003 2003 2004 
2001/24/EC 2003 2004 2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2004 2004 2006 2004 2004 2004 2004 
2001/65/EC 2004 2005 2003 2004 2002 2004 2004 2004 2004 2006 2004  2004 2005 1993 
2001/86/EC 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2006 2004 2006 2005 2005 
2001/97/EC 2003 2004 2003 2004 2005 2004 2003 2004 2002 2005 2003 2003 2004 2004 
2001/107/EC  2003 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2003 2004 2004 2003 2003 2003 2005 
2001/108/EC 2003 2004 2004 2004 2005 2004 2004 2003 2004 2004 2003 2003 2003 2004 
2002/13/EC 2003 2004 2004 2004 2004 2005 2004 2004 2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 1998 
2002/47/EC 2003 2005 2004 2005 2004 2004 2004 2005 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2005 
2002/65/EC 2004 2006 2004 2004 2005 2004 2005 2005 2004 2005 2005 2004 2005 2004 
2002/87/EC 2005 2005 2005 2005 2004 2005 2004 2004 2005 2006 2004 2005 2005 2005 
2002/83/EC 2003 2004 2004 2004 2004 2005 2004 2004 2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 1998 
2002/92/EC 2004 2005 2004 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 Not Yet 2005 2005 2005 2006 2005 
2003/6/EC 2005 2005 2005 2006 2005 2005 2005 2005 2004 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 
2003/41/EC 2005 2006 2006 2006 2005 2004 2006 2006 2005 2005 2005 2005 Not Yet 2005 
2003/48/EC 2004 2005 2005 2004 2004 2004 2004 2003 2005 2005 2003 2003 2005 2005 
2003/51/EC 2005 2006 2005 2004 2002 2005 2004 2004 2004 2006 2005 2005 Not Yet 1993 
2003/71/EC 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 Not Yet 2005 
2004/25/EC 2006 2007 2007 2006 2005 2007 2006 2006 2006 2006 Not Yet 2006 2007 2006 
2004/109/EC 2007 2007 Not Yet 2006 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 Not Yet 2007 2007 2007 
2004/39/EC 2007 2008 Not Yet 2006 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 Not Yet 2007 2007 Not Yet 
2005/56/EC 2007 2008 2007 Not Yet 2007 Not Yet 2007 2008 2007 Not Yet Not Yet 2008 2008 Not Yet 
2006/48/EC 2007 2007 Not Yet Not Yet 2007 2007 2007 2007 2006 2007 Not Yet 2007 2007 Not Yet 
2006/49/EC 2007 2007 Not Yet 2006 2007 2007 2007 2007 2006 2007 Not Yet 2007 2007 Not Yet 
 
 
143 
 
 
Sources: Kalemli – Ozcan, Sebnem, Elias Papaioannou, and Jose Luis Peydro. (2010 b). “What Lies Beneath the Euro’s Effect of Financial Integration? Currency 
Risk, Legal Harmonization, or Trade?”, Journal of International Economics, 81 (1): 75 – 88,  European Commission. 2010. “Transposition of Financial Services 
Action Plan” http://ec.europa.eu/internal market/finances/actionplan/transposition/database/austria en.htm, and Europa, Access to European Union Law 
National Execution Measures, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:72006L0049:EN:NOT#FIELD MT 
Directives LT LU MT NL PL PT SK SI ES SE UK 
            
1998/26/EC  Not Yet 2001 2002 1999 Not Yet 2000 2006 2004 1999 2000 1999 
2000/46/EC 2005 2002 2002 2002 2003 2002 2004 2006 2002 2002 2002 
2000/64/EC  2004 2001 2002 2003 2004 2000 2006 2004 2002 2000 2003 
2001/17/EC 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2003 2005 2004 2003 2006 2003 
2001/24/EC 2005 2004 2004 2005 2004 2006 2005 2004 2005 2006 2004 
2001/65/EC 2004 2006 2001 2005 1995 2004 2005 2004 2004 2004 2004 
2001/86/EC 2005 2006 2004 2005 2005 2005 2004 2006 2006 2004 2004 
2001/97/EC 2004 2004 2003 2001 2001 2004 2006 2002 2003 2005 2004 
2001/107/EC  2003 2003 2004 2005 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 
2001/108/EC 2003 2003 2004 2005 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 
2002/13/EC 2004 2004 2004 2003 2004 2003 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 
2002/47/EC 2004 2005 2005 2004 2004 2004 2005 2003 2002 2005 2005 
2002/65/EC 2004 Not Yet 2005 2006 2000 Not Yet 2005 Not Yet Not Yet 2004 2004 
2002/87/EC 2004 2006 2005 2007 2005 Not Yet 2006 2006 2005 2006 2004 
2002/83/EC 2004 2004 2004 2003 2004 2003 2004 2004 2004 2004 2005 
2002/92/EC 2004 2005 2006 2005 2004 2006 2005 2004 2006 2005 2005 
2003/6/EC 2004 2006 2005 2005 2005 2006 2006 2004 2005 2005 2005 
2003/41/EC 2006 2005 2004 2006 1999 2006 2005 2003 2005 2006 2005 
2003/48/EC 2005 2005 2004 2004 2005 2005 2005 2006 2004 2005 2005 
2003/51/EC 2003 2006 2002 2005 1995 2005 2005 Not Yet 2005 2006 2005 
2003/71/EC 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2006 2005 2005 2005 
2004/25/EC 2007 2006 2006 2007 Not Yet 2006 2007 2006 2007 2006 2006 
2004/109/EC 2007 2007 2007 Not Yet Not Yet 2007 Not Yet 2007 2007 2007 2007 
2004/39/EC Not Yet 2008 2007 2007 Not Yet 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 
2005/56/EC Not Yet 2007 2007 2008 Not Yet Not Yet Not Yet Not Yet Not Yet 2008 2007 
2006/48/EC Not Yet 2007 2007 2007 Not Yet 2007 Not Yet 2007 2008 2007 2007 
2006/49/EC Not Yet 2007 2007 2007 Not Yet 2007 2007 2007 2008 2007 2007 
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Table 2.3: Directives of the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) 
 
Directives Directive Names Deadline Category 
1998/26/EC Settlement Finality Directive 1/06/2005 Securities 
2000/46/EC Directive on the taking up, pursuit and prudential supervision of the 
businesses of electronic money institutions (E-Money Directive) 
27/04/2002 Banking 
2000/64/EC  Directive amending the insurance directives and the ISD to permit 
information exchange with third countries 
17/11/2002 Insurance 
2001/17/EC Directive on the reorganization and winding-up of insurance undertakings 20/04/2003 Insurance 
2001/24/EC Directive on the reorganization and winding-up of banks 5/05/2004 Banking 
2001/65/EC Directive amending the 4th and the 7th Company Law Directives to allow 
fair value accounting 
9/10/2004 Securities 
2001/86/EC Directive supplementing the Statute for a European Company with regard 
to the involvement of employees 
10/10/2004 Securities 
2001/97/EC Directive amending the money laundering directive (2nd Money 
Laundering Directive) 
15/06/2003 Banking 
2001/107/EC  1st Directive on UCITS (Undertakings for Collective Investments in 
Transferable Securities) 
13/08/2003 Securities 
2001/108/EC 2nd Directive on UCITS (Undertakings for Collective Investments in 
Transferable Securities) 
13/08/2003 Securities 
2002/13/EC Directive amending the solvency margin requirements in the insurance 
directives 
20/09/2003 Insurance 
2002/47/EC Directive on financial collateral arrangements 17/12/2003 Securities 
2002/65/EC Directive on the Distance of marketing of Financial Services 1/01/2004 Insurance 
2002/87/EC Directive on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, 
insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial conglomerate 
(Financial Conglomerates Directive) 
11/08/2004 Banking 
2002/83/EC Directive amending the solvency margin requirements in the insurance 
directives 
20/09/2003 Insurance 
2002/92/EC Directive on insurance mediation 15/01/2005 Insurance 
2003/6/EC Directive on insider dealing and market manipulation 12/10/2004 Securities 
2003/41/EC Directive on the prudential supervision of pension funds 23/09/2005 Insurance 
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2003/48/EC Directive on the taxation of savings income in the form of interest 
payments (Savings Tax Directive) 
1/01/2004 Banking 
2003/51/EC Directive modernizing the accounting provisions of the 4th and the 7th 
Company Law Directives 
1/01/2005 Securities 
2003/71/EC Directive on prospectuses 1/07/2005 Securities 
2004/25/EC Directive on Take Over Bids 20/5/2006 Securities 
2004/109/EC Transparency directive 20/01/2007 Securities 
2004/39/EC Directive on Markets in Financial Instruments (update of ISD) - MiFID 20/01/2007 Securities 
2005/56/EC 10th Company Law Directive on cross-border mergers of limited liability 
companies 
15/12/2007 Securities 
2006/48/EC Directive on the relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of 
credit institutions 
31/12/2006 Banking 
2006/49/EC Directive on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit 
institutions 
31/12/2006 Banking 
 
 
Sources: Kalemli – Ozcan, Sebnem, Elias Papaioannou, and Jose Luis Peydro. (2010 b). “What Lies Beneath the Euro’s Effect of Financial Integration? Currency 
Risk, Legal Harmonization, or Trade?”, Journal of International Economics, 81 (1): 75 – 88 and Supplementary Appendix Table A, 
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~elias/jie SAT-A.pdf, European Commission. 2010. Transposition of Financial Services Action Plan 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal market/finances/actionplan/transposition/database/austria en.htm 
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Table 2.4: Summary Statistics 
 
Variables Obs.      Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
      
GVAGRO  59114 0.0337 0.1462 -5.4337 3.5476 
External finance dependence 28500 0.0744 0.2001 -0.2993 0.5416 
Harmonization 101650 0.4297 0.9486 0 3.3322 
Harmonization interaction 28500 0.0319 0.2201 -0.9974 1.8047 
Harmonization*  101650 0.4240 0.9322 0 3.0910 
Harmonization**  101650 0.2104 0.5468 0 2.0794 
Harmonization* interaction 28500 0.0316 0.2164 -0.9252 1.6741 
Harmonization** interaction 28500 0.0156 0.1241 -0.6224 1.1262 
Harmonization difference 101650 4.77e-09 0.2185 -1.5349 1.5011 
Bank assets 8340 0.9677 0.0662 0.4620 0.9999 
Turnover ratio 8970 0.6125 0.5011 0.0014 2.6758 
Government effectiveness 9000 1.2835 0.5696 0.0782 2.3379 
Regulatory quality 9000 1.2636 0.3747 0.4393 2.0578 
Rule of Law 9000 1.1981 0.5232 0.1039 2.0142 
Note: GVAGRO is equal to the gross value added growth. External finance dependence is the 
external finance dependence measure of Rajan and Zingales (1998). Harmonization, 
Harmonization* and Harmonization** are harmonization indices constructed using the directives 
of the Financial Services Action Plan. Harmonization interaction, Harmonization* interaction, 
and Harmonization** interaction are interaction terms that are equal to the products of 
harmonization indices and the external finance dependence measure of Rajan and Zingales. 
Harmonization difference is the difference between a country’s harmonization index and 
average harmonization for that particular year. Bank assets ratio is the ratio of deposit money 
bank assets to the sum of deposit money bank assets and central bank assets, Turnover ratio is 
stock market turnover ratio, Government effectiveness, Regulatory quality and Rule of law are 
legal and institutional variables taken from the Worldwide Governance Indicators. 
 
     
      
      
      
 
 
147 
 
Table 2.5: Gross Value Added Growth for European Industries with Fixed Effects 
 
  
 Dependent Variables 
    
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES GVAGRO GVAGRO GVAGRO 
    
Log of Gross Value Added (Lagged)  -0.0129*** -0.0129*** -0.0128*** 
 (-5.029) (-5.027) (-4.976) 
 [0.00256] [0.00256] [0.00258] 
Harmonization -0.0105   
 (-1.323)   
 [0.00795]   
Harmonization interaction 0.0144*   
(𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑒𝑥𝑓) (1.804)   
 [0.00799]   
Harmonization*  -0.0110  
(21 directives)  (-1.371)  
  [0.00805]  
Harmonization* interaction  0.0145*  
(𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛∗ × 𝑒𝑥𝑓)  (1.784)  
  [0.00812]  
Harmonization**   -0.0250*** 
(7 directives)   (-2.628) 
   [0.00950] 
Harmonization** interaction   0.0225* 
(𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛∗∗ × 𝑒𝑥𝑓)   (1.677) 
   [0.0134] 
    
Observations 17,380 17,380 17,380 
R-squared 0.098 0.098 0.098 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
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Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) and standard errors are in brackets. GVAGRO = Gross value added 
growth is equal to the gross value added which is adjusted by the gross value added price indices, 1995 = 100 from the EU KLEMS database. 
GVAGRO is calculated as GVAGRO = 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑔𝑣𝑎𝑖,𝑠,𝑡) − 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑔𝑣𝑎𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1).  Harmonizationi,t = ln (1 + lexi,t ) where lexi,t represents the sum of all 27 
directives which take on a value of 1 on and after the date that the directive under consideration goes into effect in that particular country, 
and a value of 0 otherwise. Harmonizationi,t* = ln (1 + lexroi,t ) where lexroi,t represents the sum of all 21 directives excluding the 6 directives 
implemented after 2003. Harmonizationi,t** = ln (1 + banklexi,t) where banklexi,t represents the sum of all 7 banking directives. exf is the 
external finance dependence of U.S. firms in 1970s calculated by Rajan and Zingales (1998). The above estimations include the lagged 
logarithm of gross value added in levels. The regressions are estimated over 25 countries, 30 industries and 37 years. The 25 European Union 
countries included are: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the UK. The estimation period in 
our regressions is 1971 – 2007. The above estimations include country, industry, and time effects that are not reported here. t – statistics 
reported in the tables are based on country and industry-specific (clustered) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
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Table 2.6: New Specifications for Gross Value Added Growth for European Industries with Fixed Effects 
 
        
 Dependent Variables 
      
 All countries EU-15 Euro Non-EU 15 All countries 
        
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES GVAGRO GVAGRO GVAGRO GVAGRO GVAGRO GVAGRO GVAGRO 
        
Log of Gross Value Added  -0.0128*** -0.0128*** -0.0128*** -0.00894*** -0.0103*** -0.0274*** -0.0129*** 
(Lagged) (-5.004) (-4.996) (-4.990) (-3.355) (-3.763) (-3.736) (-5.029) 
 [0.00257] [0.00257] [0.00256] [0.00266] [0.00274] [0.00733] [0.00256] 
Harmonization    0.0176** 0.0234*** -0.0233* 0.0280*** 
    (2.375) (2.971) (-1.748) (6.133) 
    [0.00739] [0.00788] [0.0133] [0.00456] 
Harmonization interaction    0.00421 0.00648 0.0134 0.0144* 
(𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑒𝑥𝑓)    (0.596) (0.811) (0.591) (1.804) 
    [0.00707] [0.00798] [0.0227] [0.00799] 
Harmonizationdif       -0.0385*** 
       (-4.168) 
       [0.00923] 
        
Harmonization -0.00457       
(Integration directives) (-0.511)       
 [0.00893]       
Harmonization interaction 0.0221*       
(𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑒𝑥𝑓) (1.834)       
(Integration directives) [0.0121]       
        
Harmonization  -0.0153*      
(Uniformity directives)  (-1.848)      
  [0.00826]      
Harmonization interaction  0.0175      
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(𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑒𝑥𝑓)  (1.615)      
(Uniformity directives)  [0.0108]      
        
Harmonization   -0.00119     
(Other directives)   (-0.151)     
   [0.00783]     
Harmonization interaction   0.0207     
(𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑒𝑥𝑓)   (1.472)     
(Other directives)   [0.0141]     
        
Observations 17,380 17,380 17,380 14,048 11,049 3,332 17,380 
R-squared 0.098 0.098 0.098 0.111 0.123 0.116 0.098 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
Note: t – statistics are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) and standard errors are in brackets. GVAGRO = Gross value added 
growth is equal to the gross value added which is adjusted by the gross value added price indices, 1995 = 100 from the EU KLEMS database. 
GVAGRO is calculated as GVAGRO = log (𝑔𝑣𝑎𝑖,𝑠,𝑡) − log (𝑔𝑣𝑎𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1). Harmonizationi,t = ln (1 + lexi,t ) where lexi,t represents the sum of all 27 
directives which take on a value of 1 on and after the date that the directive under consideration goes into effect in that particular country, 
and a value of 0 otherwise. exf is the external finance dependence of U.S. firms in 1970s calculated by Rajan and Zingales (1998). 
𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡 where 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡 is the average harmonization across 
countries per year. The first three columns report the results for an industrial composition of financial harmonization directives. The FSAP 
directives are grouped under three categories; integration, uniformity and others. The construction of the indices follows the original 
calculations discussed in Section 2. The above estimations include the lagged logarithm of gross value added in levels. The regressions in the 
first three columns are estimated over 25 countries, 30 industries, and 37 years. The 25 European Union countries included are: Austria, 
Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the U.K. Column (4) is estimated over 15 countries, 30 industries 
and 37 years. The EU-15 countries are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the U.K.  Column (5) is estimated over 12 euro countries and 37 years. The 12 euro countries are: 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Column (6) is estimated 
over 10 countries, 30 industries and 37 years. The 10 non-EU 15 countries included are: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia.  Column (7) includes all countries in the sample and is estimated over 25 countries, 30 
industries and 37 years. The estimation period in our regressions is 1971 – 2007. The above estimations include country, industry, and time 
effects that are not reported here. t – statistics reported in the tables are based on country and industry-specific (clustered) 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
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Figure 2.1: Evolution of Financial Harmonization Policies across European Countries 
 
The figure above is generated in Stata and depicts the graphs for the harmonization index that is constructed using 27 directives of the 
Financial Services Action Plan and the harmonization average indicator which is the mean value of the harmonization index of 25 European 
countries per each year in our sample size. 
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Table 2.7: Robustness Checks for Gross Value Added Growth for European Industries with Fixed Effects 
 
  
 Dependent Variables 
        
 EU-15 Euro Non-EU 15 No Latvia or Poland No Cyprus, Luxembourg, 
Malta, or U.K. 
        
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES GVAGRO GVAGRO GVAGRO GVAGRO GVAGRO GVAGRO GVAGRO 
        
Log of Gross Value Added -0.00894*** -0.0103*** -0.0274*** -0.0124*** -0.0124*** -0.0110*** -0.0110*** 
(Lagged) (-3.355) (-3.763) (-3.736) (-4.748) (-4.748) (-3.990) (-3.990) 
 [0.00266] [0.00274] [0.00733] [0.00260] [0.00260] [0.00276] [0.00276] 
Harmonization 0.0217*** 0.0245*** 0.00979 -0.0143* 0.0285*** -0.00856 0.0255*** 
 (5.093) (5.192) (1.101) (-1.671) (6.159) (-1.020) (5.383) 
 [0.00427] [0.00473] [0.00889] [0.00854] [0.00463] [0.00840] [0.00473] 
Harmonization 
interaction 
0.00421 0.00648 0.0134 0.0125 0.0125 0.0140 0.0140 
(𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑒𝑥𝑓) (0.596) (0.811) (0.591) (1.541) (1.541) (1.618) (1.618) 
 [0.00707] [0.00798] [0.0227] [0.00811] [0.00811] [0.00865] [0.00865] 
Harmonizationdif -0.00420 -0.00115 -0.0330**  -0.0428***  -0.0340*** 
 (-0.484) (-0.123) (-2.298)  (-4.391)  (-3.584) 
 [0.00868] [0.00931] [0.0144]  [0.00974]  [0.00950] 
        
Observations 14,048 11,049 3,332 16,745 16,745 15,182 15,182 
R-squared 0.111 0.123 0.116 0.098 0.098 0.101 0.101 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Note: t – statistics are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) and standard errors are in brackets. GVAGRO = Gross value added 
growth is equal to the gross value added which is adjusted by the gross value added price indices, 1995 = 100 from the EU KLEMS database. 
GVAGRO is calculated as GVAGRO = 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑔𝑣𝑎𝑖,𝑠,𝑡) − 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑔𝑣𝑎𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1).  Harmonizationi,t = ln (1 + lexi,t ) where lexi,t represents the sum of all 27 
directives which take on a value of 1 on and after the date that the directive under consideration goes into effect in that particular country, 
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and a value of 0 otherwise. exf is the external finance dependence of U.S. firms in 1970s calculated by Rajan and Zingales (1998). 
𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡 where 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡  is the average harmonization across 
countries per year. The above estimations include the lagged logarithm of gross value added in levels. Column (1) is estimated over 15 
countries, 30 industries and 37 years. The EU-15 countries are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the U.K.  Column (2) is estimated over 12 euro countries, 30 industries and 37 years. 
The 12 euro countries are: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. 
Column (3) is estimated over 10 countries, 30 industries and 37 years. The 10 non-EU 15 countries included are: Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia.  Columns (4) and (5) are estimated over 23 countries, 30 industriess 
and 37 years, excluding Latvia and Poland. Finally columns (6) and (7) are estimated over 21 countries, 30 industries and 37 years excluding 
Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta and the U.K. The estimation period in our regressions is 1971 – 2007. The above estimations include country, 
industry, and time effects that are not reported here. t – statistics reported in the tables are based on country and industry-specific 
(clustered) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
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Table 2.8: Robustness check for competing explanations for European Industries with Fixed Effects 
 
  
 Dependent Variables 
    
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
VARIABLES GVAGRO GVAGRO GVAGRO 
    
Log of Gross value added (Lagged) -0.0128*** -0.0128*** -0.0128*** 
 (-5.004) (-4.996) (-4.990) 
 [0.00257 [0.00257] [0.00256] 
Harmonization 0.0368***   
(Integration directives) (6.029)   
 [0.00611]   
Harmonization interaction 0.0221*   
(𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑒𝑥𝑓) (1.834)   
(Integration directives) [0.0121]   
Harmonizationdif -0.0414***   
(Integration directives) (-3.804)   
 [0.0109]   
    
Harmonization  0.0409***  
(Uniformity Directives)  (6.196)  
  [0.00660]  
Harmonization interaction  0.0175  
(𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑒𝑥𝑓)  (1.615)  
(Uniformity directives)  [0.0108]  
Harmonizationdif  -0.0562***  
(Uniformity directives)  (-5.148)  
  [0.0109]  
    
Harmonization   0.0488*** 
(Other directives)   (6.569) 
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   [0.00743] 
Harmonization interaction   0.0207 
(𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑒𝑥𝑓)   (1.472) 
(Other directives)   [0.0141] 
Harmonizationdif   -0.0500*** 
(Other directives)   (-4.399) 
   [0.0114] 
    
Observations 17,380 17,380 17,380 
R-squared 0.098 0.098 0.098 
 
Note: t – statistics are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) and standard errors are in brackets. GVAGRO = Gross value added 
growth is equal to the gross value added which is adjusted by the gross value added price indices, 1995 = 100 from the EU KLEMS database. 
GVAGRO is calculated as GVAGRO = log (𝑔𝑣𝑎𝑖,𝑠,𝑡) − log (𝑔𝑣𝑎𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1). Harmonizationi,t = ln (1 + lexi,t ) where lexi,t represents the sum of all 27 
directives which take on a value of 1 on and after the date that the directive under consideration goes into effect in that particular country, 
and a value of 0 otherwise. exf is the external finance dependence of U.S. firms in 1970s calculated by Rajan and Zingales (1998). 
𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡 where 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡 is the average harmonization across 
countries per year. The first three columns report the results for an industrial composition of financial harmonization directives. The FSAP 
directives are grouped under three categories; integration, uniformity and others. The construction of the indices follows the original 
calculations discussed in Section 2. The above estimations include the lagged logarithm of gross value added in levels. The regressions in the 
first three columns are estimated over 25 countries, 30 industries, and 37 years. The 25 European Union countries included are: Austria, 
Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the U.K. The estimation period in our regressions is 1971 – 2007. 
The above estimations include country, industry, and time effects that are not reported here. t – statistics reported in the tables are based on 
country and industry-specific (clustered) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
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Table 2.9: Gross Value Added Growth for European Industries with Fixed Effects and with Further Controls 
 
  
 Dependent Variables 
    
 All countries EU-15 countries Non-EU 15 countries 
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES GVAGRO GVAGRO GVAGRO GVAGRO GVAGRO GVAGRO 
       
Log of Gross Value Added -0.0103*** -0.0103*** 0.000459 0.000459 -0.0262*** -0.0262*** 
(Lagged) (-2.623) (-2.623) (0.113) (0.113) (-3.120) (-3.120) 
 [0.00393] [0.00393] [0.00407] [0.00407] [0.00838] [0.00838] 
Harmonization -0.0160* 0.0832*** 0.0106 0.0512 -0.0310** 0.0606 
 (-1.780) (2.804) (1.236) (0.933) (-2.290) (1.475) 
 [0.00897] [0.0297] [0.00855] [0.0548] [0.0136] [0.0411] 
Harmonization interaction    -0.00591 -0.00591 -0.0164* -0.0164*         0.0168     0.0168 
(𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑒𝑥𝑓) (-0.576) (-0.576) (-1.654) (-1.654) (0.779) (0.779) 
 [0.0103] [0.0103] [0.00991] [0.00991] [0.0216] [0.0216] 
Harmonizationdif  -0.0992***  -0.0406  -0.0916** 
  (-3.268)  (-0.734)  (-2.212) 
  [0.0304]  [0.0553]  [0.0414] 
Bank assets ratio -0.205** -0.205** -0.0678 -0.0678 -0.249** -0.249** 
 (-2.482) (-2.482) (-0.427) (-0.427) (-2.551) (-2.551) 
 [0.0826] [0.0826] [0.159] [0.159] [0.0975] [0.0975] 
Turnover ratio -0.0116* -0.0116* 0.00751 0.00751 -0.0147 -0.0147 
 (-1.670) (-1.670) (1.178) (1.178) (-1.227) (-1.227) 
 [0.00696] [0.00696] [0.00638] [0.00638] [0.0120] [0.0120] 
Government effectiveness 0.0376*** 0.0376*** 0.0219* 0.0219* 0.0458 0.0458 
 (3.151) (3.151) (1.841) (1.841) (1.204) (1.204) 
 [0.0119] [0.0119] [0.0119] [0.0119] [0.0380] [0.0380] 
Regulatory quality 0.0855*** 0.0855*** 0.0504* 0.0504* 0.106* 0.106* 
 (3.147) (3.147) (1.961) (1.961) (1.837) (1.837) 
 [0.0272] [0.0272] [0.0257] [0.0257] [0.0575] [0.0575] 
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Rule of law -0.0682*** -0.0682*** -0.0795*** -0.0795*** -0.0775* -0.0775* 
 (-2.929) (-2.929) (-2.849) (-2.849) (-1.935) (-1.935) 
 [0.0233] [0.0233] [0.0279] [0.0279] [0.0401] [0.0401] 
       
Observations 7,012 7,012 4,134 4,134 2,878 2,878 
R-squared 0.097 0.097 0.098 0.098 0.119 0.119 
 
Note: t – statistics are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) and standard errors are in brackets. GVAGRO = Gross value added 
growth is equal to the gross value added which is adjusted by the gross value added price indices, 1995 = 100 from the EU KLEMS database. 
GVAGRO is calculated as GVAGRO = log (𝑔𝑣𝑎𝑖,𝑠,𝑡) − log (𝑔𝑣𝑎𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1).  Harmonizationi,t = ln (1 + lexi,t ) where lexi,t represents the sum of all 27 
directives which take on a value of 1 on and after the date that the directive under consideration goes into effect in that particular country, 
and a value of 0 otherwise. exf is the external finance dependence of U.S. firms in the 1970s calculated by Rajan and Zingales (1998). 
𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡 where 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡  is the average harmonization across 
countries per year. Bank assets ratio is the ratio of deposit money bank assets to the sum of deposit money bank assets and central bank 
assets, Turnover ratio is stock market turnover ratio, Government effectiveness, Regulatory quality and Rule of law are legal and institutional 
variables taken from the Worldwide Governance Indicators. The above estimations include the lagged logarithm of gross value added in 
levels. The regressions in columns (1) – (2) are estimated over 25 countries, 30 industries and 12 years. The 25 European Union countries 
included are: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the U.K. Columns (3) – (4) are estimated 
over 15 countries, 30 industries and 12 years. The EU-15 countries are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the U.K.  Columns (5) – (6) are estimated over 10 countries, 30 industries and 12 
years. The 10 non-EU 15 countries included are: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia. The estimation period in our regressions is 1996 – 2007. The above estimations include country, industry, and time effects that are 
not reported here. t – statistics reported in the tables are based on country and industry-specific (clustered) heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation. 
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Table 2.10: Arellano – Bond Dynamic Panel Model for Gross Value Added Growth for European Industries with 
Further Controls 
   
   
  Dependent Variables 
     
 All countries EU-15 countries Non-EU 15 countries 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES GVAGRO GVAGRO GVAGRO GVAGRO GVAGRO 
      
Gross Value Added Growth -0.936*** -0.765* -0.785* -0.457 -0.329 
(Lagged) (-3.299) (-1.648) (-1.676) (-1.379) (-1.007) 
 [0.284] [0.464] [0.469] [0.332] [0.327] 
Harmonization 0.207** -0.0144 0.000137 0.0205 0.0448* 
 (2.101) (-0.245) (0.00799) (0.345) (1.714) 
 [0.0987] [0.0588] [0.0172] [0.0596] [0.0262] 
Harmonization interaction -0.131 -0.0671 -0.0509 -0.214 -0.245 
(𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑒𝑥𝑓) (-1.174) (-0.687) (-0.646) (-1.338) (-1.571) 
 [0.112] [0.0976] [0.0787] [0.160] [0.156] 
Harmonizationdif -0.350** -0.00893 -0.0189 0.0339 -0.296*** 
 (-2.382) (-0.114) (-0.281) (0.129) (-2.830) 
 [0.147] [0.0781] [0.0673] [0.262] [0.105] 
Bank assets -11.99** -0.990 -1.354 0.189 -0.956 
 (-2.221) (-0.245) (-1.225) (0.0913) (-1.414) 
 [5.399] [4.046] [1.105] [2.065] [0.677] 
Turnover ratio 0.00177 -0.0134 -0.0275 0.0599 -0.0637 
 (0.0318) (-0.238) (-0.426) (0.376) (-0.591) 
 [0.0557] [0.0565] [0.0645] [0.159] [0.108] 
Government Effectiveness 0.236*** -0.0115 -0.00219 0.924 0.169 
 (2.719) (-0.157) (-0.0671) (1.559) (1.444) 
 [0.0866] [0.0733] [0.0326] [0.593] [0.117] 
Regulatory quality -0.290 0.592 0.535** -0.0382 -0.226 
 (-0.681) (1.578) (2.497) (-0.0545) (-0.444) 
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 [0.426] [0.375] [0.214] [0.701] [0.508] 
Rule of law 0.890 -0.205 -0.179 -0.636 -0.329 
 (1.577) (-0.428) (-0.640) (-1.289) (-0.704) 
 [0.564] [0.480] [0.280] [0.494] [0.468] 
      
Observations 6,134 3,544 3,380 2,590 2,561 
Number of groups 708 424 403 284 284 
AB test for AR(1) (p value) 0.73 -0.21 -0.14 -1.04 -0.91 
 (0.464) (0.837) (0.885) (0.300) (0.365) 
AB test for AR(2) (p value) -0.72 -1.66 -1.60 -1.15 -1.13 
 (0.470) (0.097) (0.109) (0.251) (0.259) 
Sargan test 0.203 0.177 0.505 0.060 0.027 
Hansen test 0.367 0.401 0.622 0.115 0.192 
 
 
Note: Robust t – statistics are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) and standard errors are in brackets. GVAGRO = Gross value 
added growth is equal to the Gross value added which is adjusted by the gross value added price indices, 1995 = 100 from the EU KLEMS 
database. GVAGRO is calculated as GVAGRO = log (𝑔𝑣𝑎𝑖,𝑠,𝑡) − log (𝑔𝑣𝑎𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1). Harmonizationi,t = ln (1 + lexi,t ) where lexi,t represents the sum 
of all 27 directives which take on a value of 1 on and after the date that the directive under consideration goes into effect in that particular 
country, and a value of 0 otherwise. exfs is the external finance dependence of U.S. firms in 1970s calculated by Rajan and Zingales (1998). 
𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡 where 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡 is the average harmonization across 
countries per year. Bank assets ratio is the ratio of deposit money bank assets to the sum of deposit money bank assets and central bank 
assets, Turnover ratio is stock market turnover ratio, Government effectiveness, Regulatory quality and Rule of law are legal and institutional 
variables taken from the Worldwide Governance Indicators. Regression in column (1) is estimated over 25 countries, 30 industries and 12 
years. The 25 European Union countries included are: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and 
the U.K. Column (2) is estimated over 15 countries, 30 industries and 12 years. The EU-15 countries are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the U.K.  Columns (3) and (4) are estimated 
over 10 countries, 30 industries and 12 years. The 10 non-EU 15 countries included are: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The estimation period in our regressions is 1996 – 2007. All regressions are estimated using 
the Arellano – Bond dynamic panel GMM estimation with one lag of the dependent variable to be included in the model. All columns use the 
4th lag of the logarithm of gross value added as GMM type instruments. Columns (1), (2) and (4) use political stability measure from World 
Governance Indicators dataset, first lag of the harmonization index, first lag of the interaction term and the time dummies as IV type 
instruments. Column (3) in addition to these IV type instruments employs the ratio of deposit money bank assets to the sum of deposit money 
bank and central bank assets, and government effectiveness as instruments, and column (5) introduces the ratio of deposit money bank 
assets to the sum of deposit money bank and central bank assets, and government effectiveness and stock market turnover ratio as 
instruments. The results reported here use the onestep estimator. (The estimations use the Stata xtabond2 command). 
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2.8 Supplementary Appendix 
 
DATA APPENDIX 
 
Industrial growth: We use gross value added in constant Euros for 25 European Union countries. For the time period before the 
introduction of the Euro, the EU KLEMS uses the 1999 official fixed Euro exchange rates of the Euro countries to convert local 
currencies into Euros. Consistent with this, for the non-Euro countries for the time period before the introduction of the Euro, we 
take the 1999 Euro exchange rates with the local currencies to convert them into Euros. The gross value added growth rate is 
calculated as: 𝐺𝑉𝐴𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 = log(𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖,𝑠,𝑡) − log (𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1) where 𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 is gross value added in country i, industry s, and 
time t. Source: EU KLEMS Database 
 
External finance dependence: External finance dependence is calculated for a firm as the desired investment that cannot be 
financed through internal cash flows. Rajan and Zingales (1998) calculate a firm’s external finance dependence as: 𝑒𝑥𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠,𝑡 =
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑠,𝑡−𝑐𝑓𝑜𝑠,𝑡
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑠,𝑡
 where 𝑒𝑥𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠,𝑡 is the external finance dependence measure, 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑠,𝑡 is capital expenditures, and 𝑐𝑓𝑜𝑠,𝑡  is 
cash flow from operations of a firm in industry s. In order to obtain the firm’s overall dependence on external finance in 1970s 
they sum the external finance measure over 10 years (1970 until 1980) and divide it by the sum of capital expenditures over the 
same period. To obtain a measure of finance dependence at the sectoral level, 𝑒𝑥𝑓𝑠 they use the industry median. Source: Rajan 
and Zingales (1998) 
 
Financial harmonization: We construct harmonization indices for EU countries using adoption dates of the different directives in 
different countries from the EU Commission’s Financial Services Action Plan. In particular, for each of the 27 directives listed 
under the FSAP we define a dummy variable that takes on a value of one on and after the date that the country under 
examination has transposed the directive into national law, and a value of zero otherwise.  We sum all 27 directives to construct 
our next variable, lexi,t (Kalemli – Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Peydro, 2010 a, b): 𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑘27
𝑘=1 . We construct our 
financial harmonization index by: ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = ln (1 + 𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡) where k represents all 27 directive dummies, i represents the 
countries, and t represents the years in the sample. Source: Kalemli – Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Peydro, 2010 a, b, and author’s 
calculations. 
 
Interaction term: The interaction term which will help identify the simultaneous effect of harmonization and external finance 
dependence of industries on growth is constructed as follows: 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 = (𝑒𝑥𝑓𝑠 × ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡) where i  represents the 
countries, s represents the industries (sectors), t represents the years in the sample, 𝑒𝑥𝑓𝑠 is the industry variant external finance 
dependence measure of Rajan and Zingales, and ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is the harmonization index constructed using the directives of the 
FSAP. Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Control Variables: 
Deposit money bank assets to central bank assets ratio (in percentages): It is measured by the ratio of deposit money bank claims 
on domestic non-financial real sector to the sum of deposit money bank and Central Bank claims on domestic non-financial real 
sector. Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine’s Database on Financial Development and Structure (2012) 
 
Stock market turnover ratio (in percentages): It is used as the efficiency indicator of stock markets (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 
2001). Stock market turnover ratio measures “the activity or liquidity of a stock market relative to its size.” (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine, 2001, 32). It is equal to the ratio of the value of total shares traded to average real market capitalization. Note that small 
and active stock markets will have a larger turnover ratio based on the above definition whereas large and less liquid stock 
markets will have a lower turnover ratio. Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine’s Database on Financial Development and 
Structure (2012) 
 
Number of publicly listed companies per 10K population: This variable reflects the share of companies divided by the total 
population rate. Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine’s Database on Financial Development and Structure (2012) 
Legal and institutional variable: They are used to measure economic institutions and the overall quality of legal systems. The 
three variables used in our analysis are constructed from subjective and perceptions-based data that reflect views of a range of 
respondents, agencies and organizations. These indicators, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law are 
measured through a range from -2.5 to 2.5 where higher values correspond to better governance outcomes. We also use voice 
accountability as an instrument in dynamic panel model estimations. Source: World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators 
 
 Government effectiveness: It captures the perceptions from surveys of the quality of public services, civil service, the 
degree of dependence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation and the reliability of the 
governments in terms of commitment to achieve such policies. Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators, 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/ge.pdf  
 
 Regulatory quality: It captures the perceptions of the ability of the government to implement sound policies and 
regulations that promote private sector development. Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators, 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/rq.pdf 
 
 Rule of law: It captures perceptions of the extent of agents’ confidence in the acceptance and abidance of the rules of a 
society, with a particular focus on the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, the courts and the likelihood 
of crime and violence. Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/rl.pdf 
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 Voice accountability: It captures perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in the 
selection of their government, as well as freedom of expression and association and free media. Source: Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/va.pdf 
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Table 2.2.1: Industries used in the dataset and their correspondences in Rajan & Zingales (1998) 
 
Industries in our sample Matching industries from Rajan & Zingales (1998) 
  
TOTAL INDUSTRIES  
AGRICULTURE, HUNTING, FORESTRY AND 
FISHING 
 
AGRICULTURE, HUNTING AND FORESTRY  
Agriculture  
Forestry  
FISHING  
MINING AND QUARRYING  
MINING AND QUARRYING OF ENERGY 
PRODUCING MATERIALS 
 
Mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat  
Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas 
and services 
Petroleum refineries (353) 
Mining of uranium and thorium ores  
MINING AND QUARRYING EXCEPT ENERGY 
PRODUCING MATERIALS 
 
Mining of metal ores  
Other mining and quarrying  
TOTAL MANUFACTURING  
FOOD , BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO Food products (311) + Beverages (313) + Tobacco (314) 
Food and beverages Beverages (313) + Food products (311) 
Tobacco Tobacco (314) 
TEXTILES, TEXTILE , LEATHER AND FOOTWEAR Textile (321) + Leather (323) + Footwear (324) + Spinning (3211) + Apparel (322) 
Textiles and textile Spinning (3211) 
Textiles Textile (321) 
Wearing Apparel, Dressing And Dying Of Fur Apparel (322) 
Leather, leather and footwear Leather (323) + Footwear (324) 
WOOD AND OF WOOD AND CORK Wood products (331) 
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PULP, PAPER, PAPER , PRINTING AND 
PUBLISHING 
Pulp, paper (3411) + Paper and products (341)+ Printing & publishing (342) 
Pulp, paper and paper Pulp, paper (3411) 
Printing, publishing and reproduction Printing & publishing (342) 
Publishing  
Printing and reproduction  
CHEMICAL, RUBBER, PLASTICS AND FUEL 
 
Petroleum and coal products (354) + Other chemicals (352) + Drugs (3522) + 
Basic exclude fert (3511) + Plastic products (356) + Rubber products (355) 
Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel Petroleum and coal products (354) 
Chemicals and chemical products Other chemicals (352) 
Pharmaceuticals Drugs (3522) 
Chemicals excluding pharmaceuticals Basic exclude fert (3511) 
Rubber and plastics Plastic products (356) + Rubber products (355) 
OTHER NON-METALLIC MINERAL Glass (362) + Non metal products (369) + Pottery (361) 
BASIC METALS AND FABRICATED METAL Metal products (381) 
Basic metals Non-ferrous metal (372) + Iron and steel (371) 
Fabricated metal  
MACHINERY, NEC Machinery (382) 
ELECTRICAL AND OPTICAL EQUIPMENT  
Office, accounting and computing machinery Office & computing (3825) 
Electrical engineering  
Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec Electric machinery (383) 
Insulated wire  
Other electrical machinery and apparatus nec  
Radio, television and communication 
equipment 
Radio (3832) 
Electronic valves and tubes  
Telecommunication equipment  
Radio and television receivers  
Medical, precision and optical instruments  
Scientific instruments Professional goods (385) 
Other instruments  
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TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers Motor Vehicle (3843) 
Other transport equipment Transportation equipment (384) 
Building and repairing of ships and boats Ship (3841) 
Aircraft and spacecraft  
Railroad equipment and transport equipment 
nec 
 
MANUFACTURING NEC; RECYCLING  
Manufacturing nec  
Recycling  
ELECTRICITY, GAS AND WATER SUPPLY  
ELECTRICITY AND GAS  
Electricity supply  
Gas supply  
WATER SUPPLY  
CONSTRUCTION  
WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE  
Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles 
and motorcycles; retail sale of fuel 
 
Wholesale trade and commission trade, except 
of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
 
Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles; repair of household goods 
 
HOTELS AND RESTAURANTS  
TRANSPORT AND STORAGE AND 
COMMUNICATION 
 
TRANSPORT AND STORAGE  
Inland transport  
Water transport  
Air transport  
Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; 
activities of travel agencies 
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POST AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS  
FINANCE, INSURANCE, REAL ESTATE AND 
BUSINESS SERVICES 
 
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION  
Financial intermediation, except insurance and 
pension funding 
 
Insurance and pension funding, except 
compulsory social security 
 
Activities related to financial intermediation  
REAL ESTATE, RENTING AND BUSINESS 
ACTIVITIES 
 
Real estate activities  
Renting of m&eq and other business activities  
Renting of machinery and equipment  
Computer and related activities  
Research and development  
Other business activities  
Legal, technical and advertising  
Other business activities, nec  
COMMUNITY SOCIAL AND PERSONAL SERVICES  
PUBLIC ADMIN AND DEFENCE; COMPULSORY 
SOCIAL SECURITY 
 
EDUCATION  
HEALTH AND SOCIAL WORK  
OTHER COMMUNITY, SOCIAL AND PERSONAL 
SERVICES 
 
Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and 
similar activities 
 
Activities of membership organizations nec  
Recreational, cultural and sporting activities  
Media activities  
Other recreational activities  
Other service activities  
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PRIVATE HOUSEHOLDS WITH EMPLOYED 
PERSONS 
 
EXTRA-TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATIONS AND 
BODIES 
 
 
Sources: EU KLEMS dataset http://www.euklems.net/ and Rajan, Raghuram G., and Luigi Zingales. (1998). “Financial Dependence and 
Growth”, American Economic Review, 88 (3): 559 - 586 
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Table 2.2.2: Description of the Directives of the Financial Services Action Plan 
 
Directive               Directive No.         Deadline 
Settlement Finality Directive                1998/26/EC        01/06/2005 
This directive is implemented to reduce systemic risk in payment and securities settlement systems, particularly aiming to 
reduce the risk of insolvency of a member country. Main objectives of this directive include protection of transfer orders, 
greater competition between settlement providers and the removal of barriers to post-trading. 
Directive on the taking up, pursuit and 
prudential supervision of the businesses of 
electronic money institutions (E-Money 
Directive) 
               2000/46/EC        27/04/2002 
The E-Money directive defines electronic money and sets conditions for capital and authorization requirements of electronic 
money institutions. Main objectives of this directive are to implement appropriate prudential rules and encourage innovation 
and confidence so as to boost the number of passports used in the banking system as well as to increase the use of e-money.  
Directive amending the insurance directives 
and the ISD to permit information exchange 
with third countries 
              2000/64/EC        17/11/2002 
This directive allows for the exchange of information between the third country authorities and authorities of the Member 
States. It allows for the conclusion of cooperation agreements by the Member States providing an environment for exchange of 
information with the authorities of third countries. 
Directive on the reorganization and winding-
up of insurance undertakings  
              2001/17/EC        20/04/2003 
This directive aims to ensure that mutual recognition is applied to the winding-up and reorganization of insurance undertakings 
within the EU. The main objectives of this directive include reducing regulatory requirements regarding bankruptcy and 
increasing consumer protection in order to create more cross-border business through branches and more direct cross-border 
insurance. 
Directive on the reorganization and winding-
up of banks     
              2001/24/EC        05/05/2004 
This directive ensures that the banks across the Member States can be wound up and reorganized as a single entity. The main 
objectives of this directive include reducing regulatory requirements regarding bankruptcy and increasing consumer protection. 
Directive amending the 4th and the 7th 
Company Law Directives to allow fair value 
accounting 
              2001/65/EC        09/10/2004 
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This directive highlights the existing EU Accounting Directives for companies, banks and other financial institutions and 
concentrates on the valuation of assets. It aims to achieve a single set of financial statements for listed companies across 
Member States. The directive is intended to establish greater transparency, increased investment and information disclosure. 
Directive supplementing the Statute for a 
European Company with regard to the 
involvement of employees 
              2001/86/EC    10/10/2004 
This directive provides provisions for the creation of a Statute for a European company particularly for employee involvement. 
Directive amending the money laundering 
directive (2nd Money Laundering Directive) 
               2001/97/EC     15/06/2003 
This directive highlights the importance of the scope of predicate offences and the reporting of suspicious activity in banking. It 
is established in order to cut funding for organized crime and terrorism. Its main objectives include increasing market 
confidence, reducing money laundering, and decreasing the risk of banking crises. 
1st Directive on UCITS (Undertakings for 
Collective Investments in Transferable 
Securities) 
               2001/107/EC     13/08/2003 
This directive aims to regulate management companies and provide simplified prospectuses for investment purposes. It 
promotes the consolidation of EU funds and generation of economies of scale. By providing greater flexibility for fund 
managers, this directive hopes to increase cross border trade in UCITS.  
2nd Directive on UCITS (Undertakings for 
Collective Investments in Transferable 
Securities) 
               2001/108/EC     13/08/2003 
This directive has the objectives of harmonizing information to investors, expanding investment options, providing a larger 
number of passports to ease cross border trade, and increasing the use of eligible assets so as to allow for quicker diffusion of 
products. 
Directive amending the solvency margin 
requirements in the insurance directives 
               2002/13/EC     20/09/2003 
This directive was implemented in order to improve prudential regulation of insurance companies. It addresses the reduction in 
the amount of regulatory capital an insurance undertaking is obliged to hold against unforeseen conditions, as well as aiming 
to simplify regulation and increase consumer protection. 
Directive on financial collateral arrangements                       2002/47/EC                                          17/12/2003 
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This directive creates greater enforceability for collateral backing transactions across the Member States. It aims to reduce 
systemic risk in securities settlement and the cost of capital, provide a harmonized legal treatment of financial collateral, and 
increase cross-border trading. 
Directive on the Distance of marketing of Financial                     2002/65/EC                                                  01/01/2004 
Services 
This directive helps in protecting retail consumers of financial products sold at a distance. It aims to remove barriers to cross-
border provision and expects to achieve higher cross-border consolidation in insurance through M&A activity. This directive 
provides higher protection for retail consumers and helps increase the levels of competition between suppliers throughout 
Member States.  
Directive on the supplementary supervision                                 2002/87/EC                                                  11/08/2004 
of credit institutions, insurance undertakings  
and investment firms in a financial  
conglomerate (Financial Conglomerates Directive) 
This directive provides a settlement on how the lead supervisor of a financial conglomerate should be decided and how 
supervisory arrangements should be fulfilled. It aims to ensure soundness of financial institutions through better prudential 
regulation such as risk reflective capital levels, improved risk management, and harmonization of cross-border and cross-sector 
supervision. 
Directive amending the solvency margin requirements               2002/83/EC                                                 20/09/2003 
 in the insurance directives (Solvency 1 directive for 
life insurance) 
This directive aims to increase consumer protection and lower the costs for the insurance sector. It helps merge national 
markets so as to achieve a highly integrated single market in terms of life insurance. 
Directive on insurance mediation                                                     2002/92/EC                                                 15/01/2005 
This directive is proposed to remove barriers to insurance intermediaries, enhance consumer protection and encourage retail 
insurance across borders of Member States. It brings together the issues regarding authorization, capitalization and regulation 
of intermediaries and brokers who sell insurance products under a single framework. It aims to provide higher quality advice 
and products in the insurance sector as well as to increase cross-border consolidation in insurance. 
Directive on insider dealing and market manipulation                 2003/6/EC                                                    12/10/2004 
(Market Abuse Directive) 
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This directive is aimed to terminate market abuse and insider trading. It is established to improve market transparency and 
confidence, and increase investment. Through this directive the markets are assumed to be more effectively protected against 
abuse due to the new changes that relate to mandatory suspicious transaction reporting. 
Directive on the prudential supervision of pension funds           2003/41/EC                                                  23/09/2005 
This directive brings new regulation to the operation of employment-related pension schemes across Member States. It aims to 
create an internal market that will allow for occupational retirement provision organized in a European scale. 
Directive on the taxation of savings income in                              2003/48/EC                                                  01/01/2004 
the form of interest payments (Savings Tax Directive) 
This directive is implemented to prevent cross-border tax evasion by individuals within the EU. Through this directive, the 
Member States will be able to exchange information on interest income paid to non-residents or to tax that particular income.  
Directive modernizing the accounting provisions of                    2003/51/EC                                                    01/01/2005 
the 4th and the 7th Company Law Directives 
This directive hopes to improve transparency in standards of corporate reporting. It aims to enhance investor confidence and to 
increase competition in the investment market and information quality. 
Directive on prospectuses                                                                 2003/71/EC                                                    01/07/2005 
This directive is established to increase transparency and investor confidence in the securities markets across Member States. It 
proposes passporting of prospectuses that are to be published for securities trade to the public across the EU borders so as to 
achieve a more competitive market for issuers and investors. This directive provides a single passport for issuers of equity and 
debt securities easing the transactions of securities across the EU borders. It aims to harmonize information, promote a more 
competitive EU market in securities, and reduce the cost of capital. 
Directive on Take Over Bids                                                               2004/25/EC                                                   20/05/2006 
This directive is implemented to promote free market in corporate control and enhance competition in securities markets. It 
aims to implement a minimum framework to the national approval of takeovers in applicable law, protection of shareholders 
and disclosure.  Its main objective includes insurance of an efficient market for M&A activity through which merger related 
costs and increase cross-border activity in M&A will be reduced. 
Transparency directive                                                                       2004/109/EC                                                  20/01/2007 
This directive aims to increase the quality of information available to investors in the securities market and promote a more 
competitive investment market. It proposes an obligation on issuers of securities to meet continuing disclosure requirements 
after the issue. 
Directive on markets in Financial Instruments                               2004/39/EC                                                    20/01/2007 
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(update of ISD) – MiFID 
This directive aims to create an integrated single European market of financial instruments. It promotes banks to internalize 
trading across Europe and compete with exchanges. Through greater internalization across banks, this directive hopes to 
increase competition, reduce the cost of capital and enhance fair competition between exchanges and banks. This directive is 
expected to create appropriate investor protection, single passport for securities trade, remove barriers to entry for exchanges 
and increase competition between trading venues. 
10th Company Law Directive on cross-border                                 2005/56/EC                                                    15/12/2007 
mergers of limited liability companies 
This directive is created to allow companies to conduct cross-border mergers. It ensures efficient market for M&A activity. It 
aims to decrease merger related costs and increase cross-border M&A activity. It provides a more secure and transparent 
environment for cross-border restructuring.  
Directive on the relating to the taking up                                       2006/48/EC                                                     31/12/2006 
and pursuit of the business of credit institutions 
This directive is established to coordinate credit institutions in order to protect savings and to create equal conditions of 
competition between institutions.  
Directive on the capital adequacy of investment                          2006/49/EC                                                     31/12/2006 
firms and credit institutions 
This directive establishes the capital adequacy requirements for investment firms and credit institutions, setting the rules for 
their prudential supervision. Its main objectives include harmonization of capital adequacy of investment firms and credit 
institutions, enhancement of effective risk management for banks, and the creation of a safer environment that would 
decrease possibility for banking crises.  
 
 
Source: The definitions for the directives are collected from the following: Kalemli – Ozcan, Sebnem, Elias Papaioannou, and Jose Luis Peydro. 
(2010 b). “What Lies Beneath the Euro’s Effect of Financial Integration? Currency Risk, Legal Harmonization, or Trade?”, Journal of 
International Economics, 81 (1): 75 – 88  and Supplementary Appendix Table A, http://www.dartmouth.edu/~elias/jie SAT-A.pdf,  European 
Commission. 2010. Transposition of Financial Services Action Plan 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal market/finances/actionplan/transposition/database/austria en.htm, Boyfield, Keith, Hugo Robinson, and 
Lorraine Mullally. (2006). “Selling the City Short? A Review of the EU’s Financial Services Action Plan”, Open Europe, 1 – 119, 
(http://www.openeurope.org.uk/Content/Documents/PDFs/fsap.pdf), Malcolm, Kyla, Mark Tilden, and Tim Wilsdon. (2009). “Evaluation of 
the economic impacts of the Financial Services Action Plan”, European Commission Internal Market and Services Final Report, 1 – 243 
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Table 2.2.3: Gross Value Added Growth for European Industries with fixed effects, with further controls for the 
banking sector 
 
  
 Dependent Variables 
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES GVAGRO GVAGRO GVAGRO GVAGRO 
     
Log of Gross value added  -0.0110*** -0.0110*** -0.0109*** -0.0109*** 
(Lagged) (-3.080) (-3.080) (-2.774) (-2.774) 
 [0.00356] [0.00356] [0.00394] [0.00394] 
Harmonization -0.0142 0.0463*** -0.0176** 0.101*** 
 (-1.645) (6.005) (-1.984) (3.297) 
 [0.00866] [0.00771] [0.00885] [0.0307] 
Harmonization interaction -0.00423 -0.00423 -0.00631 -0.00631 
 (-0.405) (-0.405) (-0.616) (-0.616) 
 [0.0104] [0.0104] [0.0102] [0.0102] 
Harmonizationdif  -0.0605***  -0.119*** 
  (-4.917)  (-3.804) 
  0.0123  [0.0312] 
     
Overhead costs -0.418** -0.418** -0.251 -0.251 
 (-2.157) (-2.157) (-1.251) (-1.251) 
 [0.194] [0.194] [0.200] [0.200] 
Bank’s profitability 0.192 0.192 0.561* 0.561* 
 (0.630) (0.630) (1.713) (1.713) 
 [0.304] [0.304] [0.327] [0.327] 
Banking concentration -0.0146 -0.0146 -0.0492** -0.0492** 
 (-0.662) (-0.662) (-2.076) (-2.076) 
 [0.0220] [0.0220] [0.0237] [0.0237] 
Bank assets   -0.218*** -0.218*** 
   (-2.629) (-2.629) 
   [0.0829] [0.0829] 
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Turnover ratio   -0.0127* -0.0127* 
   (-1.731) (-1.731) 
   [0.00736] [0.00736] 
Gov. Effectiveness   0.0419*** 0.0419*** 
   (3.492) (3.492) 
   [0.0120] [0.0120] 
Regulatory quality   0.0825*** 0.0825*** 
   (2.934) (2.934) 
   [0.0281] [0.0281] 
Rule of law   -0.0748*** -0.0748*** 
   (-3.120) (-3.120) 
   [0.0240] [0.0240] 
     
Observations 7,506 7,506 6,952 6,952 
R-squared 0.091 0.091 0.098 0.098 
 
Note: t – statistics are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) and standard errors are in brackets. GVAGRO = Gross value added 
growth is equal to the gross value added which is adjusted by the gross value added price indices, 1995 = 100 from the EU KLEMS database. 
GVAGRO is calculated as GVAGRO = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑔𝑣𝑎𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑔𝑣𝑎𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1. Harmonization interactioni,s,t = Harmonizationi,t * exfs, Harmonizationi,t = ln 
(1 + lexi,t ) where lexi,t represents the sum of all 27 directives which take on a value of 1 on and after the date that the directive under 
consideration goes into effect in that particular country, and a value of 0 otherwise. exfs is the external finance dependence of U.S. firms in 
the 1970s calculated by Rajan and Zingales (1998). 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡 where 
𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡is the average harmonization across countries per year. Overhead costs is the bank’s overhead costs, Bank’s profitability 
is the profitability measure of banks, Banking concentration is the concentration measure for banks, Bank assets ratio is the ratio of deposit 
money bank assets to the sum of deposit money bank assets and central bank assets, Turnover ratio is stock market turnover ratio. All these 
control variables are obtained from the Financial Development and Structure database of Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine. Government 
effectiveness, Regulatory quality and Rule of law are legal and institutional variables taken from the Worldwide Governance Indicators. All 
regressions are estimated over 25 countries, 30 industries, and 12 years. The 25 European Union countries included are: Austria, Belgium, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the U.K. The industries that have missing observations for the external 
finance dependence measure are dropped from the above analysis. The estimation period in our regressions is 1996 – 2007. The above 
estimations include country, industry, and time effects that are not reported here. t – statistics reported in the tables are based on country 
and industry-specific (clustered) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
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Table 2.2.4: Gross Value Added Growth for European Industries with fixed effects, with further controls and legal 
origins 
 
    
 Dependent Variables 
    
 All countries EU-15 countries Non-EU 15 countries 
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES GVAGRO GVAGRO GVAGRO GVAGRO GVAGRO GVAGRO 
       
Log of Gross Value Added -0.00288* -0.00288* -0.00643** -0.00643** -0.00902** -0.00902** 
(lagged) (-1.774) (-1.774) (-2.261) (-2.261) (-2.325) (-2.325) 
 [0.00162] [0.00162] [0.00284] [0.00284] [0.00388] [0.00388] 
Harmonization -0.00823 0.0210 0.0161* -0.0222 -0.0278*** 0.0921*** 
 (-1.434) (1.110) (1.943) (-0.954) (-3.814) (2.979) 
 [0.00574] [0.0189] [0.00827] [0.0233] [0.00729] [0.0309] 
Harmonizationdif  -0.0292  0.0383*  -0.120*** 
  (-1.495)  (1.698)  (-3.590) 
  [0.0196]  [0.0226]  [0.0334] 
Harmonization interaction -0.00881 -0.00881 -0.0153 -0.0153 0.0103 0.0103 
 (-0.858) (-0.858) (-1.566) (-1.566) (0.483) (0.483) 
 [0.0103] [0.0103] [0.00975] [0.00975] [0.0213] [0.0213] 
Bank assets -0.0194 -0.0194 0.153* 0.153* -0.149* -0.149* 
 (-0.300) (-0.300) (1.787) (1.787) (-1.846) (-1.846) 
 [0.0647] [0.0647] [0.0855] [0.0855] [0.0805] [0.0805] 
Turnover ratio -0.0163*** -0.0163*** -0.00345 -0.00345 -0.0334*** -0.0334*** 
 (-3.690) (-3.690) (-0.738) (-0.738) (-3.283) (-3.283) 
 [0.00441] [0.00441] [0.00467] [0.00467] [0.0102] [0.0102] 
Gov. Effectiveness 0.0267*** 0.0267*** 0.0153* 0.0153* -0.00813 -0.00813 
 (2.749) (2.749) (1.737) (1.737) (-0.246) (-0.246) 
 [0.00971] [0.00971] [0.00884] [0.00884] [0.0331] [0.0331] 
Regulatory quality 0.0322*** 0.0322*** -0.00318 -0.00318 -0.00299 -0.00299 
 (2.638) (2.638) (-0.208) (-0.208) (-0.143) (-0.143) 
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 [0.0122] [0.0122] [0.0153] [0.0153] [0.0209] [0.0209] 
Rule of law -0.0333** -0.0333** -0.0146 -0.0146 -0.0359 -0.0359 
 (-2.397) (-2.397) (-0.880) (-0.880) (-1.411) (-1.411) 
 [0.0139] [0.0139] [0.0166] [0.0166] [0.0254] [0.0254] 
Legal origin British 0.0898 -0.00468 0.0114 0.0114 0.362*** -0.0255 
 (1.412) (-0.486) (1.084) (1.084) (3.357) (-1.112) 
 [0.0636] [0.00963] [0.0105] [0.0105] [0.108] [0.0230] 
Legal origin French 0.0999 0.00538 0.000268 0.000268 0.387*** - 
 (1.573) (0.646) (0.0307) (0.0307) (3.590)  
 [0.0635] [0.00832] [0.00873] [0.00873] [0.108]  
Legal origin Socialist 0.141** 0.0465*** - - 0.429*** 0.0412** 
 (2.162) (3.960)   (4.072) (2.231) 
 [0.0652] [0.0117]   0.105 [0.0184] 
Legal origin German 0.114* 0.0195** 0.0165* 0.0165* - - 
 (1.772) (2.289) (1.756) (1.756)   
 [0.0643] [0.00851] [0.00941] [0.00941]   
Legal origin Scandinavian 0.0945 - - -  - 
 (1.495)      
 [0.0632]      
       
Observations 7,012 7,012 4,134 4,134 2,878 2,878 
R-squared 0.085 0.085 0.084 0.084 0.108 0.108 
 
 
Note: t – statistics are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) and standard errors are in brackets. GVAGRO = Gross value added 
growth is equal to the gross value added which is adjusted by the gross value added price indices, 1995 = 100 from the EU KLEMS database. 
GVAGRO is calculated as GVAGRO = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑔𝑣𝑎𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑔𝑣𝑎𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1.  Harmonization interactioni,s,t = Harmonizationi,t * exfs, Harmonizationi,t = ln 
(1 + lexi,t ) where lexi,t represents the sum of all 27 directives which take on a value of 1 on and after the date that the directive under 
consideration goes into effect in that particular country, and a value of 0 otherwise. exfs is the external finance dependence of U.S. firms in 
the 1970s calculated by Rajan and Zingales (1998). 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡 where 
𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡  is the average harmonization across countries per year. Bank assets ratio is the ratio of deposit money bank assets to 
the sum of deposit money bank assets and central bank assets, Turnover ratio is stock market turnover ratio, Government effectiveness, 
Regulatory quality and Rule of law are legal and institutional variables taken from the Worldwide Governance Indicators. Legal origin dummy 
variables give the legal origins of the U.K., France, Socialist countries, Germany and Scandinavian countries respectively. The data for legal 
origins comes from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999). The above estimations include the lagged logarithm of gross value 
added in levels. Regressions in columns (1) – (2) are estimated over 25 countries, 30 industries, and 12 years. The 25 European Union 
countries included are: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
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Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the U.K. Columns (3) – (4) are 
estimated over 15 countries, 30 industries and 12 years. The EU-15 countries are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the U.K.  Columns (5) – (6) are estimated over 10 countries, 30 
industries and 12 years. The 10 non-EU 15 countries included are: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia. The industries that have missing observations for the external finance dependence measure are dropped from the 
above analysis. The estimation period in our regressions is 1996 – 2007. The above estimations include industry, and time effects that are not 
reported here. t – statistics reported in the tables are based on country and industry-specific (clustered) heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation. 
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Table 2.2.5: Gross Value Added Growth for European Industries with fixed effects, with further controls and euro 
dummies 
 
   
 Dependent Variables 
   
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES GVAGRO GVAGRO 
   
Gross value added (Lagged) -0.0104*** -0.0103*** 
 (-2.632) (-2.623) 
 [0.00393] [0.00393] 
Harmonization 0.0906*** 0.0864*** 
 (3.040) (2.938) 
 [0.0298] [0.0294] 
Harmonizationdif -0.105*** -0.102*** 
 (-3.449) (-3.426) 
 [0.0304] [0.0299] 
Harmonization interaction -0.00587 -0.00591 
 (-0.572) (-0.576) 
 [0.0103] [0.0103] 
Bank assets ratio -0.214*** -0.205** 
 (-2.595) (-2.482) 
 [0.0824] [0.0826] 
Turnover ratio -0.0107 -0.0116* 
 (-1.552) (-1.670) 
 [0.00687] [0.00696] 
Government effectiveness 0.0352*** 0.0376*** 
 (2.940) (3.151) 
 [0.0120] [0.0119] 
Regulatory quality 0.0912*** 0.0855*** 
 (3.312) (3.147) 
 [0.0275] [0.0272] 
Rule of law -0.0719*** -0.0682*** 
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 (-3.089) (-2.929) 
 [0.0233] [0.0233] 
Euro -0.0142  
 (-1.464)  
 [0.00967]  
Euro dummy  -0.0105 
  (-0.557) 
  [0.0188] 
   
Observations 7,012 7,012 
R-squared 0.097 0.097 
 
Note: t – statistics are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) and standard errors are in brackets. GVAGRO = Gross value added 
growth is equal to the gross value added which is adjusted by the gross value added price indices, 1995 = 100 from the EU KLEMS database. 
GVAGRO is calculated as GVAGRO = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑔𝑣𝑎𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑔𝑣𝑎𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1.  Harmonization interactioni,s,t = Harmonizationi,t * exfs, Harmonizationi,t = ln (1 
+ lexi,t ) where lexi,t represents the sum of all 27 directives which take on a value of 1 on and after the date that the directive under 
consideration goes into effect in that particular country, and a value of 0 otherwise. exfs is the external finance dependence of U.S. firms in 
the 1970s calculated by Rajan and Zingales (1998). 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡 where 
𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡  is the average harmonization across countries per year. Bank assets ratio is the ratio of deposit money bank assets to 
the sum of deposit money bank assets and central bank assets, Turnover ratio is stock market turnover ratio, Government effectiveness, 
Regulatory quality and Rule of law are legal and institutional variables taken from the Worldwide Governance Indicators. Euro is a dummy 
variable that takes on a value of 1 on and after the date of implementation of the common currency, the Euro, and a value of 0 otherwise. 
Euro dummy is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 for the initial Euro adopter countries, and a value of 0 otherwise. The industries 
that have missing observations for the external finance dependence measure are dropped from the above analysis. The estimation period in 
our regressions is 1996 – 2007. The results reported are for 25 European countries, and 30 industries. The above estimations include industry, 
and time effects that are not reported here. t – statistics reported in the tables are based on country and industry-specific (clustered) 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
Financial Harmonization and Financial Development:  
An Application of Europe’s Financial Services Action Plan 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) of the European Commission intends to create an open, 
secure, integrated financial market across EU member countries. Although recent research has 
shown a positive impact of the FSAP directives on cross-border lending and industrial growth the 
effect on financial development remains to be examined. Using principal component analysis to 
construct financial, banking sector, bond and stock market development indices, we investigate 
the impact of financial harmonization policies of the FSAP on financial development in a panel of 
twenty five EU member states for the period of 1996 – 2007. Taking into account the timing 
perspective in implementing the FSAP directives across countries we find a positive link between 
financial harmonization and financial development. The results are shown to be robust to 
different approaches in constructing the harmonization index and the harmonization difference 
(relative timing of adoption) variable, adding further controls, and extending the analysis to 
include the data for the recent period. 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
Financial development is a potential engine for growth. It is the channel through which countries 
experience increasing levels of efficiency in financial markets and the overall financial system. It 
improves the quality of financial intermediaries, frameworks, and activities promoting both growth and 
welfare within countries. The argument regarding the role of financial development has grown even 
stronger in recent years. Countries with developed and integrated financial markets are more likely to 
experience enhanced growth rates. If economic growth is a chain of events, financial development 
together with legal and institutional development constitutes the first link of this process. Differences in 
banking sector, stock and bond markets across countries matter in terms of achieving higher growth 
rates. Financial harmonization thereby becomes even more important in bringing together and 
accelerating further development of the financial markets.  
 
The European Commission in hopes of harmonizing European countries has taken two important 
measures over the last two decades. The Euro, the first and well known measure of integration, has not 
only grown to be a leading currency in the world’s financial markets, but has also greatly contributed to 
unifying European financial markets since its establishment back in 1999. Following the success of the 
Euro in creating unified financial system, the European Commission has introduced the second, less well 
known measure, the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP). The FSAP aims to harmonize European 
financial markets through the imposition and adoption of regulatory and legislative frameworks. With 
the strategic objectives of ensuring “a single EU market for wholesale financial services”, creating “open 
and secure retail markets, and state-of-the-art prudential rules and supervision” and establishing “wider 
conditions for an optimal single financial market”, the FSAP intends to harmonize and reduce the costs 
of cross-border financial intermediation and transactions. (Hartmann, Maddaloni, and Manganelli, 2003, 
34; Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Peydro, 2010 a).  
 
Both the European Union and the European Commission have argued that financial harmonization, by 
reducing the cost of cross-border financial business, should increase economic growth leading to 
development of financial markets (FSA, 2003; London Economics, 2002). Ozkok (2012) has shown that 
once taking into account the relative timing of adoption of the FSAP measures, there is a positive link 
between financial harmonization and industrial growth. Grounding our analysis on that paper, we hope 
to answer the following question: Given the initial goal of the FSAP of creating an open, secure, integrated 
financial market, how effective have the directives of the FSAP been for financial development across 
countries? Using principal component analysis to construct financial, banking sector, bond and stock 
market development indices from most frequently used measures of financial development, we study the 
effects of financial harmonization policies of the FSAP on financial development in a panel of twenty five 
EU member states for the period of 1996 – 2007.  
 
Based on the view of the European Commission, we would expect harmonization to have a positive impact 
on financial development across countries controlling for the relative timing of adoption of the FSAP 
measures. As expected, when regressing financial development indices on financial harmonization, we 
find a positive and significant impact. A number of robustness checks are carried out to examine whether 
our main result --- harmonization having a positive effect on financial development and the relative timing 
of adoption having a negative effect --- holds up. The results are mostly robust to controlling for legal 
origins of countries, constructing new harmonization and relative timing of adoption measures, and 
including data for recent years.  
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Our paper is related to different strands of the literature. First is the literature that has examined the 
effect of various types of integration on growth, volatility and development. For example, Jayaratne and 
Strahan (1996, 1998) and Strahan (2002) study the impact of branching deregulation and interstate 
banking on growth. The results reveal that following state-level branching deregulation, real per-capita 
economic growth across the U.S. states increased significantly. Policy changes that allow for higher 
integration, better bank monitoring and screening across states are found to be a possible explanation. 
In a more recent study, De Avila (2010), examining the effects of financial deregulation in Europe, shows 
that the process of capital control lifting and the harmonization of banking laws have enhanced the 
growth rates of European economies. Harmonization is found to be beneficial for growth through the 
increase in the level and efficiency of financial intermediation, whereas the liberalization of capital 
controls increased growth through improvements in financial intermediation. Similarly in studying the 
effects of financial integration on financial development Chinn and Ito (2002) and (2006), Ito (2006), 
Baltagi, Demetriades and Law (2007), Demetriades and Law (2006), Demetriades and Andrianova (2005) 
and Huang (2006) show that financial integration (capital account openness in most cases) contributes 
to financial development in equity and stock markets for both less developed and emerging market 
countries. More recently, Ozkok (2010) demonstrates that using index measures for financial openness 
and financial development in a panel study of developed and emerging market countries one can 
explain a large part of the variation in financial development across countries and over time. Principal 
component type indices provide better results in understanding the link between financial openness and 
financial development.  
 
Second, there are some papers that have studied the FSAP measures. Kalemli – Ozcan, Papaioannou, and 
Peydro (2010 a) analyze the link between financial integration and business cycle synchronization. The 
authors’ analysis, using bilateral panel instrumental variables to link legislative harmonization policies to 
output synchronization, depicts a negative relationship for the country-pairs selected in the sample. In an 
attempt to examine the Euro’s effect on financial integration Kalemli – Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Peydro 
(2010 b) reveal the legislative-regulatory harmonization policies in financial markets established under 
the FSAP to be a contributing factor for cross-border lending, despite these policies’ inability to explain 
the Euro’s impact on financial integration. Ozkok (2012) conveys that there is a positive relationship 
between financial harmonization induced by the FSAP directives and industrial growth rates across 
countries controlling for the relative timing of adoption of these directives. 
 
Our current analysis contributes to the literature in three aspects. First, we provide evidence for the link 
between financial harmonization and financial development. Second, following the argument for the use 
of index measures in Ozkok (2010) we further study the importance of indexing in the harmonization 
context. Lastly we explicitly examine the potential effect of one of the biggest European harmonization 
projects, the FSAP, on the development of the financial sector.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we explain in detail our data. Section 3 
provides a discussion of the empirical model. Section 4 depicts our results and some robustness checks. 
Section 5 concludes. 
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3.2 Data 
 
The analysis is based on annual data for 25 European countries over a 12 year period of 1996 – 2007.64 
The data are obtained primarily from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine’s database on Financial 
Development and Structure (referred as BDL from onwards), the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (WDI), Worldwide Governance Indicators, and Edstats which extracts data from the UNESCO 
Institute for Statistics.  
 
3.2.1 Financial Harmonization 
 
The financial harmonization measure of our analysis is based on the directives of the Financial Services 
Action Plan. The Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) was launched by the European Union and the 
European Commission at the end of 1998 as a major 5-year program with the goals of establishing “a 
single EU wholesale market for financial services, open and secure retail markets, and state-of-the-art 
prudential and supervisory regulations.” (Kalemli – Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Peydro, 2010 b, 79).  
 
The European Commission through the establishment of the FSAP aimed to remove barriers to entry into 
the financial sector, increasing competition, and harmonizing information (Malcolm, Tilden, and Wilsdon, 
2009). However, like any legislative measure, the costs and benefits of the FSAP directives have become 
a topic of debate over the recent years. Boyfield, Robinson and Mullally (2006) state that the benefits 
involve increasing investment opportunities in securities markets across borders, easing the framework 
for investment firms, augmenting internalization and stimulating competition between banks. This 
thereby induces a reduction in the cost of trading and the cost of capital, increases investor confidence, 
market liquidity, and free flow of capital, allows for more transparency, and greater competition. The 
costs on the other hand entail compliance costs due to complexity, possibility of creating barriers to entry 
for smaller firms, further costs that involve execution of the directives, and costs of implementation of 
these directives across countries. The goal of the European Commission through the FSAP is to form a 
unified financial market that can act as an essential element for growth, employment and improved 
competition in the overall European system (European Commission, 2005). Financial Services Action Plan 
(FSAP) thereby should influence growth, and cross border lending across countries as shown in studies by 
Kalemli – Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Peydro (2010 b) and Ozkok (2012). Since the FSAP has been influential 
on financial activities across countries, it should have a positive impact on the banking sector, bond and 
stock market and overall level of financial development. The aim of this study thereby is to explore 
whether this is indeed the case.  
 
The FSAP consists of 29 legislative acts, 27 directives and 2 regulations in corporate law, banking, payment 
systems and corporate governance (Kalemli – Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Peydro, 2010 a). The most 
important of these measures are the 27 directives, which will be the focus of the remainder of our analysis. 
The directives amend previous laws, replace out-of-date proposals or offer new legislative measures for 
the EU member countries. Since the establishment of the FSAP in 1998, the European Commission has 
passed 21 out of the 27 directives by the end of 2003, with the remaining 6 directives being passed into 
legislation during the period of 2004 – 2006 (Kalemli – Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Peydro, 2010 a).  
 
                                                          
64 The data are obtained primarily from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine’s database on Financial Development and 
Structure (referred as BDL from onwards), the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), Worldwide 
Governance Indicators, and Edstats which extracts data from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics.  
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Unlike the EU regulations that are enforceable across countries immediately after their announcement, 
the FSAP directives are enforceable only after the member states pass legislations that adopt the EU law 
domestically (Kalemli – Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Peydro, 2010 a). The implementation stage of the FSAP 
directives involves the EU Commission’s proposal on legislative directives and regulations, which then will 
have to be adopted by “co-decision” of the Council of Ministers of the Member States and the European 
Parliament (HM Treasury, The Financial Services Authority, and the Bank of England, 2003). The FSAP 
directives are incorporated into the national law of each EU member state either through introduction or 
through amendment of national laws within a time frame of 18 to 24 months of their date of original 
publication. The implementation process of the FSAP directives works through three stages; transposition 
of the EU legislation into national law, adjustment for necessary arrangements and ensuring that the 
newly adopted regulations are working effectively and efficiently. Due to differences across countries in 
modifying their existing internal institutional structures and frameworks to adopt the EU law (and due to 
the discretion in when to adopt these directives), the transposition of the FSAP directives may take several 
years, creating variation in terms of the dates of implementation of these directives in different 
countries.65 For example, the 1998 Settlement Finality Directive (1998/26/EC) of the FSAP under the 
securities category was implemented into domestic law in Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Ireland, 
the Netherlands, Spain and the U.K. within a year of its circulation. However, France, Italy and Luxembourg 
did not adopt this directive until 2001, while Cyprus, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland 
had not transposed the directive till the end of our sample period (Kalemli – Ozcan, Papaioannou, and 
Peydro, 2010 a, b).66 It is this cross-country variation in the timing of the adoption of different directives 
which will allow us to identify their effect on growth.   
 
The harmonization indices for EU countries are created using adoption dates of directives in different 
countries from the European Commission’s Financial Services Action Plan. Following the methodology by 
Kalemli – Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Peydro (2010 b), we construct country and time-variant and industry-
invariant indices of harmonization that summarize the information provided by the 27 FSAP directives. In 
particular, for each of the 27 directives listed under the FSAP we define a dummy variable that takes on a 
value of one on and after the date that the country under examination has transposed the directive into 
national law and a value of zero otherwise.  The sum of all 27 directives forms our next variable, lexi,t 
(Kalemli – Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Peydro, 2010 a, b): 
 
𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑘27
𝑘=1                         (3.1) 
 
where k represents all 27 directive dummies, i represents the countries, and t represents the years in the 
sample. Following Kalemli – Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Peydro (2010 b), we use the logarithmic 
transformation of the sum of the directives for countries in constructing the harmonization index given 
below. 
𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = ln (1 + 𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡)           (3.2) 
 
Table 3.1 in the Appendix provides a time-line of adoption of the 27 directives for all countries in our 
sample, while Table 3.2 and 3.3 present detailed descriptions and categories for these directives.  
                                                          
65 As explained in Ozkok (2012) the European Commission imposes sanctions on member states that do not comply 
with the rules and regulations set forward by the Commission. The Member States are therefore obliged to pay 
penalties for the days of non-compliance. For more information please refer to the European Commission’s 
Application of EU Law website, http://ec.europa.eu/eu law/infringements/infringements 260 en.htm 
66 Please refer to Table 3.3 in the Appendix for further explanation of the directives in the Financial Services Action 
Plan. 
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The harmonization index described above takes into account the time varying sum of the directives across 
countries. We do not believe that this causes a potential problem or bias as countries are provided with a 
time frame in which they have to implement each directive into their national law. Nevertheless, it is also 
important and interesting to examine the fraction of the directives transposed each year given the 
possible number of directives that can possibly have been implemented in that year. We thereby construct 
another harmonization index that takes into account the fraction of directives implemented per year 
across countries relative to the possible sum of directives available for that year.67 The fractional 
harmonization index can then be constructed as a possible robustness check as follows: 
 
𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡(𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) =
𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡
∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑖,𝑡𝑡
        (3.3) 
 
where 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑖,𝑡  represents the number of directives that can be implemented at each 
possible year and 𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 is the sum of directives implemented across time per country.
68 
 
3.2.2 Relative timing (speed) of adoption 
 
The relative timing of adoption is an important determinant of the effect of the FSAP directives. As shown 
in Ozkok (2012) there exist significant differences across EU member countries in the timing of adoption 
of the FSAP directives and not controlling for this timing would introduce a bias. As expressed previously, 
the FSAP directives need to be transposed into national law before they become effective. This has to be 
completed within a specified period of time, however, some countries implement directives earlier in 
comparison to others. These differences in timing of adoption are highly influential on the overall level of 
harmonization across countries. For example, if Czech Republic adopts a directive, and no other country 
adopts the same directive, then we cannot talk about harmonization. In that case Czech Republic would 
simply bear the cost of adopting the directive, without attaining any benefits from it. With this in mind, 
we consider whether there is a disadvantage from adopting these directives earlier. In order to check for 
this possibility, we construct a new variable which we call the harmonization difference: 
 
𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡 
 
where 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is the harmonization index of country i in year t, and 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡 is 
the average index of harmonization across countries in year t. The harmonization difference is a measure 
that depicts how many FSAP directives are adopted by each country relative to the average rate of 
adoption for all countries per year. Using this variable we can analyze the impact of being an early versus 
a late adopter on industrial growth.  
 
3.2.3 Financial Development Indicators 
 
Financial development indicators consist of banking system, stock market and bond market measures. 
Below we discuss each group of measures and the construction of indices in detail. 
 
Banking sector development indicators: 
 
Five indicators are used to measure the development of the banking sector. These variables are liquid 
liabilities (% of GDP), private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions (% of GDP), 
                                                          
67 We would like to thank Irma Clots-Figueras for pointing out this possibility.  
68 We have also experimented using the logarithmic transformation in the numerator of the fractional 
harmonization index. The results are similar to those reported in Table 3.6 in the appendix. 
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the ratio of deposit money bank assets to the sum of deposit money bank assets and central bank assets 
(in percentages), total bank assets (% of GDP), and domestic credit provided by the banking sector (% of 
GDP). The annual data is obtained from the Financial Development and Structure Database by BDL and 
the World Bank’s WDI.  
 
Liquid liabilities (% of GDP) equals the ratio of liquid liabilities of bank and nonbank financial 
intermediaries to GDP (Demirguc-Kunt, Levine, 2001). This variable is commonly used as a measure of 
financial sector development and is a typical measure of financial depth.  
 
Private credit by deposit money banks and other institutions (% of GDP) is an indicator for the overall 
development in private banking markets (Chinn and Ito, 2006). This variable includes financial resources 
provided to the private sector by deposit money banks and other financial institutions. It measures the 
level of credit available for the private sector.  
 
The ratio of deposit money bank assets to the sum of deposit money bank assets and central bank assets 
(in percentages) is used to demonstrate the weight of deposit money bank assets among total assets. It 
reflects the importance of private lending compared to total lending (Huang, 2006).  
Total bank assets (% of GDP) is used as a measure of financial depth. It is used to represent the overall 
size of the banking sector. 
 
Domestic credit provided by the banking sector (% of GDP) includes credit extended to the private sector 
and general government, to the nonfinancial public sector in the form of investments in short- and long-
term government securities, to banking and nonbank institutions and loans to state enterprises but 
excludes credit to the central government (World Bank, 2012). It is a measure of banking sector depth 
and financial sector development in terms of size (World Bank, 2012). 
 
Stock market development indicators: 
 
Three different variables are used to measure development in stock markets. These variables are stock 
market capitalization (% of GDP), stock market turnover ratio (in percentages), and stock market total 
value traded (% of GDP). Annual data is obtained from the Financial Development and Structure 
Database of BDL. 
 
Stock market capitalization (% of GDP) is equal to the value of listed shares divided by GDP. It is an 
indicator of the size of the stock market.  Stock market turnover ratio (in percentages) is used as the 
efficiency indicator of stock markets (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2001). It is classified as the ratio of the 
value of total shares traded to stock market capitalization. Stock market total value traded (% of GDP) is 
equal to the total shares traded on the stock market exchange divided by GDP. This indicator measures 
the activity or liquidity of the stock markets (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2001). 
 
Bond market development indicators: 
 
Private bond market capitalization (% of GDP) and public bond market capitalization (% of GDP) are the 
two indicators used to measure bond market development.  Data is reported annually from the Financial 
Development and Structure database of BDL. 
 
Private bond market capitalization (% of GDP) is equal to the total amount of outstanding domestic debt 
securities issued by financial institutions and corporations as a share of GDP.  Public bond market 
capitalization (% of GDP) is equal to the total amount of public domestic securities issued by 
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governments as a share of GDP. Both of these indicators are used to determine the efficiency of bond 
markets.  
 
The financial development literature does not use bond market development indicators as potential 
measures for financial development. Due to their short period of availability bond market indicators may 
reduce the number of estimations or may create problems in estimations due to their large variability. 
Hence we also construct financial development indices that exclude the bond market development 
indicators. 
 
3.2.4 Creating financial development indices 
 
We argue for the use of indices for financial development for various reasons. First, the choice of 
indicators to be used is a topic of concern in the literature. Studies lack a comprehensive indicator that 
can bring together all features of financial development; the banking system, the stock and the bond 
markets. Second, with different measures used for financial development, the results obtained seem 
unconvincing. Constructing better financial development indices will help resolve problems associated 
with particular choice of measures. By aggregating different measures of financial development into a 
single index we summarize the comprehensive nature of the financial markets and bring together 
different sectors that affect financial development. 
 
The use of principal components and factors models in creating indices have become more common 
among the researchers particularly in examining the link between financial openness and financial 
development and growth. Principal components analysis in its simplest form involves a mathematical 
procedure that helps transform a number of possibly correlated variables into a smaller number of 
uncorrelated ones. Principal components has two main objectives; reducing the dimensionality of the 
data set, and identifying new meaningful variables.69 Here we use the methodology of Bo and Woo 
(2008) and apply it to our context following Ozkok (2010). This index calculates weights taking into 
account the information from all components. According to this methodology the weights for each 
measure of the index are constructed as follows: 
 
𝑤𝑗 =
∑ 𝜆𝑖𝛼𝑗
𝑖𝑖=𝑝
𝑖=1
∑ 𝜆𝑖
𝑖=𝑝
𝑖=1
 
 
where 𝜆𝑖 (i =1,…,p) is the i
th eigenvalue and αipx1 (i = 1, …, p) is the ith eigenvector of the correlation 
matrix Rpxp respectively (Bo and Woo, 2008). The technique used by Bo and Woo (2008) is similar to that 
proposed by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) for constructing the 
Trade and Development Index. Bo and Woo (2008/2010), Nagar and Basu (2002) and Klein and Ozmucur 
(2002/2003) provide different approaches in creating indices analogous to the Trade and Development 
Index (TDI) with minor alterations. 
 
The index is then constructed taking into account the relative importance of all indicators: 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 =
∑ ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝛼𝑗
𝑖𝑥𝑗
𝑖=𝑝
𝑗=1
𝑖=𝑝
𝑖=1
∑ 𝜆𝑖
𝑖=𝑝
𝑖=1
= ∑ 𝑤𝑗
𝑗=𝑝
𝑗=1
𝑥𝑗 
                                                          
69 For a more in depth discussion of the principal component analysis please refer to Jackson (1991), Dunteman 
(1989) and Jolliffe (2002). 
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where  𝑥𝑗 (j = 1, …, p) is the j
th column of the matrix X and 𝑤𝑗 is the final weight of the indicator j.  All 
variables that constitute the jth column of the matrix X, xj, are standardized. One important remark is in 
place; the sum of the weights expressed by the formula above does not necessarily have to equal unity. 
This is due to the fact that the principal component analysis in its underlining structure normalizes the 
mode of each eigenvector to unity. The weights therefore could be very close to but not always equal to 
1 (Bo and Woo, 2008). 
 
Following this methodology we construct indices with standardized individual measures for financial 
openness, banking sector, stock and bond market development, financial development.70 This avoids 
any potential problem that could arise as a result of using different scales or units of measurement. 
 
3.2.5 Control Variables 
 
To further examine the relationship between financial harmonization and financial development we 
introduce a series of variables to control for legal and institutional differences, health care and education. 
Control variables described in detail below are country and time-variant for the period of 1996 – 2007. 
The data for the control variables are from the World Bank’s WDI and the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, and Edstats. 
 
We employ a series of legal and institutional variables from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators dataset. We use three different measures to control for institutional, legal, political and 
economic factors that may affect the overall level of growth. The three indicators --- government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, and rule of law --- are constructed using subjective and perceptions-
based data that reflect views of a range of respondents, agencies and organizations. They are measured 
in a range from -2.5 to 2.5, where higher values correspond to better governance outcomes.71  
 
Secondary school gross enrolment rate (% of population) is used as an indicator that controls for 
differences in educational attainment across countries. This measure is an important determinant of 
development. Following the examples of educational attainment indicators from the economic growth 
literature we use secondary school gross enrollment rate as a control for educational differences across 
countries. 
 
Public health expenditure (% of government expenditure) is an indicator used for controlling funds 
provided for the health sector across countries. It consists of recurrent and capital spending from 
government (central and local) budgets, external borrowings and grants and social (or compulsory) 
health insurance funds (World Bank, 2012).72 
 
                                                          
70 This method makes use of all eigenvectors and proposes to use weights depending on the eigenvectors and 
eigenvalues. 
71 Please refer to the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) dataset. 1996 – 2011. World Bank. 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/resources.htm. The institutional quality variables used in our analysis 
do not fluctuate widely across time. Due to the relatively small fluctuation structure of these indicators, we take 
the averages of two consecutive years to replace the missing years’ data for these three legal and institutional 
variables. 
72 The grants also include donations from international agencies and nongovernmental organizations. For further 
information please refer to http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.PUBL.GX.ZS  
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Control variables help in further explaining the effect of financial harmonization on financial development 
as well as banking sector, bond and stock market development. The ease in adopting FSAP directives into 
national law can be induced by the quality of regulatory and legislative institutions. Education could be a 
factor in establishing human capital which would facilitate faster and simpler implementation of 
legislative policies. Health expenditure could be taken as an indicator of better functioning of countries. 
In order to control for these potential influences we include the variables discussed above in our 
regressions. 
 
3.3 Empirical Model 
 
We measure the effect of financial harmonization on financial development through an empirical model 
using fixed effects estimation. We follow the literature (Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), (1998), Strahan 
(2002), Morgan, Rime and Strahan (2004), and Kalemli – Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Peydro (2010 a, b)) and 
use a model which controls for average differences across countries and time in harmonization policies. 
We estimate the below benchmark empirical model in our estimations: 
𝐹𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜆𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝜏𝑝 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑝
5
𝑝=1
+ 𝑣𝑖,𝑡 
 
where the dependent variable in the above equation is the index of financial development73, 𝜆𝑖 represents 
country fixed effects, 𝜃𝑡 represents time fixed effects, 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is the index measure created 
using the FSAP directives, 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖,𝑡 is the relative timing of adoption of the FSAP directives 
measuring the difference between how much a country implements these directives in response to the 
average rate of adoption, and 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 are the three legal and institutional quality variables of 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality and rule of law, secondary school enrollment rate, and the 
health expenditure.  
 
In the above equation our main focus is on the coefficient of the harmonization index. We would expect 
to find a positive and significant coefficient for harmonization which would imply a positive link between 
financial harmonization and financial development. We convey our main findings for both the empirical 
model and robustness checks in detail in the next section. 
 
3.4 Results 
 
3.4.1 Benchmark Model 
 
We report our results using 25 EU member countries for the period of 1996 – 2007. In our regressions we 
use fixed effects estimations with country and time specific effects. The results from Table 3.5 illustrate 
the effect of the harmonization index on financial development. Previous discussions had conveyed that 
through the Financial Services Action Plan, European economies would achieve an increase in the real 
GDP by 1.1% over a decade (FSA, 2003; London Economics, 2002). Although there is no clear explanation 
regarding how the FSAP would influence the level of financial development across countries, given its 
initial goal of creating a unified and integrated European financial market we would expect it to be one of 
the primary determinants of an increase in financial development both across countries and time. The 
                                                          
73 We also use indices of banking sector, bond and stock market developments as dependent variables to analyze 
the impact of harmonization on different financial sectors. 
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results from Table 3.5 show that this is indeed the case. Controlling for the relative timing of adoption, 
the financial harmonization index is found to be positive and significant for all dependent variables of 
development with the exception of the bond market development index. Harmonization difference on 
the other hand takes on a negative effect implying that being an early adopter does not have a clear 
benefit in terms of financial development. The relative timing of adoption is shown to have a significantly 
disadvantageous effect on banking sector, stock market and financial development that excludes the bond 
market. The goal of unification of financial markets by the FSAP directives can only be mutually beneficial 
for countries when they all implement these directives.74 Legal and institutional variables take on altering 
coefficients that are mostly insignificant. Health and education variables are generally positive and partly 
significant. This shows that health and educational attainment are contributing factors for financial 
development. In order to examine whether the inclusion of other control variables affect our results 
particularly for the banking sector we include further controls to our benchmark model. The results are 
reported below. 
 
3.4.2 Robustness checks 
 
As a first robustness check we examine our results with the harmonization index that takes into account 
the fraction of directives implemented. Constructing a harmonization index that depends on the fraction 
of the directives implemented we can observe whether countries adopt the FSAP directives in a timely 
manner. This index differs from our original measure by taking into account that not every year are newer 
FSAP directives proposed by the European Commission. As shown in equation (3), we expect this index to 
convey information regarding the adoption process of the directives rather than quantity of directives 
implemented per year. Our results from Table 3.6 (columns 1 to 5) report no significant relationship 
between the fractional harmonization index and the banking sector, bond and stock market and overall 
financial development indices. In order to examine whether the inclusion of a harmonization difference 
variable using the fractional argument would alter our findings, we construct the relative timing of 
adoption measure taking into account the fractions of directives as follows: 
 
𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑓(𝑓𝑟𝑎)𝑖,𝑡 =
(𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑙𝑒𝑥(𝑎𝑣𝑒)𝑖,𝑡)
∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑖,𝑡𝑡
 
 
where 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑖,𝑡  represents the number of directives that can be implemented at each 
possible year,  𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 is the sum of directives implemented across time per country and 𝑙𝑒𝑥(𝑎𝑣𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 is the 
mean of the country and time variant sum of directives. 
 
The findings from columns (5) to (10) of Table 3.6 are mostly insignificant. The fractional harmonization 
index is insignificant for all dependent variables, whereas the harmonization difference measure is found 
to be positively significant for the financial development index that excludes the bond market. 
Nevertheless the fractional harmonization index should not be regarded as a substitute of the original 
harmonization index. The results portray that the effect of harmonization most probably does not work 
through a fractional argument. By using the fraction of directives implemented in the harmonization index 
we cannot find the positive and significant link that we examine when using the original logarithmic 
harmonization index. 
 
Another potential concern may stem from the construction of the relative timing of adoption of the FSAP 
directives across countries. The 25 countries, although being a part of the most powerful economic and 
                                                          
74 With the inclusion of the harmonization difference measure, the harmonization index acts like an average 
harmonization indicator that generates the impact of harmonization across countries at the average level. 
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political union in the world, differ from each other in terms of growth rates. Taking into account the 
differences across economies of the 25 EU countries we can construct a variable for relative timing of 
adoption such that it depends on the overall structure of the economy across countries. The relative 
timing of adoption measure created depends on the GDP levels. The weights for this variable are 
calculated as follows: 
𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖,𝑡 =
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡
∑ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑖
         (3.4) 
 
where 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is the gross domestic product of country i given in constant 2000 USD from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators. Similarly the relative timing of adoption measure, or in other 
words, the harmonization difference can be constructed as: 
 
𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 − (∑ 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡𝑖 )     (3.5) 
 
where 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is the harmonization index of the FSAP directives that is country and time 
variant. Using the above methodology each country takes on a weight that depends on the performance 
of their economy relative to the overall performance of the EU 25.  
 
The results from Table 3.7 agree with those of the benchmark model. Harmonization index is positively 
significant for all development indices with the exception of the bond market development index, while 
the weighted harmonization difference variable takes on a negatively significant coefficient for most 
development indices, indicating that being an early adopter has a disadvantageous effect on financial 
development. The control variables of legal and institutional quality, together with education and health 
measures report coefficients similar to those of Table 5. Different constructions of the harmonization 
difference measure in computing the effect of early versus late harmonization on financial development 
show that harmonization is beneficial when all countries implement the directives around the same time.  
 
As a third robustness check we reexamine the results by constructing two different harmonization indices. 
These two indices include the initial twenty-one directives that were put into force by the European 
Commission before the official completion of the FSAP directives in 2006, and the seven directives that 
correspond to the banking initiatives of the FSAP (Kalemli – Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Peydro, 2010 b). By 
doing so we hope to determine whether the effect of the harmonization process on financial development 
alters when we consider the initial 21 directives that were put into force long before the end of the FSAP 
and identify a possible significant link between the banking directives and financial development. The first 
alternative harmonization index includes twenty one directives excludes the directives implemented prior 
to 2004. It is constructed as:  
 
𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑟𝑜𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑘21
𝑘=1  and 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
∗ = ln (1 + 𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑟𝑜𝑖,𝑡)               (3.6) 
 
The second alternative to the harmonization index highlights the importance of the 7 banking directives 
of the FSAP. The banking harmonization index is then formed as: 
 
𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑘7
𝑘=1  and 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
∗∗ = ln (1 + 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡)     (3.7) 
 
The results from Tables 3.8 and 3.9 show that harmonization indices with initial 21 directives, and 7 
banking directives have a positive effect on most financial development indices. Harmonization difference 
has a negative impact implying that being an early adopter is not beneficial for development. This shows 
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that the construction of the harmonization index is crucial, however, excluding some directives does not 
change the robustness of our benchmark model. 
 
Additionally we check for the robustness of our results when accounting for legal origins. Legal origins 
refer to the differences across countries in legal systems that are structured according to families of law. 
Depending on the historical background and development of legal families, characteristics of the legal 
structures, and distinctive institutions, each country has a different legal tradition. As La Porta et al. 
present in their series of articles (1997, 1998, and 2008), the most popular legal traditions are the common 
law and the civil law from which several sub-traditions such as the French, German, socialist and 
Scandinavian legal origins arise.75 Although for our purpose, there is not much difference between the 
French, German and British laws in terms of implementing the EU legislation proposed under the FSAP, 
the way these provisions will be carried out into domestic law, the manner that these directives will be 
monitored and enforced may show vast differences across member countries. This remains to be a factor 
too strong to forgo. Together with governmental and institutional factors, health and educational 
variables, differences in legal origins across countries may highly influence the link between financial 
harmonization and financial development. Our analysis with the addition of legal origins in Table 3.10 
finds the effect of financial harmonization index to be positive and significant for all development indices 
with the exception of the bond market development index. Once again, the harmonization difference 
variable is shown to have a negative coefficient for most development indices. Although the legal origin 
dummies for the U.K., France, Germany, Socialist regimes, and Scandinavian countries appear to be 
negatively significant in some regressions, the coefficients alter signs depending on the dependent 
variables selected. The results correspond to those of the benchmark model of Table 3.5, demonstrating 
the robustness of our initial findings. 
 
Lastly, we examine the effects of the recent financial crisis on the link between financial harmonization 
and financial development. Starting from 2008, the financial crisis has had a wide-spread effect on most 
European countries. Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Spain and recently Cyprus have had to deal with 
increasing levels of unemployment, large declines in growth rates, and worst of all with increasing levels 
of deficits and bankruptcy. Germany, France and the UK have experienced worsening of financial markets 
and a damaging slowdown of economic growth. In order to study the impact of the crisis on how the FSAP 
directives have been implemented across countries, we include the most recent years, for which data is 
available, in our analysis.76  
 
The recent financial crisis has undermined the degree of integration across countries. As the fear of 
contagion of the detrimental outcomes of the crisis surges, harmonization and the relative timing of 
adoption of the FSAP directives could very well be negatively affected. The results from Table 3.11 show 
similarities to our benchmark model. Harmonization index is positive and significant for the financial 
development index that excludes the bond market, and for the banking sector development index.  
 
In order to examine how harmonization has been affected by the recent financial crisis we include 
interaction terms of the explanatory variables in our model and analyze their behavior once the dataset 
is extended to include the crisis period. An indicator for the crisis period is initially constructed as a dummy 
variable that takes on a value of 1 on and after 2008, and a value of 0 otherwise. This term is then 
                                                          
75 Please refer to La Porta et al. (2008). Legal origins dummies are obtained from the original La Porta et al. (1998) 
study and they are created by assigning a value of 1 for countries that have a specified legal tradition such as civil 
or common law, and 0 otherwise. 
76 The analysis includes the years of 2008, 2009 and 2010. 
 
 
193 
 
multiplied by the explanatory variables to construct interaction terms. The results reported in Table 3.12 
convey a harmonization index that is positive and significant. The harmonization difference measure is 
similarly found to have a negative coefficient that is significant for most dependent variables. Examining 
the interaction terms, harmonization has a negative but insignificant coefficient. Figure 1 depicts the 
harmonization index and the harmonization variable. Similarly the graphs across countries do not convey 
a clear alteration of the rate of harmonization during 2008 – 2010. The crisis period does not seem to have 
affected the pace of the harmonization process. This could be the result of the last directives being 
established in 2006. Although by the end of our sample period there were countries remaining to 
implement some of the directives under the FSAP, most countries had already transposed majority of the 
directives into national law. Hence the positive impact of harmonization on financial, banking sector and 
bond and stock market development indices continues when we control for relative timing of adoption 
across countries. We have thereby shown that the link between financial harmonization and financial 
development is positive and robust. 
 
3.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
The Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) was established with the initiative of building an integrated and 
harmonized financial market among its member states. After the implementation of the Euro, the FSAP 
directives have constituted a further step in bringing together European countries through legislative and 
regulatory terms in banking, insurance and securities markets. 
 
The literature has shown a positive impact of financial harmonization (from the FSAP directives) on cross-
border lending and industrial growth across countries. Given that the FSAP directives aim to create open 
and secure financial markets, we have assessed the effect of these directives on the development of 
financial markets. With a standard fixed effects estimation--- regressing financial, banking, bond and stock 
market development indices constructed using principal components analysis on harmonization and 
controlling for country and time fixed effects and the relative timing of adoption of the directives --- we 
find that there is a positive relationship between financial harmonization and financial development. The 
results are shown to be robust to different approaches in constructing the harmonization index and the 
harmonization difference variable, including other control variables such as dummies for legal origins, and 
extending the dataset to include the crisis period. 
 
This paper has shown that by taking into account the timing perspective in implementing the FSAP 
directives across countries we can find a positive link between financial harmonization and financial 
development. The transposition of the FSAP directives has been shown to positively affect our financial 
development indices. This however does not imply that the FSAP directives have entirely been successful 
in realizing their initial objectives. There existed countries by the end of our sample period, by 2010, which 
had not implemented all the directives. Although the last FSAP directives had been established in 2006, 
some countries have taken a longer time frame in adopting them. This could be a result of the costs 
attached to the implementation of the directives. As the Financial Services Action Plan nears completion 
in terms of full adoption with the remaining countries implementing the directives, the cost and benefit 
debate is ongoing. Having shown that the relative timing of adoption is key to understanding the impact 
of harmonization policies on financial development, future research, as more data become available, 
would call for a cost and benefit analysis of the FSAP directives. Such an analysis will clear doubts on the 
implementation stage of the FSAP and on its timing, and thereby provide a full picture on the efficiency 
of these directives. 
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3.7 Appendix 
 
Table 3.1: Timing of the FSAP Directives for the EU Member Countries 
 
Directives AT BE CY CZ DK EE FI FR DE GR HU    IE IT LV 
               
1998/26/EC 1999 1999 Not Yet Not Yet 2000 2004  1999 2001  1999 2000 Not Yet 1999  2001 Not Yet 
2000/46/EC 2002 2003 2004 2003 2005 2006 2003  2003 2002 2003 2004 2002  2002  2004 
2000/64/EC  2003 2004 2002 2004 2004 2001 2004 2006 2002 2004 2002 Not Yet Not Yet     2004 
2001/17/EC 2003 2004 2004 2004 2006 2005 2004 2005 2003 Not Yet 2004 2003 2003 2004 
2001/24/EC 2003 2004 2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2004 2004 2006 2004 2004 2004 2004 
2001/65/EC 2004 2005 2003 2004 2002 2004 2004 2004 2004 2006 2004  2004 2005 1993 
2001/86/EC 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2006 2004 2006 2005 2005 
2001/97/EC 2003 2004 2003 2004 2005 2004 2003 2004 2002 2005 2003 2003 2004 2004 
2001/107/EC  2003 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2003 2004 2004 2003 2003 2003 2005 
2001/108/EC 2003 2004 2004 2004 2005 2004 2004 2003 2004 2004 2003 2003 2003 2004 
2002/13/EC 2003 2004 2004 2004 2004 2005 2004 2004 2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 1998 
2002/47/EC 2003 2005 2004 2005 2004 2004 2004 2005 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2005 
2002/65/EC 2004 2006 2004 2004 2005 2004 2005 2005 2004 2005 2005 2004 2005 2004 
2002/87/EC 2005 2005 2005 2005 2004 2005 2004 2004 2005 2006 2004 2005 2005 2005 
2002/83/EC 2003 2004 2004 2004 2004 2005 2004 2004 2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 1998 
2002/92/EC 2004 2005 2004 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 Not Yet 2005 2005 2005 2006 2005 
2003/6/EC 2005 2005 2005 2006 2005 2005 2005 2005 2004 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 
2003/41/EC 2005 2006 2006 2006 2005 2004 2006 2006 2005 2005 2005 2005 Not Yet 2005 
2003/48/EC 2004 2005 2005 2004 2004 2004 2004 2003 2005 2005 2003 2003 2005 2005 
2003/51/EC 2005 2006 2005 2004 2002 2005 2004 2004 2004 2006 2005 2005 Not Yet 1993 
2003/71/EC 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 Not Yet 2005 
2004/25/EC 2006 2007 2007 2006 2005 2007 2006 2006 2006 2006 Not Yet 2006 2007 2006 
2004/109/EC 2007 2007 2009 2006 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 Not Yet 2007 2007 2007 
2004/39/EC 2007 2008 2010 2006 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 Not Yet 2007 2007 2008 
2005/56/EC 2007 2008 2007 Not Yet 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2009 Not Yet 2008 2008 2010 
2006/48/EC 2007 2007 Not Yet Not Yet 2007 2007 2007 2007 2006 2007 Not Yet 2007 2007 2010 
2006/49/EC 2007 2007 Not Yet 2006 2007 2007 2007 2007 2006 2007 Not Yet 2007 2007 2010 
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Sources: Kalemli – Ozcan, Sebnem, Elias Papaioannou, and Jose Luis Peydro. (2010 b). “What Lies Beneath the Euro’s Effect of Financial Integration? Currency 
Risk, Legal Harmonization, or Trade?”, Journal of International Economics, 81 (1): 75 – 88,  European Commission. 2010. “Transposition of Financial Services 
Action Plan” http://ec.europa.eu/internal market/finances/actionplan/transposition/database/austria en.htm, and Europa, Access to European Union Law 
National Execution Measures, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:72006L0049:EN:NOT#FIELD MT 
Directives LT LU MT NL PL PT SK SI ES SE UK 
            
1998/26/EC  Not Yet 2001 2002 1999 Not Yet 2000 2006  2004 1999 2000  1999 
2000/46/EC 2005 2002 2002 2002 2003 2002 2004 2006 2002 2002 2002 
2000/64/EC  2004 2001 2002 2003 2004 2000 2006 2004 2002 2000 2003 
2001/17/EC 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2003 2005 2004 2003 2006 2003 
2001/24/EC 2005 2004 2004 2005 2004 2006 2005 2004 2005 2006 2004 
2001/65/EC 2004 2006 2001 2005 1995 2004 2005 2004 2004 2004 2004 
2001/86/EC 2005 2006 2004 2005 2005 2005 2004 2006 2006 2004 2004 
2001/97/EC 2004 2004 2003 2001 2001 2004 2006 2002 2003 2005 2004 
2001/107/EC  2003 2003 2004 2005 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 
2001/108/EC 2003 2003 2004 2005 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 
2002/13/EC 2004 2004 2004 2003 2004 2003 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 
2002/47/EC 2004 2005 2005 2004 2004 2004 2005 2003 2002 2005 2005 
2002/65/EC 2004 Not Yet 2005 2006 2000 Not Yet 2005 Not Yet Not Yet 2004 2004 
2002/87/EC 2004 2006 2005 2007 2005 Not Yet 2006 2006 2005 2006 2004 
2002/83/EC 2004 2004 2004 2003 2004 2003 2004 2004 2004 2004 2005 
2002/92/EC 2004 2005 2006 2005 2004 2006 2005 2004 2006 2005 2005 
2003/6/EC 2004 2006 2005 2005 2005 2006 2006 2004 2005 2005 2005 
2003/41/EC 2006 2005 2004 2006 1999 2006 2005 2003 2005 2006 2005 
2003/48/EC 2005 2005 2004 2004 2005 2005 2005 2006 2004 2005 2005 
2003/51/EC 2003 2006 2002 2005 1995 2005 2005 Not Yet 2005 2006 2005 
2003/71/EC 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2006 2005 2005 2005 
2004/25/EC 2007 2006 2006 2007 2009 2006 2007 2006 2007 2006 2006 
2004/109/EC 2007 2007 2007 Not Yet Not Yet 2007 Not Yet 2007 2007 2007 2007 
2004/39/EC 2008 2008 2007 2007 Not Yet 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 
2005/56/EC 2012 2007 2007 2008 2008 Not Yet Not Yet 2008 2009 2008 2007 
2006/48/EC 2011 2007 2007 2007 2010 2007 Not Yet 2007 2008 2007 2007 
2006/49/EC 2008 2008 2007 2007 2010 2007 2007 2007 2008 2007 2007 
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Table 3.2: Directives of the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) 
 
Directives Directive Names Deadline Category 
1998/26/EC Settlement Finality Directive 1/06/2005 Securities 
2000/46/EC Directive on the taking up, pursuit and prudential supervision of the 
businesses of electronic money institutions (E-Money Directive) 
27/04/2002 Banking 
2000/64/EC  Directive amending the insurance directives and the ISD to permit 
information exchange with third countries 
17/11/2002 Insurance 
2001/17/EC Directive on the reorganization and winding-up of insurance undertakings 20/04/2003 Insurance 
2001/24/EC Directive on the reorganization and winding-up of banks 5/05/2004 Banking 
2001/65/EC Directive amending the 4th and the 7th Company Law Directives to allow 
fair value accounting 
9/10/2004 Securities 
2001/86/EC Directive supplementing the Statute for a European Company with regard 
to the involvement of employees 
10/10/2004 Securities 
2001/97/EC Directive amending the money laundering directive (2nd Money 
Laundering Directive) 
15/06/2003 Banking 
2001/107/EC  1st Directive on UCITS (Undertakings for Collective Investments in 
Transferable Securities) 
13/08/2003 Securities 
2001/108/EC 2nd Directive on UCITS (Undertakings for Collective Investments in 
Transferable Securities) 
13/08/2003 Securities 
2002/13/EC Directive amending the solvency margin requirements in the insurance 
directives 
20/09/2003 Insurance 
2002/47/EC Directive on financial collateral arrangements 17/12/2003 Securities 
2002/65/EC Directive on the Distance of marketing of Financial Services 1/01/2004 Insurance 
2002/87/EC Directive on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, 
insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial conglomerate 
(Financial Conglomerates Directive) 
11/08/2004 Banking 
2002/83/EC Directive amending the solvency margin requirements in the insurance 
directives 
20/09/2003 Insurance 
2002/92/EC Directive on insurance mediation 15/01/2005 Insurance 
2003/6/EC Directive on insider dealing and market manipulation 12/10/2004 Securities 
2003/41/EC Directive on the prudential supervision of pension funds 23/09/2005 Insurance 
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2003/48/EC Directive on the taxation of savings income in the form of interest 
payments (Savings Tax Directive) 
1/01/2004 Banking 
2003/51/EC Directive modernizing the accounting provisions of the 4th and the 7th 
Company Law Directives 
1/01/2005 Securities 
2003/71/EC Directive on prospectuses 1/07/2005 Securities 
2004/25/EC Directive on Take Over Bids 20/5/2006 Securities 
2004/109/EC Transparency directive 20/01/2007 Securities 
2004/39/EC Directive on Markets in Financial Instruments (update of ISD) - MiFID 20/01/2007 Securities 
2005/56/EC 10th Company Law Directive on cross-border mergers of limited liability 
companies 
15/12/2007 Securities 
2006/48/EC Directive on the relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of 
credit institutions 
31/12/2006 Banking 
2006/49/EC Directive on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit 
institutions 
31/12/2006 Banking 
 
 
Sources: Kalemli – Ozcan, Sebnem, Elias Papaioannou, and Jose Luis Peydro. (2010 b). “What Lies Beneath the Euro’s Effect of Financial Integration? Currency 
Risk, Legal Harmonization, or Trade?”, Journal of International Economics, 81 (1): 75 – 88 and Supplementary Appendix Table A, 
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~elias/jie SAT-A.pdf, European Commission. 2010. Transposition of Financial Services Action Plan 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal market/finances/actionplan/transposition/database/austria en.htm 
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Table 3.3: Description of the Directives of the Financial Services Action Plan 
 
Directive               Directive No.         Deadline 
Settlement Finality Directive                1998/26/EC        01/06/2005 
This directive is implemented to reduce systemic risk in payment and securities settlement systems, particularly aiming to reduce the risk of 
insolvency of a member country. Main objectives of this directive include protection of transfer orders, greater competition between settlement 
providers and the removal of barriers to post-trading. 
Directive on the taking up, pursuit and prudential 
supervision of the businesses of electronic money 
institutions (E-Money Directive) 
               2000/46/EC        27/04/2002 
The E-Money directive defines electronic money and sets conditions for capital and authorization requirements of electronic money institutions. 
Main objectives of this directive are to implement appropriate prudential rules and encourage innovation and confidence so as to boost the 
number of passports used in the banking system as well as to increase the use of e-money.  
Directive amending the insurance directives and the 
ISD to permit information exchange with third 
countries 
              2000/64/EC        17/11/2002 
This directive allows for the exchange of information between the third country authorities and authorities of the Member States. It allows for 
the conclusion of cooperation agreements by the Member States providing an environment for exchange of information with the authorities of 
third countries. 
Directive on the reorganization and winding-up of 
insurance undertakings  
              2001/17/EC        20/04/2003 
This directive aims to ensure that mutual recognition is applied to the winding-up and reorganization of insurance undertakings within the EU. 
The main objectives of this directive include reducing regulatory requirements regarding bankruptcy and increasing consumer protection in 
order to create more cross-border business through branches and more direct cross-border insurance. 
Directive on the reorganization and winding-up of 
banks     
              2001/24/EC        05/05/2004 
This directive ensures that the banks across the Member States can be wound up and reorganized as a single entity. The main objectives of this 
directive include reducing regulatory requirements regarding bankruptcy and increasing consumer protection. 
Directive amending the 4th and the 7th Company 
Law Directives to allow fair value accounting 
              2001/65/EC        09/10/2004 
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This directive highlights the existing EU Accounting Directives for companies, banks and other financial institutions and concentrates on the 
valuation of assets. It aims to achieve a single set of financial statements for listed companies across Member States. The directive is intended 
to establish greater transparency, increased investment and information disclosure. 
Directive supplementing the Statute for a European 
Company with regard to the involvement of 
employees 
             
               2001/86/EC 
     
  10/10/2004 
This directive provides provisions for the creation of a Statute for a European company particularly for employee involvement. 
Directive amending the money laundering directive 
(2nd Money Laundering Directive) 
               2001/97/EC     15/06/2003 
This directive highlights the importance of the scope of predicate offences and the reporting of suspicious activity in banking. It is established in 
order to cut funding for organized crime and terrorism. Its main objectives include increasing market confidence, reducing money laundering, 
and decreasing the risk of banking crises. 
1st Directive on UCITS (Undertakings for Collective 
Investments in Transferable Securities) 
               2001/107/EC     13/08/2003 
This directive aims to regulate management companies and provide simplified prospectuses for investment purposes. It promotes the 
consolidation of EU funds and generation of economies of scale. By providing greater flexibility for fund managers, this directive hopes to 
increase cross border trade in UCITS.  
2nd Directive on UCITS (Undertakings for Collective 
Investments in Transferable Securities) 
               2001/108/EC     13/08/2003 
This directive has the objectives of harmonizing information to investors, expanding investment options, providing a larger number of 
passports to ease cross border trade, and increasing the use of eligible assets so as to allow for quicker diffusion of products. 
Directive amending the solvency margin 
requirements in the insurance directives 
               2002/13/EC     20/09/2003 
This directive was implemented in order to improve prudential regulation of insurance companies. It addresses the reduction in the amount of 
regulatory capital an insurance undertaking is obliged to hold against unforeseen conditions, as well as aiming to simplify regulation and 
increase consumer protection. 
Directive on financial collateral arrangements                                 2002/47/EC                                                  17/12/2003 
This directive creates greater enforceability for collateral backing transactions across the Member States. It aims to reduce systemic risk in 
securities settlement and the cost of capital, provide a harmonized legal treatment of financial collateral, and increase cross-border trading. 
Directive on the Distance of marketing of Financial                        2002/65/EC                                                  01/01/2004 
Services 
This directive helps in protecting retail consumers of financial products sold at a distance. It aims to remove barriers to cross-border provision 
and expects to achieve higher cross-border consolidation in insurance through M&A activity. This directive provides higher protection for retail 
consumers and helps increase the levels of competition between suppliers throughout Member States.  
 
 
206 
 
Directive on the supplementary supervision                                   2002/87/EC                                                   11/08/2004 
of credit institutions, insurance undertakings  
and investment firms in a financial  
conglomerate (Financial Conglomerates Directive) 
This directive provides a settlement on how the lead supervisor of a financial conglomerate should be decided and how supervisory 
arrangements should be fulfilled. It aims to ensure soundness of financial institutions through better prudential regulation such as risk 
reflective capital levels, improved risk management, and harmonization of cross-border and cross-sector supervision. 
Directive amending the solvency margin requirements               2002/83/EC                                                   20/09/2003 
 in the insurance directives (Solvency 1 directive for 
life insurance) 
This directive aims to increase consumer protection and lower the costs for the insurance sector. It helps merge national markets so as to 
achieve a highly integrated single market in terms of life insurance. 
Directive on insurance mediation                                                     2002/92/EC                                                   15/01/2005 
This directive is proposed to remove barriers to insurance intermediaries, enhance consumer protection and encourage retail insurance across 
borders of Member States. It brings together the issues regarding authorization, capitalization and regulation of intermediaries and brokers 
who sell insurance products under a single framework. It aims to provide higher quality advice and products in the insurance sector as well as 
to increase cross-border consolidation in insurance. 
Directive on insider dealing and market manipulation                 2003/6/EC                                                     12/10/2004 
(Market Abuse Directive) 
This directive is aimed to terminate market abuse and insider trading. It is established to improve market transparency and confidence, and 
increase investment. Through this directive the markets are assumed to be more effectively protected against abuse due to the new changes 
that relate to mandatory suspicious transaction reporting. 
Directive on the prudential supervision of pension funds           2003/41/EC                                                   23/09/2005 
This directive brings new regulation to the operation of employment-related pension schemes across Member States. It aims to create an 
internal market that will allow for occupational retirement provision organized in a European scale. 
Directive on the taxation of savings income in                              2003/48/EC                                                    01/01/2004 
the form of interest payments (Savings Tax Directive) 
This directive is implemented to prevent cross-border tax evasion by individuals within the EU. Through this directive, the Member States will 
be able to exchange information on interest income paid to non-residents or to tax that particular income.  
Directive modernizing the accounting provisions of                    2003/51/EC                                                    01/01/2005 
the 4th and the 7th Company Law Directives 
This directive hopes to improve transparency in standards of corporate reporting. It aims to enhance investor confidence and to increase 
competition in the investment market and information quality. 
Directive on prospectuses                                                                 2003/71/EC                                                    01/07/2005 
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This directive is established to increase transparency and investor confidence in the securities markets across Member States. It proposes 
passporting of prospectuses that are to be published for securities trade to the public across the EU borders so as to achieve a more 
competitive market for issuers and investors. This directive provides a single passport for issuers of equity and debt securities easing the 
transactions of securities across the EU borders. It aims to harmonize information, promote a more competitive EU market in securities, and 
reduce the cost of capital. 
Directive on Take Over Bids                                                               2004/25/EC                                                    20/05/2006 
This directive is implemented to promote free market in corporate control and enhance competition in securities markets. It aims to implement 
a minimum framework to the national approval of takeovers in applicable law, protection of shareholders and disclosure.  Its main objective 
includes insurance of an efficient market for M&A activity through which merger related costs and increase cross-border activity in M&A will be 
reduced. 
Transparency directive                                                                       2004/109/EC                                                  20/01/2007 
This directive aims to increase the quality of information available to investors in the securities market and promote a more competitive 
investment market. It proposes an obligation on issuers of securities to meet continuing disclosure requirements after the issue. 
Directive on markets in Financial Instruments                               2004/39/EC                                                    20/01/2007 
(update of ISD) – MiFID 
This directive aims to create an integrated single European market of financial instruments. It promotes banks to internalize trading across 
Europe and compete with exchanges. Through greater internalization across banks, this directive hopes to increase competition, reduce the 
cost of capital and enhance fair competition between exchanges and banks. This directive is expected to create appropriate investor 
protection, single passport for securities trade, remove barriers to entry for exchanges and increase competition between trading venues. 
10th Company Law Directive on cross-border                                 2005/56/EC                                                    15/12/2007 
mergers of limited liability companies 
This directive is created to allow companies to conduct cross-border mergers. It ensures efficient market for M&A activity. It aims to decrease 
merger related costs and increase cross-border M&A activity. It provides a more secure and transparent environment for cross-border 
restructuring.  
Directive on the relating to the taking up                                       2006/48/EC                                                     31/12/2006 
and pursuit of the business of credit institutions 
This directive is established to coordinate credit institutions in order to protect savings and to create equal conditions of competition between 
institutions.  
Directive on the capital adequacy of investment                          2006/49/EC                                                     31/12/2006 
firms and credit institutions 
This directive establishes the capital adequacy requirements for investment firms and credit institutions, setting the rules for their prudential 
supervision. Its main objectives include harmonization of capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions, enhancement of effective 
risk management for banks, and the creation of a safer environment that would decrease possibility for banking crises.  
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Source: The definitions for the directives are collected from the following: Kalemli – Ozcan, Sebnem, Elias Papaioannou, and Jose Luis Peydro. (2010 b). “What 
Lies Beneath the Euro’s Effect of Financial Integration? Currency Risk, Legal Harmonization, or Trade?”, Journal of International Economics, 81 (1): 75 – 88  and 
Supplementary Appendix Table A, http://www.dartmouth.edu/~elias/jie SAT-A.pdf,  European Commission. 2010. Transposition of Financial Services Action 
Plan http://ec.europa.eu/internal market/finances/actionplan/transposition/database/austria en.htm, Boyfield, Keith, Hugo Robinson, and Lorraine Mullally. 
(2006). “Selling the City Short? A Review of the EU’s Financial Services Action Plan”, Open Europe, 1 – 119, 
(http://www.openeurope.org.uk/Content/Documents/PDFs/fsap.pdf), Malcolm, Kyla, Mark Tilden, and Tim Wilsdon. (2009). “Evaluation of the economic 
impacts of the Financial Services Action Plan”, European Commission Internal Market and Services Final Report, 1 – 243 
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Table 3.4: Summary Statistics 
 
Variables Obs.       Mean     Std. Dev.        Min.      Max. 
      
Financial development  145 0.38678 0.8669 -1.5686 2.4907 
Financial development* 202 0.08187 1.2056 -2.6924 4.0789 
Banking sector development 205 0.05424 1.3383 -3.0448 3.2115 
Bond market development 214 0.01414 0.7352 -0.8746 2.9753 
Stock market development 297 0.00330 1.1153 -1.3210 4.3889 
Harmonization 300 1.34614 1.2694 0 3.3322 
Harmonization difference 300 0.00003 0.3694 -1.5349 1.5011 
Government effectiveness 300 1.28349 0.5706 0.0782 2.3379 
Regulatory quality 300 1.26356 0.3753 0.4393 2.0578 
Rule of Law 300 1.19809 0.5241 0.1039 2.0142 
Health 300      12.7227 2.5069 4.8078      18.3899 
Education 290      103.988      14.609      81.322      162.349 
Note: Financial development, banking sector development, stock and bond market development indices are constructed using the principal components 
analysis. Financial development* is a principal components index that excludes the bond market development indicators. Harmonization is the 
harmonization index constructed using the directives of the Financial Services Action Plan. Harmonization difference is the difference between a country’s 
harmonization index and average harmonization for that particular year. Government effectiveness, Regulatory quality and Rule of law are legal and 
institutional variables taken from the Worldwide Governance Indicators. Health is the percentage of government expenditure that is devoted to public 
health, and Education is the gross percentage of secondary school enrollment rate. 
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Table 3.5: Financial development, financial harmonization and relative timing of adoption 
 
  
 Dependent Variables 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Financial 
development 
Financial 
development* 
Banking sector 
development 
Bond market 
development 
Stock market 
development 
      
Harmonization 0.305*** 0.549*** 0.360*** 0.0296 0.453*** 
 (3.801) (5.762) (4.319) (0.505) (6.450) 
 [0.0801] [0.0953] [0.0834] [0.0586] [0.0702] 
Harmonizationdif -0.116 -0.497*** -0.407** -0.0649 -0.321*** 
 (-0.838) (-3.682) (-2.777) (-0.631) (-3.558) 
 [0.138] [0.135] [0.146] [0.103] [0.0901] 
Government effectiveness -0.253 -0.272 -0.149 -0.00626 -0.324** 
 (-1.209) (-1.679) (-0.694) (-0.0350) (-2.121) 
 [0.209] [0.162] [0.215] [0.179] [0.153] 
Regulatory quality -0.479* -0.378 -0.262 -0.301 0.242 
 (-1.929) (-0.959) (-0.582) (-1.139) (0.713) 
 [0.248] [0.394] [0.450] [0.264] [0.339] 
Rule of law 0.904* 0.0529 0.714 0.723 -0.553** 
 (1.856) (0.124) (1.454) (1.032) (-2.068) 
 [0.487] [0.427] [0.491] [0.701] [0.267] 
Health 0.155** 0.0869 0.111 0.131** -0.0118 
 (2.540) (1.254) (1.465) (2.723) (-0.339) 
 [0.0610] [0.0694] [0.0760] [0.0480] [0.0348] 
Education 0.0116* 0.00297 0.00891 0.00900 -0.00621* 
 (1.986) (0.494) (1.511) (1.593) (-1.977) 
 [0.00583] [0.00600] [0.00590] [0.00565] [0.00314] 
      
Observations 141 194 196 209 288 
R-squared 0.721 0.728 0.629 0.339 0.517 
Number of countries 20 25 25 22 25 
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Note: t-statistics are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) and standard errors are in brackets. Financial development, Financial development*, 
Banking sector development, Bond market development and Stock market development are all indices calculated using principal components analysis.  
Harmonizationi,t = ln (1 + lexi,t ) where lexi,t represents the sum of all 27 directives which take on a value of 1 on and after the date that the directive under 
consideration goes into effect in that particular country, and a value of 0 otherwise. 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡 
where 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡 is the average harmonization across countries per year. Government effectiveness, Regulatory quality and Rule of law are legal 
and institutional variables taken from the Worldwide Governance Indicators, Health is the percentage of government expenditure that is devoted to public 
health, and Education is the gross percentage of secondary school enrollment rate. The regressions are estimated over 25 countries and 12 years. The 25 
European Union countries included are: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the UK. The estimation period in our regressions is 
1996 – 2007. The above estimations include country and time effects that are not reported here. t – statistics reported in the tables are based on country-
specific (clustered) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
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Table 3.6: Financial development and financial harmonization constructed using fractions 
 
  
 Dependent Variables 
           
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES Financial 
dev. 
Financial 
dev.* 
Banking 
sector dev. 
Bond 
market dev. 
Stock 
market dev. 
Financial 
dev. 
Financial 
dev.* 
Banking 
sector dev. 
Bond 
market dev. 
Stock 
market dev. 
           
Harmonization (Fractional) 0.247 0.00154 -0.165 -0.0242 0.201 -0.172 -0.128 -0.311 0.0911 0.0922 
 (1.156) (0.00683) (-0.696) (-0.258) (1.601) (-0.690) (-0.565) (-1.272) (0.755) (0.667) 
 [0.214] [0.225] [0.237] [0.0940] [0.126] [0.249] [0.226] [0.244] [0.121] [0.138] 
Harmonizationdif (Fractional)      0.248* 0.0180 0.0772 -0.0999 -0.0194 
      (1.873) (0.296) (1.094) (-1.331) (-0.435) 
      [0.133] [0.0609] [0.0705] [0.0750] [0.0447] 
Government effectiveness -0.222 -0.273 -0.156 -0.00599 -0.344** -0.0808 -0.303* -0.126 -0.0189 -0.370*** 
 (-1.086) (-1.674) (-0.724) (-0.0337) (-2.203) (-0.447) (-1.813) (-0.743) (-0.123) (-2.917) 
 [0.204] [0.163] [0.215] [0.178] [0.156] [0.181] [0.167] [0.170] [0.154] [0.127] 
Regulatory quality -0.499* -0.369 -0.226 -0.294 0.214 -0.370 -0.372 -0.367 -0.312 0.0951 
 (-1.950) (-0.929) (-0.501) (-1.100) (0.632) (-1.240) (-0.830) (-0.886) (-1.088) (0.425) 
 [0.256] [0.397] [0.451] [0.267] [0.339] [0.298] [0.448] [0.414] [0.286] [0.224] 
Rule of law 0.848* 0.0366 0.705 0.714 -0.532* 0.573 0.283 0.659 0.762 -0.217 
 (1.758) (0.0886) (1.454) (1.009) (-2.016) (1.070) (0.590) (1.321) (0.965) (-1.059) 
 [0.482] [0.414] [0.485] [0.708] [0.264] [0.536] [0.480] [0.499] [0.790] [0.205] 
Health 0.149** 0.0863 0.114 0.131** -0.0149 0.107* 0.0807 0.117 0.124** -0.0188 
 (2.426) (1.239) (1.531) (2.711) (-0.420) (1.841) (1.123) (1.475) (2.552) (-0.520) 
 [0.0616] [0.0696] [0.0745] [0.0482] [0.0355] [0.0581] 0.0718 [0.0790] [0.0484] [0.0362] 
Education 0.0110* 0.00273 0.00884 0.00907 -0.00634** 0.0131*** 0.00156 0.00908* 0.0105* -0.00618** 
 (2.035) (0.459) (1.506) (1.584) (-2.086) (4.573) (0.304) (1.873) (1.789) (-2.404) 
 [0.00543] [0.00595] [0.00587] [0.00572] [0.00304] [0.00286] [0.00511] [0.00485] [0.00585] [0.00257] 
           
Observations 141 194 196 209 288 115 157 157 178 246 
R-squared 0.718 0.727 0.630 0.338 0.517 0.720 0.658 0.606 0.358 0.458 
Number of countries 20 25 25 22 25 18 22 22 21 25 
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Note: t-statistics are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) and standard errors are in brackets. Financial development, Financial development*, Banking 
sector development, Bond market development and Stock market development are all indices calculated using principal components analysis.  
𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡(𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) =
𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡
∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑖,𝑡𝑡
 where lexi,t represents the sum of all 27 directives which take on a value of 1 on and after the date that 
the directive under consideration goes into effect in that particular country, and a value of 0 otherwise. Similarly the relative timing of adoption measure is 
constructed as 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑓(𝑓𝑟𝑎)𝑖,𝑡 =
(𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑙𝑒𝑥(𝑎𝑣𝑒)𝑖,𝑡)
∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑖,𝑡𝑡
 where lex(ave)I,t is the average of the sum of all 27 directives adopter per country across time. 
Government effectiveness, Regulatory quality and Rule of law are legal and institutional variables taken from the Worldwide Governance Indicators, Health is the 
percentage of government expenditure that is devoted to public health, and Education is the gross percentage of secondary school enrollment rate. The 
regressions are estimated over 25 countries and 12 years. The 25 European Union countries included are: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden and the UK. The estimation period in our regressions is 1996 – 2007. The above estimations include country and time effects that are not reported here. 
t – statistics reported in the tables are based on country-specific (clustered) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
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Table 3.7: Financial development, financial harmonization, with a different relative timing of adoption measure 
 
      
 Dependent Variables 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Financial 
development 
Financial 
development* 
Banking sector 
development 
Bond market 
development 
Stock market 
development 
      
Harmonization 0.301*** 0.535*** 0.348*** 0.0277 0.443*** 
 (3.878) (5.712) (4.283) (0.491) (6.428) 
 [0.0777] [0.0936] [0.0813] [0.0563] [0.0690] 
Harmonizationdif (Weighted) -0.112 -0.483*** -0.395** -0.0629 -0.311*** 
 (-0.838) (-3.682) (-2.777) (-0.631) (-3.558) 
 [0.134] [0.131] [0.142] [0.0998] [0.0875] 
Government effectiveness -0.253 -0.272 -0.149 -0.00626 -0.324** 
 (-1.209) (-1.679) (-0.694) (-0.0350) (-2.121) 
 [0.209] [0.162] [0.215] [0.179] [0.153] 
Regulatory quality -0.479* -0.378 -0.262 -0.301 0.242 
 (-1.929) (-0.959) (-0.582) (-1.139) (0.713) 
 [0.248] [0.394] [0.450] [0.264] [0.339] 
Rule of law 0.904* 0.0529 0.714 0.723 -0.553** 
 (1.856) (0.124) (1.454) (1.032) (-2.068) 
 [0.487] [0.427] [0.491] [0.701] [0.267] 
Health 0.155** 0.0869 0.111 0.131** -0.0118 
 (2.540) (1.254) (1.465) (2.723) (-0.339) 
 [0.0610] [0.0694] [0.0760] [0.0480] [0.0348] 
Education 0.0116* 0.00297 0.00891 0.00900 -0.00621* 
 (1.986) (0.494) (1.511) (1.593) (-1.977) 
 [0.00583] [0.00600] [0.00590] [0.00565] [0.00314] 
      
Observations 141 194 196 209 288 
R-squared 0.721 0.728 0.629 0.339 0.517 
Number of countries 20 25 25 22 25 
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Note: t-statistics are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) and standard errors are in brackets. Financial development, Financial development*, Banking 
sector development, Bond market development and Stock market development are all indices calculated using principal components analysis.  Harmonizationi,t = 
ln (1 + lexi,t ) where lexi,t represents the sum of all 27 directives which take on a value of 1 on and after the date that the directive under consideration goes into 
effect in that particular country, and a value of 0 otherwise. 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 − (∑ 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 × 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡𝑖 ) where 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 =
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡
∑ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑖
. 
Government effectiveness, Regulatory quality and Rule of law are legal and institutional variables taken from the Worldwide Governance Indicators, Health is the 
percentage of government expenditure that is devoted to public health, and Education is the gross percentage of secondary school enrollment rate. The 
regressions are estimated over 25 countries and 12 years. The 25 European Union countries included are: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden and the UK. The estimation period in our regressions is 1996 – 2007. The above estimations include country and time effects that are not reported here. 
t – statistics reported in the tables are based on country-specific (clustered) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
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Table 3.8: Financial development and financial harmonization; using a harmonization index of 21 directives 
 
      
 Dependent Variables 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Financial 
development 
Financial 
development* 
Banking sector 
development 
Bond market 
development 
Stock market 
development 
      
Harmonization (21 directives) 0.324*** 0.582*** 0.382*** 0.0310 0.480*** 
 (3.830) (5.761) (4.304) (0.499) (6.432) 
 [0.0846] [0.101] [0.0887] [0.0620] [0.0747] 
Harmonizationdif (21 directives) -0.123 -0.531*** -0.407** -0.0612 -0.366*** 
 (-0.862) (-3.786) (-2.725) (-0.561) (-3.872) 
 [0.143] [0.140] [0.149] [0.109] [0.0945] 
Government effectiveness -0.252 -0.272 -0.149 -0.00692 -0.324** 
 (-1.203) (-1.673) (-0.689) (-0.0386) (-2.124) 
 [0.209] [0.162] [0.216] [0.179] [0.153] 
Regulatory quality -0.478* -0.379 -0.266 -0.300 0.240 
 (-1.915) (-0.964) (-0.592) (-1.133) (0.705) 
 [0.249] [0.393] [0.450] [0.265] [0.340] 
Rule of law 0.913* 0.0538 0.721 0.719 -0.550* 
 (1.878) (0.126) (1.460) (1.027) (-2.057) 
 [0.486] [0.426] [0.494] [0.700] [0.267] 
Health 0.155** 0.0872 0.111 0.131** -0.0120 
 (2.535) (1.260) (1.458) (2.722) (-0.343) 
 [0.0612] [0.0692] [0.0763] [0.0480] [0.0349] 
Education 0.0117* 0.00297 0.00901 0.00901 -0.00626* 
 (1.992) (0.494) (1.525) (1.593) (-2.000) 
 [0.00587] [0.00602] [0.00590] [0.00565] [0.00313] 
      
Observations 141 194 196 209 288 
R-squared 0.721 0.728 0.628 0.339 0.516 
Number of countries 20 25 25 22 25 
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Note: t-statistics are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) and standard errors are in brackets. Financial development, Financial development*, 
Banking sector development, Bond market development and Stock market development are all indices calculated using principal components analysis.  
Harmonizationi,t = ln (1 + lexi,t ) where lexi,t represents the sum of all 21 directives, which take on a value of 1 on and after the date that the directive under 
consideration goes into effect in that particular country, and a value of 0 otherwise. This sum excludes the 6 directives implemented after 2003. 
𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡 where 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡 is the average harmonization across countries per year. 
Government effectiveness, Regulatory quality and Rule of law are legal and institutional variables taken from the Worldwide Governance Indicators, Health is 
the percentage of government expenditure that is devoted to public health, and Education is the gross percentage of secondary school enrollment rate. The 
regressions are estimated over 25 countries and 12 years. The 25 European Union countries included are: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden and the UK. The estimation period in our regressions is 1996 – 2007. The above estimations include country and time effects that are not 
reported here. t – statistics reported in the tables are based on country-specific (clustered) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
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Table 3.9: Financial development and financial harmonization; using a harmonization index of 7 banking directives 
 
      
 Dependent Variables 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Financial 
development 
Financial 
development* 
Banking sector 
development 
Bond market 
development 
Stock market 
development 
      
Harmonization (Banking directives) 0.494*** 0.865*** 0.568*** 0.0457 0.715*** 
 (3.838) (5.729) (4.320) (0.501) (6.487) 
 [0.129] [0.151] [0.131] [0.0912] [0.110] 
Harmonizationdif (Banking directives) -0.476** -0.747*** -0.662*** -0.111 -0.538*** 
 (-2.285) (-3.778) (-3.811) (-1.110) (-4.127) 
 [0.208] [0.198] [0.174] [0.0998] [0.130] 
Government effectiveness -0.222 -0.277 -0.146 -0.00129 -0.326** 
 (-0.977) (-1.702) (-0.676) (-0.00704) (-2.232) 
 [0.227] [0.163] [0.215] 0.182 [0.146] 
Regulatory quality -0.481* -0.374 -0.265 -0.308 0.274 
 (-1.959) (-0.939) (-0.596) (-1.172) (0.801) 
 [0.246] [0.399] [0.445] [0.263] [0.342] 
Rule of law 0.898* 0.0665 0.705 0.705 -0.543* 
 (1.818) (0.153) (1.467) (1.030) (-2.017) 
 [0.494] [0.436] [0.481] [0.685] [0.269] 
Health 0.151** 0.0880 0.111 0.131** -0.0130 
 (2.549) (1.278) (1.459) (2.681) (-0.385) 
 [0.0591] [0.0689] [0.0759] [0.0489] [0.0337] 
Education 0.0108* 0.00311 0.00883 0.00906 -0.00656* 
 (1.973) (0.528) (1.551) (1.604) (-2.051) 
 [0.00547] [0.00588] [0.00569] [0.00564] [0.00320] 
      
Observations 141 194 196 209 288 
R-squared 0.714 0.729 0.629 0.340 0.516 
Number of countries 20 25 25 22 25 
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Note: t-statistics are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) and standard errors are in brackets. Financial development, Financial development*, 
Banking sector development, Bond market development and Stock market development are all indices calculated using principal components analysis.  
Harmonizationi,t = ln (1 + lexi,t ) where lexi,t represents the sum of all 7 banking directives, which take on a value of 1 on and after the date that the directive 
under consideration goes into effect in that particular country, and a value of 0 otherwise. 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡 
where 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡 is the average harmonization across countries per year. Government effectiveness, Regulatory quality and Rule of law are legal 
and institutional variables taken from the Worldwide Governance Indicators, Health is the percentage of government expenditure that is devoted to public 
health, and Education is the gross percentage of secondary school enrollment rate. The regressions are estimated over 25 countries and 12 years. The 25 
European Union countries included are: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the UK. The estimation period in our regressions is 
1996 – 2007. The above estimations include country and time effects that are not reported here. t – statistics reported in the tables are based on country-
specific (clustered) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
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Table 3.10: Financial development, financial harmonization with legal origin dummies 
 
      
 Dependent Variables 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Financial 
development 
Financial 
development* 
Banking sector 
development 
Bond market 
development 
Stock market 
development 
      
Harmonization 0.364*** 0.500*** 0.435*** 0.0152 0.374*** 
 (4.620) (5.300) (4.640) (0.263) (4.786) 
 [0.0788] [0.0943] [0.0938] [0.0581] [0.0781] 
Harmonizationdif -0.0692 -0.355** -0.525*** 0.0767 -0.187 
 (-0.495) (-2.393) (-3.789) (0.654) (-1.562) 
 [0.140] [0.149] [0.139] [0.117] [0.119] 
Gov. effectiveness 0.0735 0.280 0.320 0.0736 0.271 
 (0.282) (1.101) (1.189) (0.393) (1.129) 
 [0.261] [0.254] [0.269] [0.187] [0.240] 
Regulatory quality 1.086*** 0.792*** 0.253 0.449*** 1.030*** 
 (5.042) (2.767) (0.989) (2.611) (4.696) 
 [0.215] [0.286] [0.256] [0.172] [0.219] 
Rule of law -0.434* -0.235 0.283 -0.522** -0.387 
 (-1.668) (-0.931) (1.055) (-2.304) (-1.569) 
 [0.260] [0.252] [0.268] [0.227] [0.246] 
Health 0.0352 0.0327 -0.105*** 0.113*** 0.0566** 
 (1.088) (1.128) (-3.961) (5.183) (2.338) 
 [0.0323] [0.0290] [0.0266] [0.0218] [0.0242] 
Education 0.00695* 0.00448 -0.00351 0.0119*** 0.00462 
 (1.905) (0.903) (-0.746) (3.676) (0.964) 
 [0.00365] [0.00496] [0.00471] [0.00324] [0.00479] 
Legal origin UK -2.264*** -1.736*** 1.201** -3.044*** -2.726*** 
 (-3.825) (-2.986) (2.129) (-6.600) (-5.158) 
 [0.592] [0.581] [0.564] [0.461] [0.529] 
Legal origin French -2.124*** -2.134*** 0.432 -2.688*** -2.586*** 
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 (-3.896) (-3.809) (0.773) (-5.638) (-4.764) 
 [0.545] [0.560] [0.559] [0.477] [0.543] 
Legal origin Socialist -3.537*** -3.492*** -1.132** -3.279*** -3.561*** 
 (-6.887) (-6.272) (-2.084) (-7.552) (-6.781) 
 [0.514] [0.557] [0.543] [0.434] [0.525] 
Legal origin German -2.427*** -2.540*** 0.759 -2.585*** -3.610*** 
 (-3.885) (-4.055) (1.286) (-5.226) (-6.340) 
 [0.625] [0.626] [0.590] [0.495] [0.569] 
Legal origin Scandinavian -2.287*** -2.639*** -0.220 -2.001*** -2.324*** 
 (-3.792) (-3.917) (-0.331) (-3.911) (-3.569) 
 [0.603] [0.674] [0.664] [0.512] [0.651] 
      
Observations 141 194 196 209 288 
R-squared 0.784 0.739 0.770 0.526 0.598 
 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) and standard errors are in brackets. Financial development, Financial development*, 
Banking sector development, Bond market development and Stock market development are all indices calculated using principal components analysis.  
Harmonizationi,t = ln (1 + lexi,t ) where lexi,t represents the sum of all 27 directives which take on a value of 1 on and after the date that the directive under 
consideration goes into effect in that particular country, and a value of 0 otherwise. 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡 
where 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡 is the average harmonization across countries per year. Government effectiveness, Regulatory quality and Rule of law are legal 
and institutional variables taken from the Worldwide Governance Indicators, Health is the percentage of government expenditure that is devoted to public 
health, and Education is the gross percentage of secondary school enrollment rate. Legal origin dummy variables provide the legal origins of the U.K., France, 
Socialist countries, Germany and Scandinavian countries respectively. The data for legal origins comes from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1999). The regressions are estimated over 25 countries and 12 years. The 25 European Union countries included are: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the UK. The estimation period in our regressions is 1996 – 2007. The above estimations include time fixed effects that are not 
reported here. t – statistics reported in the tables are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
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Table 3.11: Financial development, financial harmonization with crisis period data 
 
      
 Dependent Variables 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Financial 
development 
Financial 
development* 
Banking sector 
development 
Bond market 
development 
Stock market 
development 
      
Harmonization 0.360*** 0.367*** 0.529*** 0.142 0.173*** 
 (4.933) (6.301) (6.148) (1.586) (4.159) 
 [0.0730] [0.0583] [0.0860] [0.0895] [0.0417] 
Harmonizationdif -0.131 -0.310** -0.538*** -0.135 -0.0869 
 (-1.209) (-2.599) (-3.516) (-0.966) (-1.139) 
 [0.109] [0.119] [0.153] [0.140] [0.0763] 
Gov. effectiveness -0.222 -0.354** -0.373 -0.108 -0.297** 
 (-1.079) (-2.466) (-1.316) (-0.363) (-2.130) 
 [0.206] [0.144] [0.283] [0.298] [0.140] 
Regulatory quality -0.608*** -0.286 -0.335 -0.363 0.171 
 (-2.927) (-0.814) (-0.827) (-1.279) (0.553) 
 [0.208] [0.352] [0.405] [0.284] [0.310] 
Rule of law 0.365 0.210 0.886* 0.631 -0.476** 
 (1.200) (0.665) (1.846) (0.776) (-2.267) 
 [0.304] [0.317] [0.480] [0.812] [0.210] 
Health 0.00969 0.0197 0.0422 0.0368 -0.0181 
 (0.221) (0.467) (0.750) (0.776) (-0.529) 
 [0.0438] [0.0422] [0.0564] [0.0474] [0.0343] 
Education      0.00907*** 0.00443 0.0141** 0.00876 -0.00523 
 (3.140) (1.167) (2.180) (1.665) (-1.660) 
 [0.00289] [0.00379] [0.00645] [0.00526] [0.00315] 
      
Observations 180 234 236 270 360 
R-squared 0.786 0.747 0.688 0.347 0.485 
Number of countries 21 25 25 22 25 
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Note: t-statistics are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) and standard errors are in brackets. Financial development, Financial development*, 
Banking sector development, Bond market development and Stock market development are all indices calculated using principal components analysis.  
Harmonizationi,t = ln (1 + lexi,t ) where lexi,t represents the sum of all 27 directives which take on a value of 1 on and after the date that the directive under 
consideration goes into effect in that particular country, and a value of 0 otherwise. 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡 
where 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡 is the average harmonization across countries per year. Government effectiveness, Regulatory quality and Rule of law are legal 
and institutional variables taken from the Worldwide Governance Indicators, Health is the percentage of government expenditure that is devoted to public 
health, and Education is the gross percentage of secondary school enrollment rate. The regressions are estimated over 25 countries and 15 years. The 25 
European Union countries included are: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the UK. The estimation period in our regressions is 
1996 – 2010. The above estimations include country and time effects that are not reported here. t – statistics reported in the tables are based on country-
specific (clustered) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
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Table 3.12: Financial development, financial harmonization with crisis period data, interaction terms 
 
      
 Dependent Variables 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Financial 
development 
Financial 
development* 
Banking sector 
development 
Bond market 
development 
Stock market 
development 
      
Harmonization 0.458*** 0.529*** 0.382*** 0.102 0.440*** 
 (5.837) (6.827) (4.607) (1.353) (6.220) 
 [0.0784] [0.0775] [0.0828] [0.0752] [0.0707] 
Harmonizationdif -0.244** -0.485*** -0.420*** -0.100 -0.351*** 
 (-2.407) (-4.325) (-3.283) (-0.984) (-4.050) 
 [0.101] [0.112] [0.128] [0.102] [0.0866] 
Gov. effectiveness -0.182 -0.289* -0.104 0.119 -0.317** 
 (-1.000) (-2.058) (-0.496) (0.555) (-2.231) 
 [0.182] [0.140] [0.210] [0.215] [0.142] 
Regulatory quality -0.627** -0.435 -0.686 -0.364 0.189 
 (-2.694) (-1.056) (-1.561) (-1.342) (0.556) 
 [0.233] [0.412] [0.439] [0.271] [0.339] 
Rule of law 0.257 0.0590 0.615 0.521 -0.456** 
 (0.920) (0.183) (1.420) (0.823) (-2.240) 
 [0.279] [0.322] [0.433] [0.633] [0.204] 
Health 0.0675 0.0491 0.0817 0.0330 -0.0176 
 (1.524) (0.923) (1.258) (1.021) (-0.567) 
 [0.0443] [0.0532] [0.0650] [0.0323] [0.0311] 
Education 0.00879** 0.00377 0.0120** 0.00697 -0.00501** 
 (2.658) (0.956) (2.309) (1.405) (-2.081) 
 [0.00331] [0.00394] [0.00521] [0.00496] [0.00241] 
Crisis 26.14 23.49 17.03 -2.425 19.86 
 (1.087) (1.124) (0.812) (-0.176) (1.426) 
 [24.05] [20.89] [20.98] [13.77] [13.93] 
 -7.751 -7.199 -5.877 -0.149 -5.949 
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 (-1.058) (-1.127) (-0.913) (-0.0349) (-1.383) 
 [7.324] [6.389] [6.438] [4.263] [4.303] 
 11.06 9.120 5.253 0.707 5.872 
 (1.365) (1.222) (0.681) (0.158) (1.282) 
 [8.099] [7.464] [7.717] [4.476] [4.582] 
 -0.637* -0.430 -0.666 -0.160 -0.225 
 (-1.844) (-1.052) (-1.282) (-0.396) (-0.530) 
 [0.345] [0.409] [0.519] [0.404] [0.424] 
 0.662 0.694 1.515** 0.472 -0.328 
 (1.145) (0.887) (2.190) (1.091) (-0.690) 
 [0.578] [0.782] [0.692] [0.432] [0.476] 
 0.0599 -0.0685 -0.494 -0.325 0.507 
 (0.126) (-0.132) (-0.866) (-0.878) (1.171) 
 [0.474] [0.519] [0.570] [0.371] [0.433] 
 -0.0977*** -0.0771** -0.134** -0.0321 0.0256 
 (-3.349) (-2.606) (-2.721) (-0.702) (1.377) 
 [0.0292] [0.0296] [0.0493] [0.0458] [0.0186] 
 6.64e-05 0.00283 0.0378** 0.0334*** -0.0145 
 (0.00643) (0.173) (2.197) (3.170) (-1.492) 
 [0.0103] [0.0164] [0.0172] [0.0105] [0.00973] 
      
Observations 180 234 236 270 360 
R-squared 0.816 0.766 0.769 0.468 0.497 
Number of countries 21 25 25 22 25 
 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) and standard errors are in brackets. Financial development, Financial development*, 
Banking sector development, Bond market development and Stock market development are all indices calculated using principal components analysis.  
Harmonizationi,t = ln (1 + lexi,t ) where lexi,t represents the sum of all 27 directives which take on a value of 1 on and after the date that the directive under 
consideration goes into effect in that particular country, and a value of 0 otherwise. 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡 
where 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡 is the average harmonization across countries per year. Government effectiveness, Regulatory quality and Rule of law are legal 
and institutional variables taken from the Worldwide Governance Indicators, Health is the percentage of government expenditure that is devoted to public 
health, and Education is the gross percentage of secondary school enrollment rate. Crisis is an indicator that takes on a value of 1 on and after 2008 and a value 
of 0 otherwise. The regressions are estimated over 25 countries and 15 years. The 25 European Union countries included are: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, 
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Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the UK. The estimation period in our regressions is 1996 – 2010. The above estimations include country and time effects 
that are not reported here. t – statistics reported in the tables are based on country-specific (clustered) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
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Figure 3.1: Evolution of Financial Harmonization Policies across European Countries 
 
 
 
The figure above is generated in Stata and depicts the graphs for the harmonization index that is constructed using 27 directives of the Financial Services 
Action Plan and the harmonization average indicator which is the mean value of the harmonization index of 25 European countries per each year in our sample 
size. 
 
